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المجاري في مائة عام: تتبع آثار شبكة الصرف الصحي التاريخية لمدينة القاهرة

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مرت بهدوء متوقع في مارس الماضي مئوية مشروع أثر كثيراً على حياة القاهريين، ألا وهو مشروع الصرف الصحي لمدينة القاهرة، والذي تم افتتاحة في 22 مارس 1915. يتتبع هذا المقال المصور شبكة مجاري القاهرة ويلقي الضوء على تاريخها كما يتجول بصرياً بين بقاياها التي ترجع إلى عام 1915. يكشف المشروع الذي خططه وأشرف على تنفيذه المهندس الإنجليزي تشارلز كاركيت جيمس عن عدد من الإشكاليات الهامة لفهم تاريخ القاهرة في عصر الاحتلال البريطاني الرسمي (1882-1923)، فمن ناحية كان إنشاء شبكة الصرف الصحي ضرورة ملحة للحد من تأثير أوبئة الكوليرا التي كانت تفتك بمصر والقاهرة بصفة دورية خلال القرن التاسع عشر وحتى أول القرن العشرين، وبلا شك فقد أثر إنشاء المجاري إيجابياً على صحة القاهريين بشكل عام. ومن ناحية أخرى كان المشروع إيذاناً ببدء جدل محتدم عن حدود ما هو عام وما هو خاص، وعن الصحة كمسئولية الدولة ومهمة ملقاة على عاتقها، فتم تسييس مسألة الصحة في خضم تصعيد التحدي ضد الاستعمار قبل ثورة ١٩١٩. عبّر المشروع أيضا عن تنافس رأس المال ودوره في إعادة تشكيل المدن، نظراً لتكاليف المشروع الباهظة، وما سببه ذلك من تنافس حاد بين شركات المقاولات البريطانية والألمانية والفرنسية، كما عبر بشكل أوسع عن تناول مختلف من قبل الإدارة البريطانية لسياسات العمران وظهور المدينة في مصر كإشكالية بعد أن كانت في المخيلة البريطانية بلداً زراعياً بالأساس. كان إنشاء شبكة الصرف الصحي في القاهرة جزءاً من مشروع بريطاني لإدخال القاهرة في الحداثة.

يقول فيكتور هوجو في روايته الشهيرة "البؤساء" بأن "تاريخ الإنسانية ينعكس في تاريخ مجاريها"، فمثلا قارن هوجو بين مجاري باريس القديمة كمكان كانت تُنْسَج عنه أساطير بأنه خطر ومخيف، بل وكموقع لمؤمرات سياسية أو مجموعات ثورية، وبين مجاري باريس الجديدة، مجاري المهندس البارون هوسمان التي تم انجازها منذ ١٨٥٠، فهي "نظيفة، باردة، مستقيمة، وصحيحة" بشكل يعكس تصورات مهندسها عن ما يجب أن تكون عليه المدينة، بل المجتمع ككل. فتعكس المجاري الجديدة بالنسبة لهوجو هزيمة معينة لثورات ١٨٣٢ و١٨٤٨ وتشكل النظام السياسي القمعي الجديد للإمبراطورية الثانية تحت قيادة نابليون الثالث. شبكة المجاري هنا هي إحدى رموز الحداثة والسلطوية في ذات الوقت، فهي من ناحية تشير إلى التطور التكنولوجي والعلمي القادر على مكافحة الأوبئة التي كانت تفتك بالمدينة كما تبلور تغير علاقة سكان المدينة بجسدهم وبمعايير النظافة الجسدية، ومن ناحية أخري فهي جزء من مشروع سياسي قمعي.  (1)     

كثيراً ما يتم سرد تاريخ القاهرة في فترة الاحتلال الإنجليزي كحقبة "جميلة"، ولكن ما تغفله هذه السردية هي أن  جمال بعض أحياء القاهرة، بل إن حياة الرفاهية التي كان من الممكن للصفوة والأجانب أن يعيشوها في المدينة مبنية على، بل وتتطلب، وضعاً استعمارياً وطبقياً تعيش فيه الطبقات الدنيا في المجتمع ومعظمها من المصريين في أحياء فقيرة مهملة. ببساطة تغفل هذه السردية أن رفاهية الحقبة الجميلة هي الجانب الآخر لسياسة إفقار كولونيالية. من المفهوم إذاً أن تركز سردية القاهرة الجميلة على عمران الرفاهة، أي على الأحياء الجديدة الراقية مثل الإسماعيلية (حالياً وسط البلد) وبعدها هليوبوليس والمعادي وجاردن سيتي. إذا أخذنا  هوجو على محمل الجد، فكيف ينعكس تاريخ القاهرة في تاريخ مجاريها؟ بدلاً من قاهرة "الحقبة الجميلة"، تظهر الآن القاهرة كشبكة كثيفة من المواسير المترابطة، القاهرة كنظام أو كشيء كلي. بمعني آخر تظهر المدينة كحقل للتدخل  الإداري الذي يريد فهم وإعادة تشكيل والتحكم في المدينة ككل بل وفي مستقبلها، فتظهر المدينة أيضا كموضوع للتخطيط وللهندسة الاجتماعية.

 

[ رسم هندسي لعنبر الرفع الرئيسي سنة ١٩١٢ وعليها إمضاء المهندس الإنجليزي تشارلز كاركيت جيمس]

إنشاء شبكة صرف صحي لأول مرة في أي مدينة ليس بالأمر السهل فهو بمثابة إقامة مدينة كاملة مدفونة تحت الأرض ولكنها تعكس ما فوقها، أو بالأحرى تترجم عالم المدينة الفوقي المعقد إلى مفردات قليلة: مواسير، مياه، فضلات، بلاعات، كثافة، سرعة، ماكينات رفع، مضخات، مصبات. كان المشروع في وقتها يُعد أضخم مشروع عمراني يتم تنفيذه في القاهرة أو في المدن المصرية كافة ليس فقط من حيث تكاليفه الباهظة حيث تكلف قرابة ما تكلفه إنشاء سد أسوان في ١٩٠٢، ولكنه أيضا تطلب إنتاج وتجميع معلومات دقيقة عن المدينة على نطاق غير مسبوق. فتم انتاج وتنسيق وجدولة معلومات عن الأحياء والشوارع وعن أهل المدينة والأنماط المختلفة لإستهلاكهم ومعيشتهم، كما تم رسم خرائط لمدينة القاهرة على درجات غاية في الدقة. كل هذا كان خطوة ضرورية لإعادة إنتاج المدينة والتدخل في "وظائفها الحيوية" بطرق جديدة أكثر قدرة على السيطرة على المدينة وعلى مستقبلها.      

رحلة إلى آثار شبكة الصرف الصحي

شبكة المجاري هي تكنولوجيا معقدة في الإخفاء، بالتعريف هي شيء لا يتعامل معه ساكنو المدن بشكل مباشر، فهي عالم معظمه تحت الأرض، أما ما فوقه فلم يره أو يتعامل معه الكثيرون. يتتبع هذا المقال المصور آثار، أو بالأحرى حطام وبقايا مشروع الصرف الصحي للقاهرة كما قامت بإنشائه الإدارة البريطانية عام ١٩١٥. بتعبير آخر، يرصد هذا المقال إحدى بقايا مشروع التحديث البريطاني للقاهرة. مثل البواكي أو محطات القطار أو المستشفيات، عبرت مباني شبكة الصرف الصحي بأشكال مختلفة عن الأساطير الجديدة التي تخلقها الحداثة.  

بدأت تتبع آثار مجاري القاهرة باستخدام أول خريطة لشبكة الصرف الصحي للمدينة، وهي خريطة صنعت للمشروع أثناء تنفيذه عام ١٩١١، فالمشروع جزء من رسالة دكتوراه أقوم بتحضيرها عن تطور القاهرة العمراني في فترة الاحتلال البريطاني. منذ سنوات، لفت نظري موقع محطة الرفع الأساسية للمشروع في ما كان يسمي ب "كفر الجاموس" وقدرت أنه هذا ما كان يطلق على منطقة عين شمس حالياً حينما كانت بالأساس أراض زراعية على الحدود ما بين محافظتي القاهرة والقليوبية. بعدها بفترة نجحت باستخدام برنامج لنظم المعلومات الجغرافية في تحديد موقع المحطة بدقة، فبدت بالفعل موجودة في عين شمس على امتداد شارع الأربعين وبمحاذاة خط سكة حديد لنقل الجنود. ذهبت إلى موقع المحطة وبمجرد المشي حول سور المحطة لفت انتباهي مساحتها الكبيرة وأنها محاطة بالعمارات السكنية التي يظهر طوبها الأحمر مثل الكثير من العمارات في الأحياء الشعبية. ثم ظهر من خلف السور عنبر الرفع القديم وتأكدت تماماً أنني في المكان الصحيح، وإلا فماذا يفعل هذا المبنى القديم ذو الطراز الإنجليزي الصناعي داخل أعماق عين شمس؟!  لم أستطع يومها الدخول إلى أرض المحطة ونصحني أمن المحطة بالذهاب إلى مقر الشركة في شارع رمسيس للحصول على التصاريح اللازمة للدخول. (2)    


[عنبر الرفع الرئيسي بمحطة كفر الجاموس من أعلى إحدى العمارات المجاورة، وتظهر في الصورة مدخنة العنبر حيث كانت ماكينات الرفع تعمل بالمازوت كما يظهر على اليسار برج مياه تبريد الماكينات. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي]

مقر الشركة بشارع رمسيس: محطة رفع مياه الأمطار

ذهبت إلى مقر شركة الصرف الصحي بالقاهرة الكبرى للحصول علي التصاريح السالف ذكرها، وبمجرد العبور من السور إلى داخل المقر ترى على اليمين مبنى ملوناً بالأحمر والأبيض على الطراز الإنجليزي يقف في تباين واضح عما حوله. كان المبنى في المشروع الأصلي عنبراً مخصصاً لرفع مياه الأمطار وصبها في النيل إذا زادت الأمطار عن حد معين. في عام ١٩١٠، حينما كان المشروع قيد المراحل الأولية للتنفيذ، حدثت بالتوازي أزمة حول نقاء وطعم مياه الشرب في القاهرة، تم على إثرها تغيير نظام المجاري للنظام الموحد حيث تصب مياه الشوارع ومخلفات البيوت والمنشآت في نفس المواسير بحيث لا يصل أي مصدر تلوث لمياه النيل. ولكن في حالة الأمطار الشديدة تعتبر مياه الشوارع نقية بما يكفي لصبها في النيل.

     

[ عنبر رفع مياه الأمطار داخل مقر الشركة. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي]

محطة كفر الجاموس (عين شمس)

عبر طرق كثيرة مرسومة بعناية ستصل حتماً إلى هنا فضلات كل ساكني القاهرة، فهذه هي محطة رفع كفر الجاموس وهي محطة الرفع الرئيسية في المشروع الأصلي، ومن هناك يتم ضخ الصرف الصحي للمدينة بأكملها عبر ماسورة رافعة طولها ١١.٧ كم في اتجاه المصب النهائي، أي محطة تنقية ومزرعة الجبل الأصفر. تصل الفضلات إلى عنبر الرفع بكفر الجاموس عن طريق وسيلتين أساسيتين. الأولى إذا كانت قادمة من أي حي بين الظاهر وبولاق شمالاً والسيدة عائشة شرقاً ومصر القديمة جنوباً، فيتم رفعها عبر مضخات صغيرة  (عددها الإجمالي ٦٣) إلى ماسورة الميل الأساسية المتجهة إلى كفر الجاموس، والتي كما يشير اسمها تدفع مياه الصرف الصحي فقط عن طريق ميل الماسورة. أما الأحياء الجديدة نسبيا في الشمال الشرقي مثل العباسية والقبة وهليوبوليس والزيتون والحلمية والمطرية فكانت تصب مخلفاتها في ماسورة الميل الأساسية مباشرة. وقد تغيرت هذه التفاصيل كثيراً مع التعديلات التي طرأت على شبكة الصرف الصحي منذ أواخر العقد الثالت من القرن العشرين.    

من الملاحظات المدهشة الاهتمام الشديد بجماليات مباني ومنشآت الصرف الصحي في أواخر القرن التاسع عشر وبدايات القرن العشرين والذي لم يكن بأي حال مقتصراً على تجربة الصرف الصحي في القاهرة. فمثلاً، اهتم البارون هوسمان كثيراً بجمال مجاري باريس لدرجة أنه كانت هناك رحلات في عربات مخصصة داخل المواسير والغرف الكبيرة تحت الأرض، وحتى الآن يوجد متحف مخصص لمجاري باريس. (3) أما في لندن فيحتوي عنبر رفع شبكة المجاري الأولى التي تم إنشاؤها تحت إشراف المهندس جوزيف بازلجيت في ١٨٦٥ على كم كبير من الزخارف التفصيلية ذات الأسلوب الأسباني المغربي (Moorish) هذا إلى جانب الاهتمام الشديد بجمال المبنى من الخارج، والذي تحول أيضا إلى مزار سياحي. (4) أما في محطة كفر الجاموس، فلك أن تتخيل فخامة العنبر من الداخل بمجرد النظر إلى بواباته ونوافذه وما تبقى من القيشاني (البلاط). يعكس هذا الاهتمام بجماليات مباني الصرف الصحي الرغبة في إظهار شبكة المجاري كمكان نظيف وآمن لتفنيد فكرة أنه مكان خطير وبعيد عن مراقبة الدولة، إلا أن الأمر لا يخلو من سخرية ما، فكيف لأماكن تجمع ومرور براز مدن بأكملها أن تكون بمثل هذا الطابع الجمالي المتحفي؟! ولماذا يُمنح هذا الطابع المتحفي لأماكن لا يدخلها جمهور حقيقي؟!   

 

[ عنبر الرفع من الداخل: العنبر لا يعمل حاليا وكما يتضح من الصور فالمبنى مهجور تماماً باستثناء ورشة صغيرة. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي] 

[ داخل عنبر الرفع. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي] 

[ داخل عنبر الرفع. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي] 

[تظهر الدقة والعناية في تشييد العنبر حتى بعد عشرات السنين من عدم استخدامه. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي] 

 

[ عنبر الرفع من الخارج. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي]

[ صورة أخرى لعنبر الرفع من الخارج. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي]

محطة تنقية ومزرعة الجبل الأصفر، الخانكة

لهذه المزرعة - التي كانت مملوكة من قبل شركة الصرف الصحي - تاريخ طويل يرجع إلى قبل إنشائها. فمن الأساس، وجود مزرعة تابعة لمصلحة ثم شركة الصرف الصحي ليس بالأمر البديهي. في الحقيقة ترتبط فكرة المزرعة بتاريخ فكرة إعادة تدوير الفضلات أو الحلم الطوباوي بأن التقدم التكنولوجي سوف يتيح للبشرية أن تسد حاجتها الغذائية فقط من "مخلفاتها" دون عناء أو عمل حقيقي. ظهرت الفكرة بوضوح بين السان سيمونيين والاشتراكيين الطوباويين في فرنسا في القرن التاسع عشر حيث ذهب بيير لوروا مثلا أنه في وقت قريب سيصير بالإمكان ميكنة عملية تحويل البراز إلى مواد غذائية وبذلك تكون البشرية قد أبطلت إلى الأبد أطروحة مالتوس عن الزيادة السكانية، إن لم تكن قد أبطلت مفاهيم العمل والقيمة التي تعمل بها الرأسمالية ككل.(5)كما انتشرت فكرة مشابهة ولكن ذات طابع أكثر "عملية" في انجلترا في العصر الڤيكتوري، حينما بلغت الثقة في العلم والتكنولوجيا ذروتها كعلاج للإشكاليات الاجتماعية والسياسية. تقول الفكرة إن التقدم التكنولوجي الأوروبي سيحول دون ألا يكون لكل الموارد الطبيعية نفع. التكنولوجيا هنا ليست فقط تنتج كثيراً ولكنها تنقذ المخلفات من لانفعيتها، فهي تحولها إلى قيمة وإلى سلعة داخل نظام التراكم الرأسمالي. ارتبطت هذه الفكرة بالإمبراطورية حيث تمت إعادة فهم الاستعمار كواجب أخلاقي أوروبي تجاه كلٍّ من "الحضارة" والطبيعة، فهو يحمي موارد الطبيعة من أنماط الاستخدام غير المسؤولة "لمن هم أقل تحضراً" ويستغلها بشكل رشيد وفعال. كما ارتبطت الفكرة بكتابات تمجيد المهندسين وبتدشين أخلاقيات العمل والهمة والاعتماد على الذات تحت مسمى "مساعدة الذات" (self-help) التي عبرت في النصف الثاني من القرن التاسع عشر عن وجهة نظر طبقة الرأسماليين الصناعيين في كيفية تقليل اللافائدة الاجتماعية وفي كيفية تحسين الإنسان من نفسه وحده، بعيداً عن السياسة وتحت كل شروط الرأسمالية. أي بمعنى آخر: "لا تترك نفسك تتحول إلى مخلفات بلا فائدة".(6)

كانت مزارع الصرف الصحي في العالم هي إحدى التطبيقات العملية لهذه الأفكار، فقد قدر كاركيت جيمس أن المزرعة الملحقة بمحطة تنقية الجبل الأصفر والمقامة على مساحة تزيد عن ٣ آلاف فدان سوف تقوم على الأقل بتغطية كل تكاليف الصيانة الدورية اللازمة للمشروع عن طريق الري بمياه الصرف الصحي المعالجة. وقد تم بالفعل تشكيل لجنة زراعية (جلس بها أحد أكبر خبراء الزراعة العلمية الإنجليز) لبحث مايمكن زراعته هناك في ١٩١٢. بعد احاطة المزرعة بسور من مصدات الرياح مثل أشجار الكافور والكازورينا، استمرت المزرعة في إنتاج الموالح بل والبيكانز (Pecans) حتى قرار وزير الزراعة السابق أمين أباظة لسنة ٢٠٠٩ بمنع الزراعة بمياه الصرف الصحي سواء المعالجة أو غير المعالجة. ومنذ هذا القرار عصفت بالمزرعة الخلافات بين وزارة الزراعة وشركة الصرف الصحي كما اتُهم الفلاحون المستأجرون بالري بمياه الصرف الصحي غير المعالجة وبزراعة محاصيل غير ملائمة.

أخيرا، هل كان اختيار موقع مصب الصرف الصحي بجوار كلٍّ من سجن أبو زعبل ومستشفى الخانكة للأمراض العقلية محض صدفة؟ هل يمكننا النظر إلى هذه البقعة كمنفى؟ وكأن المجتمع  يلفظ في مكان واحد ما يعتبره أخطاراً على النظام الاجتماعي والبيولوجي أو ربما أيضاً لاوعيه وما يريد أن ينساه - فضلات وخارجين عن القانون وخارجين عن معايير المجتمع للسلامة النفسية.

 

[ عنبر محطة توليد الكهرباء التابع لمحطة تنقية ومزرعة الجبل الأصفر. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي] 

[ لوحة داخل عنبر توليد الكهرباء. "وزارة الأشغال العمومية/مجاري القاهرة-محطة الكهرباء/تم افتتاح هذا المبنى وتشغيل الماكينات في ٢٢ مارس ١٩١٥/من قبل إسماعيل سري باشا/ وزير الأشغال العمومية/ونائب وزير الخارجية مردوك ماكدونالد/والمهندس المشرف كاركيت جيمس/ومهندس المحطة لويد/المقاولون/الماكينات: ساير وكولي، القاهرة/المباني: فيرجارا وبودروكو". تصوير أحمد الغنيمي]

[ بداية مزرعة الجبل الأصفر حيث تظهر أشجار مصدات الرياح. تصوير أحمد الغنيمي] 

[ صورة لأحواض الترسيب الأصلية لمحطة التنقية تظهر فيها إحدى ماكينات الكشط الأصلية التابعة للمشروع ومكتوب عليها "وليام فارير ليميتد/مهندسون/لندن-برمنجهام". تصوير أحمد الغنيمي]

 

[فيديو: تنظيف لوحة عنبر توليد الكهرباء]

خاتمة

يأتي هذا المقال بمناسبة مئوية مجاري القاهرة، لكنه ليس احتفاءً مطلقاً بهذا المشروع، وأرجو أن أكون قد وفقت في توضيح بعض الإشكاليات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية التي رافقت المشروع قبل وأثناء تنفيذه. ما أود أن أقوله هو أن تشكل القاهرة كمساحة لتدخل السلطة تكنولوجياً ومعرفياً تم جزئياً من خلال مشاريع مثل هذه وغيرها من المشاريع الكبرى، بطرق رسمت مستقبل المدينة ومستقبل صراعاتها وعلاقة القاهريين بالسلطة وبأجسادهم.

قررت بمناسبة المئوية تتبع ما تبقى من مشروع المجاري الأصلي بدلا من فقط الكتابة عن تاريخه، واستنطاق ما تبقى من هذه المباني لتتحدث عن تاريخها، فأخذتني الرحلة إلى عين شمس والخانكة وكان من المدهش أن أرى بالفعل المنشآت التي قرأت عنها كثيراً، بقايا مشروع التحديث البريطاني. رأيت هذه المنشآت في مناطق لا يذهب إليها الكثير من القاهريين غير سكانها إلا لتقضية أعمال أو ربما لزيارة أهل أو أقارب، وأكد لي هذا أن المدينة مدهشة بالفعل على الرغم من الصعوبات التي يروق للكثير من القاهريين الشكوى منها.


Protests in Beirut: Quick Background and Some Videos

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Updated: 11pm Sunday 23 August (Beirut Time)

For the second night in a row protestors have clashed with riot police and armed forces in downtown Beirut. Yesterday security forces attempted to violently disperse protestors at a demonstration called for by the You Stink movement using water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets. In response, Lebanese television stations reported that over fifteen thousand people from all over the country congregated in downtown Beirut to continue to demand accountability for government and elite corruption, a plan to provide affordable and reliable public goods (garbage disposal, running water, and electricity), and the immediate resignation of the Lebanese government. In solidarity with protestors in Beirut, protests were held in the northern city of Tripoli and the southern city of Nabatieh and several major highways across the country were shut down by citizens.

The Lebanese government is currently a caretaker government, one that lacks electoral legitimacy due to the illegal extension of the current parliament’s term and the deferral of parliamentary elections that were scheduled for 2014. In addition to the lack of an elected parliament, there has been a presidential vacuum for over a year. 

As of writing, downtown Beirut is a battlefield between protestors and security forces. Over thirty protesters have been injured—many critically— in violent altercations with security forces and brutal methods of dispersal. The YouStink movement is alleging that “baltagia” or “thugs” allied to established political leaders and parties have infiltrated the protest and used violence—including throwing Molotov cocktails— against security forces in order to discredit their political demands. Other protestors are suggesting that the violent altercations are not due to infiltrators, but are rather due to protestors reacting to government-ordered brutal anti-demonstration measures and a lack of clear cohesion in protestors' demands.  These security measures include storming, beating, throwing stones and firing tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets.

As of yet, no Lebanese government official has resigned. Another protest has been called for tomorrow. There are unconfirmed reports of a protestor dyring from his wounds.

Original Post 3am Sunday August 23 (Beirut Time)

On Saturday 22 August 2015 thousands of people rallied in Beirut to protest political and economic corruption and the dismal state of public utility services in Lebanon. The lack of reliable basic services in the country, including water, electricity, and garbage pickup, has a long history that was exacerbated by the civil war, the subsequent political settlements, and periodic Israeli military strikes. The failure to provide reliable and affordable public services to the entire country has been a feature of every post-independencen government formed.

Saturday’s demonstration was organized by the "You Stink" campaign. But it was also galvanized by the police brutality that protestors were subjected to on 19 August at a similar protest. Videos from that demonstration show Lebanese security forces charging at and beating protestors with batons while dressed in riot gear. The videos went viral, and when combined with organizing efforts, resulted in thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets today, Saturday 22 August 2015.

The protestors gathered in downtown Beirut near the parliament building, an area that has become the central arena of political protests in Lebanon since 2005. They are demanding that the Lebanese government resign, and that the corruption that plagues the country’s services be made public and addressed. Today, the protestors were again met with police brutality, this time with batons, water canons, tear gas, and rubber bullets. In addition to barricading parts of the downtown area, the government also deployed the army. As of writing, protestors are still trying to hold their ground in downtown Beirut as Lebanese security forces and military forces continue to brutalize them.

The “You Stink” campaign is a grassroots activist network that arose out of public frustration and anger over the trash buildup in Beirut in particular and Lebanon more generally in July 2015. During this month, garbage collection stopped in Beirut as activitsts and residents successfully blocked access to the landfill that had been dangerously filled to over capacity. This landfill began functioning in 1997 as a “temporary” solution to Lebanon’s garbage. In 2014 the government had made promises to find an alternative when residents also succeeded in blocking access to the landfill. Yet the government failed to find a solution, and there is very little indication that it even attempted to do so. In July 2015, after the garbage had not been picked up in Beirut for weeks, the government began trucking and dumping trash to and in towns and municipalities outside of Beirut without the consent (and sometimes knowledge) of the residents of those municipalities. This was the overall context within which “You Stink” campaing mobilized.

Follow #youstink via Facebook and Twitter to get updates. 

Videos from Saturday's Protest and Government Repression

Overhead shot showing water cannons pushing back protesters: 
https://www.facebook.com/faribodar/videos/10153111578278977/

Security Forces threating protesters with gun fire:
https://www.facebook.com/Zaynoun/videos/10153548422469841/

Video from Previous Protest (19 August)

One of the videos that went viral:
https://www.facebook.com/tol3etre7etkom/videos/1628085397453575/?pnref=story
 

 

Lebanon, August 2015: Notes on Paralysis, Protests, and Hope

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The past ten years in Lebanon have been a study in political paralysis and escalating anger and frustration among citizens and residents of the country. To recap only the most basic of facts, since 2005 the country divided and polarized into two “camps”—March 14 and March 8, led by the Future Movement and Hezbollah, respectively. In these ten years there has been a war with Israel, armed clashes between these two camps, and a series of political assassinations. These years have also brought the military destruction of a refugee camp (Nahr Al-Bared), armed clashes between the army and Islamists in Saida and Tripoli, a war in Syria that has again polarized the population, a series of bombings by radical Islamist groups across the country, and an ongoing war against ISIS in the north of the country. Lebanon has become a front in the international war on terror, according to the US, Israel, and the Lebanese government. Politicians have failed to form governments, leading to power vacuums and a series of caretaker governments and the degradation of government services and institutions. There has been a presidential vacuum for over fourteen months, and Parliament has illegally extended its own term twice so far. In short, there is no legitimately elected political representation in the country. 

The number of citizens residing in Lebanon is approximately four million. In addition to these citizens, there are over two million refugees from Syria, Palestine, Sudan and Iraq currently struggling to live under conditions of structural impoverishment and segregation. There are hundreds of thousands of migrant and domestic laborers also struggling to live in Lebanon, often under structural conditions of servitude. Over thirty percent of Lebanese citizens live at or below the poverty line, and a sliver of the population control the majority of spending power. The sharpest line dividing the population of Lebanon is not sect, as many (and certainly politicians) would argue, but class.

During these ten years one thing has remained constant: corruption, cronyism, nepotism and ineptitude at the government level. Corruption and cronyism—in addition to liberal and, later, neoliberal economic policies and patriarchal masculinism— are in fact what unites the political class. The history of this ruling ideology—and its manifestations as sectarian discourse—is as old as the Lebanese state itself. In fact, sectarian discourse has been the cloak behind which politicians hide their unified stance when it comes to their parasitic relationship to the state and its citizens. Lebanese politicians have for years proven that corruption knows no sect, no political party, and no ideology. 

For the past week protestors have been clashing with riot police and armed forces in downtown Beirut.  Thousands of citizens and residents were galvanized into participation when footage of police brutality at a protest on August 19, 2015 went viral. Since that day, there have been almost daily protests bringing up to fifteen thousand people to downtown Beirut in order to protest political and economic corruption and the dismal state of public services in Lebanon. Almost five hundred protestors have been injured by the brutality of the armed forces and received medical attention since the protests began. Every day people go to meet the securitized face of the state: brutal men armed with guns, barbed wire, water cannons and batons. These men (and a few women) in uniform are the representations and protectors of an even more brutal political and economic system. In spite of this, protestors in Lebanon have proven that the state does not control the streets. The political class has failed in its aim to control hearts, minds, and fists.  

The lack of basic services in Lebanon, including running potable water, sewage, communications, electricity, and garbage pickup, has a long history. The the criminal negligence of the state was exacerbated by the 1975-1990 civil war and the subsequent political settlements, in addition to periodic Israeli air raids. No government has ever succeeded in providing reliable and affordable public services to the entire country. Only the rich (including the politicians) can fully circumvent the lack of public goods and resources in Lebanon. The majority of the population lives and suffers through daily electricity cuts, water shortages, exorbitant phone and internet prices. Even the rich, however, cannot avoid the toxic and mountainous trash buildups throughout the country.

The protests of today were born out of frustration and anger over the trash buildup in Beirut and Lebanon in July 2015. During this month garbage collection stopped in Beirut as citizens and residents successfully closed a landfill that had been dangerously filled to over capacity. This landfill that began functioning in 1997 as a “temporary” solution to Lebanon’s garbage. In 2014 the government had made promises to find an alternative when residents previously blocked access to the landfill, but no action was taken. The government failed to find a solution. In July 2015, after the garbage had not been picked up in Beirut for weeks, the government began trucking and dumping this trash to and in towns and municipalities around Beirut without the consent (or sometimes knowledge) of the residents of those municipalities. The country, quite literally, was turned into a mass garbage dump by the inactions and corruption of the ruling state-business elite. People are living among the waste of the system. The most vulnerable, the homeless (most of them refuges from war torn Syria) are literally living within it.

The mobilization and commitment of today’s protestors grows and builds upon previous networks of activism. These previous movements include “Isqat al-Nizam”, "Take Back Parliament", anti-sectarian and civil marriage movements, and feminist activism against domestic violence, police negligence, and female second class citizenship. In addition, in recent years labor and teacher union strikes— in addition to electricity workers strikes – have mobilized thousands of participants in recent years. 

Each protest is increasingly larger and more diverse than its predecessor, and is met with escalating violence by armed forces.  Initially organized by the YouStink movement, the protest movement has grown out of their control. And that is perhaps a good thing: everyone in Lebanon is affected, even if unevenly so, by the lack of basic public services. In order for this uprising to succeed in its stated goals—the resignation of the current caretaker government— mass mobilization is required.  And herein lies the glitch: Lebanon is a country ridden with class and sectarian tension, phobia, and bias. A politics of respectability urges non-violence, nationalist chanting, and is generally tied to the ngo-ization of civil society and of activism in Lebanon.  Within this discourse of respectability violence, swearing, and the destruction of public property are considered illegitimate actions. Importantly, these discourses of respectability and vulgarity are classed and gendered, as Paul Amar has argued in the case of Egypt and Brazil. In Lebanon, these discourses also intersect with sectarianism, such that groups of young men with covered faces throwing rocks or Molotov cocktails at police are immediately assumed to belong to a particular class, sect, and form of masculinity. They are assumed to blindly follow the orders of sectarian leadership, in this case those of the president of parliament and leader of the Shiite Amal movement, Nabih Berri. They are the purported zombie army of sectarianism, the danger that will befall the country if the system of rule is removed.

Lebanese media pose these young men as “hooligans” or “dogs,” in diametrical opposition to the non-sectarian, educated, independent thinking, middle class and non-violent protestors. The license given to armed forces to break their bones and bodies is more generous than the license given regarding the bones of “peaceful protestors.” These are discourses on masculinity that proliferate across borders in the twinned eras of the war on terror and of neoliberal securitization. They intersect and traffic alongside discourses on sectarianism, masculinity and violence in Lebanon.

Perhaps there are infiltrators within the movement, whether the police send them or this or that political/sectarian party sends them. But if there are infiltrators, they are representing the entire system of corruption and unaccountability that unites the entire political class.  No amount of “violent instigation” can explain the hundreds of injuries the police have inflicted on protestors. Blaming protestors for “instigating violence” while facing down riot cops carrying guns and batons is akin to blaming stone throwing youth in Palestine for the disproportionate responses of the Israeli army. It misplaces the responsibility of violence and gives a discursive alibi to disproportionate state violence. The corruption and negligence of the state and ruling elite, tied to the extreme class polarization and segregation throughout the country, must be understood as forms of structural violence in and of themselves. The author of the violence manifesting itself on Lebanon’s streets today is clear, and it is not the protestors.

Many on the ground protestors and commentators have refused to play into the divide and conquer attitudes of politicians. They have refused the corrosive and overwhelming power of sectarian and class discourses in Lebanon. The protestors have rightfully refused the condescending calls of support by this or that politician, the bickering of the political class over who is to blame and the pointing of fingers.  The movement is growing, and there are reports that labor unions may join the protest scheduled for Saturday, August 29. The movement grows with every broken bone or bruised cheek, with every arrest, every detainee gone missing in police custody. With every joke of a “solution” (the latest being the tranformation of akkar, one of the most impoverished of Leabnon's municipalitiesinto Beirut’s garbage dump) offered by politicians, the movement fiercer. What started off as a protest movement over basic public services may prove to be much more than even organizers had dared imagine.

Hope is an uncomfortable feeling for many living and breathing the Middle East since the uprisings began in 2010. Hope is a risky investment, and this is no different in Lebanon—a country that has been in a seemingly permanent state of war since its independence in 1943. But for the past week, protestors have succeeded in shattering that stubborn myth about Lebanon: that it is a liberal laissez faire broken state. That Lebanon is the only Arab state where citizens have and exercise the right to protest freely and safely, a state where protestors and police and army exchange flowers and are united in a form of nationalist patriotism. That it is a country held together—hostage and complacent and resigned—by fears of zombie sectarian armies and/or a Islamist apocalypse that will prevail if the current system of power sharing fails.

Protestors have proven that the state and political elites do not control the horizon of political imagination.

The greatest success of today’s protestors is that they have inspired millions both inside and outside of the country. They have broken the ceiling of cynicism and opened a space to imagine alternative political futures for Lebanon. If only for these reasons, there is no going back. 

Open Letter to Mr. Bilal Hamad, President of the Municipal Council of Beirut

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[The following open letter by Lebanese economist Jad Chaaban was originally published on his website on 27 August 2015.]

Beirut, 27 August 2015

Open Letter to Mr. Bilal Hamad, President of the Municipal Council of Beirut

Dear Mr. Hamad,

I am writing to you as a Lebanese citizen and taxpayer, and a permanent resident of Beirut. I did not vote to elect you for the Municipal Council, because of our country’s twisted and sectarian election laws that do not allow us to elect our representatives based on our main area of residence. But nevertheless I believe it is my right to address you as the only elected municipal representative in the city where I live. And my main complaint is pretty straightforward: Either you and the municipal council take concrete actions to resolve the waste crisis immediately, or you should resign.

I like many of my fellow Beirut residents, Lebanese or foreigners, am a law-abiding citizen, who pays a lot of taxes to finance your and other civil servants’ salaries and expenses. In fact I have calculated that as much as 30% of my income is swiped away by taxes (income tax, Value Added Tax (VAT), benzene tax, mobile phone tax, Beirut municipal taxes – which by the way are 50$/month! – etc…). This comes on top of having to pay two bills for every public service, which in other countries are typically provided by municipalities: I have to buy additional electricity (Beirut municipality doesn’t provide any); I have to buy drinking water in gallons (Beirut municipality doesn’t provide good quality tap water); I need to have a car to go anywhere (Beirut municipality doesn’t have an efficient public transport system); and the list goes on! I am not expecting you and your council to solve all of these issues now (although I believe this can be done, look at some other cities in Lebanon!), but the least you can do immediately is to address the trash issue, before this also becomes a public service that we have to pay two or three times more for it to be resolved!

You will tell me that all of this is none of your business, as almost all public services in the city are handled by the central Government. You will also tell me that the city of Beirut has a peculiar governance structure, where the Government-appointed Beirut Governor shares executive powers with the municipality. You will also mention that your municipality has a limited budget, and no space to handle waste treatment, thus the need to find another area in Lebanon to dump our waste on it. Well Mr. President all of these arguments are invalid.

There is nothing that prevents you from offering public services, even if this were to go against the wishes of the central government. The city of Zahleh has electricity, Jbeil has electric cars in the old town, and Saida has its own freaking waste treatment plant! Since the beginning of the current crisis several Lebanese municipalities have already engaged in sorting household waste at source and recycling. If there is a will there is a way, and no one can prevent your Municipal Council from actively engaging in any public service, especially waste management. Go ahead and you will have mine and all of the Beirut residents’ (voters and non-voters) support.

Also don’t tell me there is no money and space. Your municipality has a cash reserve of 1.2 billion USD, 170 times the budget allocated to the Ministry of Environment! But somehow during your tenure you only found money (and executive powers!) to close down one of Beirut’s last public green spaces (the Dalieh), to install controversial surveillance cameras, and to expropriate land and public parks to build controversial highways (Fouad Boustros Boulevard) and parking lots!

Mr. Hamad you and the Beirut Municipal Council are requested to implement immediately a waste management plan that in my (and many experts’) opinion consists of the following:

  1. Implement a city-wide campaign for sorting waste at source, including separation into recyclables, organic, and non-recyclable items. This would immediately reduce the amount of garbage on the streets and engage Beirut residents as partners in the solution. If you want tips on how this is done, please call the municipalities of Roumieh, Bekfaya, Joun, Arsoun, and many others.
  2. Upgrade the existing waste treatment plants of Karantina into more efficient ones: Once the amount of garbage is reduced through sorting, the existing plants (which fall under the municipality’s jurisdiction) could be easily turned into more efficient waste treatment facilities, therefore minimizing the amount of trash that has to be dumped. By producing better compost and extracting more recyclables, we can minimize the percent of trash currently going to landfills from 75% to only 15%!

The only solution for the waste crisis is that municipalities take back their executive powers and implement sustainable and responsible solutions. If you and your colleagues at the Beirut Municipality cannot do this, then I invite you all to submit your resignations immediately.

Sincerely,

Jad Chaaban
Beirut resident and Lebanese economist

Cities Media Roundup (August 2015)

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[This is a monthly roundup of news articles, and other materials related to urban issues in the region, and beyond. It does not reflect the views of the Cities Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send recommendations for inclusion in the Cities Media Roundup to cities@jadaliyya.com, mentioning "Roundup" in the subject line. We also welcome your submissions to the Cities Page: please check details on cities.jadaliyya.com]

Urban and Real Estate Development 

Aladdin City in Dubai
Todd Reisz writes on Dubai’s Aladdin City for Ibraaz, seeking to debunk the stereotypes associated to such projects, uncovering instead their potential meanings by going back to the city’s urban and economic history.

Capital Cairo: A Regime of Graphics
Adham Selim analyzes in Madamasr the announcement of a new capital for Cairo which utilized a wealth of make-believe images as a way of ruling and producing the State’s power.
 

War and Cities

Walls and Boundaries in the Middle East        
Mary Atkinson reports for Middle East Eye on the walls securing Middle East’s national boundaries and the history of their making. 

The Wall between Tunisia and Libya [in French]
Geographer Habib Ayeb warns on his blog Demmer about the dangers of the Tunisian government’s initiative of erecting a wall aimed at stopping incoming ‘terrorists’ from Libya. He argues that such a wall would destroy the economics of the border region between the two countries.

The situation in Turkish Kurdistan [in French]
Writing on Turkey for the Observatory of the Political Life blog, Geographer Jean-François Pérouse compares Turkey’s military intervention in the Kurdish region to that of its 1990s intervention, and discusses, among other issues, the urban dimension of the new insurrection.

The Mastery of Non-Mastery
Michael Taussig has recently spent some time among the Kurdish resistance fighters in northern Syria. His detailed, insightful and poetic report on this situation in this region addresses the state of political Islam, the policies of the United States in the Middle East, and the lived experience of emancipatory and progressive movements worldwide.  

The Syrian economy damaged by the war
Journalist Fehim Tastekin reports for Al Monitor about the looting of the industrial area of Aleppo that many industrialists blame on Turkey.

The Syrian banking sector between downturn and resilience
Saint Andrews scholar Rashad al-Kattan writes on the Monkey Cage blog about the resilience of the Syrian banking sector. He predicts that local businessmen who are close to the regime will play a key role in the future reconstruction of the country.
 

Local and Regional Policies and Governance

Old Rents in Beirut [in Arabic]
Hadeel Farfour reports for Al-Akhbar on the workshop organized by Public Works in Beirut assessing old rents and the situation of tenants in the working-class neighborhood of Tarik al-Jadideh.

State support for Housing in Lebanon [in French]
Head of the Lebanese State-owned Public Corporation for Housing explains to L’Orient-Le Jour its institution’s support half of the new homebuyers in Lebanon, currently around 6000 families.   

Management of public space in Tunisian Cities
Journalist Elyes Zammit reports for BusinessNews about the infringement of restaurants, bars and other outlets on the public space in L’Ariana, a middle class suburb of Tunis.


Highlight: Lebanon’s Garbage Crisis

* Municipalities and Waste Management in Lebanon
In the context of the garbage crisis in Lebanon, Blog Baladi reports on how some municipalities are starting to adopt recycling as a mode of waste management in alliance with civil society activists and the private sector.

 * The failure of the Lebanese political elite to deal with the garbage crisis
LCPS director Sami Atallah recalls the story of the garbage crisis in Lebanon and indicts the political elite for having failed to imagine solutions to it for a long time.

* The government policy to deal with the garbage crisis in Lebanon [in French]
As many other newspapers in Lebanon, L’Orient-Le Jour extensively covers the garbage crisis in Lebanon supporting it with infographics about the stages of the crisis.

*The garbage crisis: beyond the critic of the State [in French]
Many bloggers on the Lebanese scene, like Alexandre Medawar and Bakhos Baalbaki, call for a change in the way people deal with their garbage and urges them to start recycling them.

*Lebanon’s Rubbish Crisis
Hassan Al-Qishawi reports in Al-Ahram on the garbage crisis in Lebanon and its political ramifications.
 

Urban Heritage

Hebron’s Urban Renovation
Harriet Sherwood reports for The Guardian on how the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee renovated the old city and brought Palestinian residents back to their homes. 

Alexandria’s Industrial Heritage [in Arabic]
Basma Saif argues in Cairo Observer about the need to preserve the industrial architectural heritage of Alexandria focusing on Mina Al-Basal. The article provides a history of Mina Al-Basal and proposes possible approaches to preserving and revitalizing the neighborhood. 
 

Urban Poverty

Informality in Tunis’s Margins after the Uprising [in Arabic]
Jihad Al-Hajj Salem discusses in Al-Safir the informal sector that emerged since the uprising in the city of Tunis. He described the different informal sectors (transportation, recycling, food, etc.) and shows how the urban poor has staked claims to urban space after the revolution.  

Cairo: A Divided City 
A video produced by Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National on the ongoing segregation in Cairo between the rich and the poor, as the rich and the middle class move out to the city to luxurious communities on the outskirts of the city, leaving the poor behind. 

A State’s approach to Informal settlements in Cairo [in Arabic]
In a video interview, the Minister of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements in Egypt announces that there are eighteen informal  (`ashwai) areas and emphasizes that Izbet Naser is the most dangerous:

Criminalizing Informal Settlements in Cairo
Omnia Khalil writes for as-Safir on the criminalization of informal settlements in Cairo, and how national agencies and the media are promoting their eradication instead of appreciating their socio-spatial qualities.

The Making of “Death” in Hai Al-Zabbaleen in Cairo [in Arabic]
Mohamad Fathi and Hasan Ahmad Hussein provide in Al-Masri el-Youm a detailed report about the recycling process and the health challenges linked to it in Hai al-Zabbaleen (Garbage People Area) in Cairo.

Revitalising Khedival Cairo
Mai Samih discusses in Al-Ahram plans to renovate downtown Cairo and some of its major landmarks:

The Garbage Crisis Affecting two Cairo neighborhoods 
Mohamad Faraj used a visual essay in Al-Youm 7 to discuss the massive challenges posed by garbage and its management in the city of Port Said.

Vendors Plight in Face of Location in Downtown Cairo 
Walaa Gebaa reports in Al-Ahram on downtown Cairo’s vendor critiques for government plans to relocate them and the limitations imposed on them by the new location.

On the Failures of Relocating Cairo’s downtown Vendors 
A report about challenges facing Cairo’s Governorate in its efforts to relocate the vendors from downtown Cairo to designated areas.


Featured Resources:

Report: Parallel Urban Practice in Egypt
10Tooba issued a report documenting parallel urban practices and initiatives in Egypt covering urban planning, upgrading, governance, legislation, housing and service provision. 

New Release: Brownbook
The Latest issue of Brownbook, An Urban Guide to the Middle East, features articles on Dubai, New York, Constantine, Amman, Marrakech, among others.

CFP: After the Uprisings
The Issam Faris Institute at the American University of Beirut and Princeton University issued a CFP in collaboration with POMEPS, for a conference to be held in Princeton on 4-5 March 2016. The conference is entitled: “After the Uprisings: The Arab World in Freefall, Fragmentation or Reconfiguration?” Deadline is 5 September 2015. 

Online Videos on Urban Issues
Planetizen offers several online videos informing urban scholars, practitioners and students on a variety of issues in urban design, planning and the law, and urban food systems.

Blog: Cairo Walks
This blog by urbanist Amr Abotawila maps and documents Cairo through photos and texts taken during walks in the metropolis.

Fragments from a Critical Geography Conference
Lisa Tilley's shares her experience in attending the latest International Critical Geography Conference held in Palestine, last July. 

Funambulist Magazine Launch
The Funambulist Magazine, a bimestrial printed and digital magazine about the politics of space and bodies, was launched this month in New York. Check the presentations by Léopold Lambert, Sadia Shirazi, Olivia Ahn and Minh-Ha T. Pham. 

Made in China. Transnational trade and urban spaces around the Mediterranean basin [In French]
Geographers Oliviez Pliez and Said Belguidoum edited this new issue of Les Cahiers d’EMAM, with articles on Tanger, Casablanca, Kurdish Cities, Saleh, Constantine, Algiers, Oran.


Recently on Jadaliyya

مجاري في مائة عام: تتبع آثار شبكة الصرف الصحي التاريخية لمدينة القاهرة 
On the hundredth anniversary of the installment of a sanitation infrastructure in Cairo, Shehab Fakhry Ismail and Ahmed al Ghoneimy write about the network’s history.

دمشق في اللباس الموحّد
 
Author Fawwaz Haddad writes about the current state of Damascus as the war rages in Syria, mourns the city, and reminisces its history as a cultural, political, and economic center that is being destroyed. 

The Architecture of Nostalgia
Haider Shahbaz writes about Hazem Harb’s exhibition, The Invisible Landscape and Concrete Futures,that is featured in the Salsali Private Museum, Dubai. 3 March—1 September 2015.

المشهد الاقتصادي في حيفا قبل سقوطها
Himmat Zu'bi writes about the economic scene of the city of Haifa before its fall.

Lebanon, August 2015: Notes on Paralysis, Protests, and Hope
Maya Mikdashi provides a critical account of the protests in Beirut about the garbage issue.

 

Protests in Beirut: Quick Background and Some Videos
Online resources and first analysis on the events in Beirut from Jadaliyya Reports.

 

Place as Provisional: Site-Specific Art Commissions in Sharjah

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Two metaphors, both equally decrepit, are alternately deployed in discussions of “place” in the Gulf Arab states: on the one hand, the notion of a tabula rasa, and, on the other hand, an attachment to a codified narrative of historical and cultural sitedness. Rem Koolhaas exemplified the former stance in his pronouncement in 2007 that the topography along the Persian Gulf provides “the final tabula rasaon which new identities can be inscribed: palms, world maps, cultural capital, and financial centers.”[i] The latter attitude is conveyed by al-Manakh, the self-described inaugural guide to architecture and urbanism in the Gulf, which distinguishes Sharjah by its “authenticity” as a modern Islamic city.[ii] This characterization is linked to the ways that Sharjah has presciently and consistently invoked culture—encompassing everything from archaeology to “traditional” building methods and contemporary art—as its defining attribute. But what does it really mean to call Sharjah an “authentic” city?

The sense of place in the Middle East is often described as shaped by deterritorialization, or what Aamir Mufti has called a “dialectic of rooting and uprooting.”[iii] These sensibilities have, in turn, been deployed in contemporary art practice. The way place is described in the United Arab Emirates, however, is slightly different, in part because the country has not been as affected by conflict, and the consequent widespread relocation, as has much of the broader region. Yet historically, the movements of people have shaped the cultural identity of the Emirates: those involved in the pearling industry and trade routes throughout the Gulf, and in more recent years, by an influx of foreign workers. The enormous numbers of people who temporarily live, work, and move through the region has only intensified with the stunning pace of development following the discovery of oil there in the mid-twentieth century (and not until 1972 in Sharjah), which transformed formerly rural and coastal trading communities into urban hubs of commerce and tourism. The rhetoric of deterritorialization seems less urgent when economic demands, rather than conflict, are largely shaping the large-scale circulation of people. Indeed, official cultural initiatives in the Emirates appear more concerned with instantiating a sense of place than with overtly addressing dispossession. Yet might this preoccupation with place be just another form of addressing these same issues of dispossession and uprooting?


              [Fig. 1: Sharjah Art Foundation. Photo by Andrew Ruff.] 

One particular mode of cultural production in Sharjah today explicitly examines this question of “authentic” place making: annual site-specific art projects commissioned by the Sharjah Art Foundation (SAF). SAF, established in 2009, is far from the only institution in the region to sponsor such a program,[iv] but what sets it apart is the explicit mandate that the international artists must respond to the local environment of Sharjah [fig. 1]. It seems a rather surprising move for a national body to commission foreign artists to comment specifically on “place,” particularly since a parallel discourse of “authenticity” and “specificity” accompanies the mandate. The political underpinnings of this decision may perhaps be located in a rather bald attempt to implicate the culture of Sharjah within a broader global constellation, at least in the sphere of contemporary art. Yet we might also think about these commissions as part of a broader impulse on the part of the Emirates to solidify a sense of authenticity and specificity that is always already premised on circulation, and a persistent tension between “inside” and “outside.” For what does it really mean to talk about “place” in our contemporary context, marked as it is by the velocity of circulating information, images, products, and people, both virtual and actual?

In the spring of 2013, the Danish artistic collective SUPERFLEX created a public art installation on Bank Street in Sharjah, just a few blocks from the heritage area that is home to the SAF, which commissioned the project [fig. 2].


  [Fig 2. SUPERFLEX, TheBank, installation view at Sharjah Biennial 11, March 2013. Photo: SUPERFLEX.] 

Many of the banks originally located on this street have in recent years relocated to more affluent neighborhoods, leaving the once-vibrant thoroughfare vacant. SUPERFLEX imagined replacing the defunct monetary model of exchange with a relational model intended to engage the local population and reactivate this stretch of the city.A written survey asked local residents, most of whom are originally from South and Southeast Asia, to nominate public objects like benches, trees, and signage from their countries of origin or other places in which they had lived or traveled[v][fig. 3]. The selected items were then purchased, or produced, and installed on the median. This installation engages the particular societal fabric of Sharjah, made visible vis-à-vis acts of transposition that affirm the local experience of life in the city.


[Fig. 3. Survey filled out by Sharjah resident in preparation for SUPERFLEX’s installation TheBank, 2013. Photo: SUPERFLEX.]

TJ Demos has argued that earlier approaches to site specificity moored the art object to a particular location—as exemplified in the post-minimalist practices of US artists Richard Serra and Robert Smithson—but that since the 1990s, this affinity has been eclipsed by a formulation of sitedness in and as deterritorialization.[vi]Under Standing Over Views, a 2009 installation by the Tunisian-born, Berlin-based artist Nadia Kaabi Linke (b. 1978) manifested this shift [fig. 4]. This hanging map is comprised of slivers of paint collected from walls in Tunis, Bizerte, Kairouan, Paris, Berlin, Venice, Kiev, and Cologne. Each paint shard is individually suspended from a black silk string [fig. 5]. Taken as a whole, they form a map of the Emirates. Kaabi Linke activates a literal suspension of place: the landscape is no longer the ground beneath our feet, but rather a surreal structure suspended above. A secondary dislocation is at work as well, for the shadows cast on the floor and wall act to mirror the transposition of the paint removed from its original context. Moreover, the individual paint slivers are not denoted by point of origin. Instead, the various countries and regions are rendered, in some material sense, inseparable. The constituent parts are here subsumed under the format—and the symbol—of the Emirates as a structuring principle.

 
[Fig. 4]  


[Fig. 5] 

[Figs. 4–5. Nadia Kaabi Linke, UnderStandingOverViews, 2009. Installation views at Sharjah Contemporary Arab Art Museum. Photo: Alfredo Rubio. Courtesy Nadia Kaabi Linke.]

 

One could parse various sociopolitical currents, perhaps reading the piece as a comment on the flow of Sharjah’s population. The circulation of oil rents as capital is reshaping both the material and symbolic sense of place in the Emirates, generating new urban construction projects as well as determining the social and cultural texture of the city. Sharjah today is shaped by the way property markets—spurred by oil rents—are reorienting urban space. The peeling paint of Under Standing Over Views may evoke the planned displacement of local residents from several 1970s-era apartment blocks that surround the SAF heritage area. The buildings have been slated for demolition to make way for landscaped pedestrian routes through downtown, part of “The Heart of Sharjah,” an urban renewal plan initiated in 2012. Michelle Buckley describes the typical narrative of development in the Emirates, specifically in Dubai, as a tale of division: governmental efforts to engineer an urban scape for an affluent population, over and against the exploitative treatment and conditions of the poorer, largely foreign, workforce. Yet Buckley wants to complicate this polarizing narrative. She suggests that the autocratic neoliberalism at work in Dubai and Sharjah are in fact more complex, and are challenged and shaped by fragmentary labor politics, including demonstrations and mass-worker households.[vii]

The relationship between the flow of capital and that of bodies, alluded to in Under Standing Over Views, is more explicitly examined in SUPERFLEX’s project. Oil rents attract foreign laborers, who directly construct the new urban and commercial built environment, and who also sustain the economic infrastructure of a city like Sharjah by providing other necessary services. The Bank Street installation points to some of the ways in which the local cultural context is infused with new influences via the circulation of both capital and human labor. At the same time, the work calls into question the very notion of what constitutes place: a spatial configuration or locality, or temporal experience and memory? Both installations transpose fragmentary traces of other places, pasts, and memories, and explore this transposition as an important aspect of how the works speak to the specificity of Sharjah.

British artist Carey Young plays with reinvesting place with lived and temporal experience in a 2007 photographic project, Body Techniques, created during a residency at the Sharjah Biennial that year.[viii] Each photograph in this series ofeight documents a restaging of a performance piece from the international conceptual canon, ranging from works by Valie Export to Richard Long and Bruce Nauman [figs. 6–7].

 


[Fig. 6]


[Fig. 7] 

[Figs. 6–7. Carey Young, Body Techniques (after Dance or Exercise on the Perimeter of a Square [Square Dance], Bruce Nauman, 1967–68), 2007, and Body Techniques (after Parallel Stress, Dennis Oppenheim, 1970), 2007. Produced as part of a Sharjah Biennial Artist in Residence Program, 2007. Photos © Carey Young. Courtesy Paula Cooper Gallery, New York.] 

 

The original performances share a number of threads running through artistic experimentation in the 1970s: the elimination of the object, the centrality of the artist’s body, durational practices, conceptualism, earth art, and tactics of installation. These tactics were intended to challenge and animate the territorial boundaries between such well-rehearsed dichotomies as artist and viewer, body and mind, nature and built environment, life and art. Art making in the 1970s was also beginning to seep beyond the spaces of the studio, gallery, and museum, moving into the sphere of everyday life.

Young relocates a specific legacy of artistic practice to the contemporary landscape—literal and metaphorical—of the Gulf, thereby unsettling standard binaries of East and West, just as SUPERFLEX’s The Bank transfigures a site of commercial capital into an environment for transcultural interchange. Yet the fact remains—it is capital that brings these bodies to Sharjah and indebts them to the economic system and workforce. In Body Techniques, Young ambiguously inserts a body uneasily amid building sites in Sharjah, Dubai, and the surrounding desert landscape. A visual discordance persists between the natural desert landscape and the sleek, modern structures, which are in varying states of completion. Moreover, the artist’s body—the identity of which has been effaced through distance and positioning or concealed with clothing—emerges as isolated within the constructed and constructive landscape. It is never clear whether she molds herself into this environment, or marks and resists it.

Artistic practice in the United Arab Emirates today is similarly imbricated with institutional culture, from the promotion of tourism and the production of museums and universities, to the cultivation of a knowledge economy and the institutional format of art commissions themselves. Young, like many of the artists that SAF taps, is interested in reconfiguring these modes of exchange. The title, Body Techniques, refers to a phrase coined by the French sociologist Marcel Mauss and elucidated by Pierre Bourdieu, who describes body techniques, or “habitus,” as the ways in which institutional ideologies can affect behavior. What kind of body, then, is documented in Young’s project? There is no universal body upon which these institutions and ideologies work. Young self-consciously inserts herself into the work, thus inserting herself not only into the trajectory of the Western canon of performances she is restaging, but also into and onto the social, political, economic, and built environment of Sharjah and Dubai.

While Body Techniques seeks to challenge the institutionalization of “institutional culture,” these very institutions still fund this work. By participating in the SAF residency that produced these photographs, Young contributes to the production of this knowledge economy; the same tension holds true in the critiques offered by SUPERFLEX and Kaabi Linke.Moreover, Young’s photographs may be seen as problematic insofar as they depict place as something that can be observed from the outside. This is a thorny position for an artist who is not particularly familiar with, or integrated into, the region—a position that is doubly problematic for the viewer, who is at another degree of spatial and temporal remove.  

This quandary recurs in different guises throughout contemporary artistic initiatives in the region. As Qatari nationals and more privileged expatriates have relocated to the affluent suburbs of Doha, or into luxury high-rises, older downtown neighborhoods, such as Msheireb, came to be populated almost exclusively by male migrant workers, primarily from Southeast Asia. With plans underway to further transform Doha in time for the World Cup in 2022, neighborhoods like Msheireb have been aggressively depopulated to make way for an extensive, high-end urban renewal project.[ix] In a section of the old neighborhood that still stands, Qatar Foundation and Msheireb Properties created the Msheireb Arts Center in a shuttered elementary school, and appointed a young British visual artist named Ben Barbour to oversee the center and its ancillary art projects, the principal initiative of which is the Echo Memory Project[fig. 8]. This project was established to locate, collect, and preserve objects found in vacated houses and businesses in Msheireb; the objects deemed worthy of posterity are photographed in the context in which they were discovered, labeled with a number corresponding to the site, and then sorted by type and stored at the center or in one of several warehouse facilities in Doha [fig. 9].[x] 

 


[Fig. 8. Msheireb Arts Center, Doha, Qatar. Photo: Andrew Ruff.]

 

  
[Fig. 9. Objects in Echo Memory Project, Msheireb Arts Center, Doha, Qatar. Photo: the author. ]

In retrieving these objects, the Msheireb Arts Center claims that it seeks to preserve local history and memory, a conceit that seems highly improbable when one considers that these are artifacts whose owners either disposed of or intentionally left behind. Moreover, beyond recording the location of an object’s recovery, very little information or context is available. The original residents of the neighborhood have no involvement in the project, and the items are now legally owned by Msheireb Properties. As such, this is a memory project without the benefit of oral or textual recollection, devoid of individual and communal experience. In this scenario, the objects must seemingly speak for themselves. This premise becomes even more problematic in its second phase: Barbour curates displays of the found objects, and the items are available for international artists to use in their own installations, projects, and curatorial initiatives. The quotidian artifacts are thus presented as raw material already invested with meaning—embodying aspects of Doha’s culture, history, and diverse communities—to be deployed for the artistic visions of foreign artists. The Echo Memory Project relies on depoliticized dislocation and depopulation in the name of linking the neighborhood’s past to its nascent future.

The Echo Memory Project may be more egregious in its tactics, but do the underlying assumptions and provisions really diverge that greatly from those espoused by SAF? Both institutions seek to articulate a sense of place, and look to foreign artists and interlocutors to participate in this formulation. Just as the Echo Memory Project’s capacity to reveal the history of the neighborhood is constrained, the SAF commissions are also limited in their scope, audience, and the brevity of the artist’s engagement with the site. However, the Echo Memory Project does little to acknowledge these complexities, whereas the SAF commissions strive to engage notions of place in a manner that not only acknowledges transience, but also stages the artistic production as itself temporal and temporary. A year after SUPERFLEX installed Bank Street, the site was emptied and returned to an asphalt median, a place for passing through rather than congregating and engaging. 

Perhaps we might see Bank Street and Body Techniques as works that image Sharjah, documenting its contemporary ruins, the rapid pace of development, and its networks of residence, but the works alsooffer place-images, in the double sense described by Aamir Mufti: as images of places of various sorts but also images about the imaging of these places.[xi] SUPERFLEX’s reconstitution of Bank Street acknowledges the commercial and architectural past of the neighborhood, even as it affirms new modes of exchange. The Bank installation might be considered a different kind of “Heart of Sharjah” project, one premised not upon crafting a univocal narrative of the city, but rather on making visible within the daily fabric of the urban space the dense, multidirectional relations already at place among the urban and social landscape of Sharjah, its inhabitants, and their imaginaries, both local and global. Kaabi Linke’s Under Standing Over Views similarly complicates the representational legibility of mapping. While the mapinvokes the specific origins of the artist’s materials, it visually thwarts attribution, as if to suggest that sitedness is always traceable but, at the same time, remains irrevocably in excess of our impulse to demarcate, grasp, and thereby presume knowledge. Young re-presents originary bodily practices, activating these encounters within a new geographical and cultural context, as if to suggest that the specificity at stake is not that of history—discrete places and specific moments—but of the flux of embodied experience.

Each of these artworks traffics in a productive ambiguity that recalls Marc Augé’s proposal that contemporary life produces non-places: spaces that are not properly anthropological or geographical, parts of which are composed of images.[xii] Place and non-place never completely preclude one another. The interplay between literal and metaphorical, actual and virtual, projected and lived is perpetually re-inscribed. At their best, the SAF commissions are compelling not because they instantiate or illuminate a particular locale, but rather because of how they address provocations of a historical and contemporary, as well as artistic and social nature.

Yet when Young implicitly invokes Bourdieu’s claim that one cannot fully escape the cultural conditioning, might we press further and ask: are the SAF commissions similarly bounded by the conditions of their creation? Is it possible for critique to be deployed within existing systems of circulation? The SAF commissions, the institutional structures that oversee them, and the viewing public (local as well as international) are imbricated within a network of circulation: the art market and artistic patronage, oil rents and economic systems more broadly, the construction (and concomitant destruction) of different kinds of built environments, the movement of bodies. Perhaps the question of site specificity, and the impulse to concretize a sense of place in Sharjah, is premised on this nexus of circulation—of capital and bodies; what Nadia Kaabi Linke has called “the mobility of things.”[xiii]



[i] Ole Bouman, Mitra Khoubrou, and Rem Koolhaas (eds.), al-Manakh (Amsterdam: Stichting Archis, 2007).

[ii] Ibid., 140. This same entry refers to Sharjah as “the capital of the Generic.”

[iii] Aamir R. Mufti, “Zarina Hashmi and the Arts of Dispossession,” in The Migrant’s Time: Rethinking Art History and Diaspora ed. Saloni Mathur, Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 175.

[iv] Artists-in-Residency Dubai, for example,encourages cross-pollination between the Emirates and the United Kingdom; the artists create site-specific works for Art Dubai Projects, the annual art fair’s not-for-profit program of new art commissions, which are installed during Art Dubai.

[v] See the artists’ own description of the project for more detail: http://www.superflex.net/tools/the_bank.

[vi] TJ Demos, “Desire in Diaspora,” in Contemporary Art in the Middle East editor? (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2009), 42.

[vii] Michelle Buckley, “Locating Neoliberalism in Dubai: Migrant Workers and Class Struggle in the Autocratic City,” Antipode 45, no. 2 (2013), 256-74.

[viii] Although the SAF was not founded until 2009, the Biennial hosted residencies focused on site-specific artist projects as a precursor to what would become the SAF commissions.

[ix] Such collusions of so-called heritage and culture with baldly commercial ventures are not uncommon in the Gulf. See al-Manakh and al-Manakh 2 for more extensive considerations by Todd Reisz and others.

[x] Conversation with Ben Barbour, Msheireb Arts Center, Doha, 12 March, 2014.

[xi] Mufti, 188.

[xii] Marc Augé, Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity, trans.  John Howe (New York and London: Verso, 1995), 78–79, 117.

[xiii] Nadia Kaabi Linke, “Artist Statement,” in Provisions, Sharjah Biennial 9: Book 1 (Sharjah: Sharjah Art Foundation, 2009), 277.

Garbage Crisis Exposes Arrogance and Conflict Among the Political Elite of Lebanon

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The government just does not seem to get it. Protests that kicked off in Lebanon a few weeks ago are no longer about the garbage crisis. They are fundamentally about the failure of successive Lebanese governments to provide basic services for citizens. They are about corruption associated with managing public resources, and the subsequently high prices that Lebanese are forced to pay for very poor services. Let us take power for instance: many Lebanese pay two bills—one to unreliable EDL (Electricité du Liban), and the other for an overpriced private generator. The same holds true for water. As of last year, we have been forced to pay more money to public water authorities for less water in our tanks, in addition to informal private water providers. What is common in both cases is that public providers failed to deliver, and private suppliers supplanted the role of the state at a hefty price.

Lebanese found inefficiencies in garbage collection a much tougher pill to swallow though, not only because it is yet another example of a poor state service, but also on account of the physical properties of the garbage—its awful smell, the environmental and health implications, as well as the lack of private alternatives to deal with it—which have exposed the arrogance and corruption of the political elite who were willing to bury the country with trash until they extract more resources from each other. In one sense, the garbage crisis is the straw that broke the camel’s back.

The crisis not only reveals the contempt of the political elite toward society, it has also exposed a conflict among the elite on how to “divvy up the pie.” Unlike previous arrangements, this one could not be negotiated behind closed doors. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war and the beginning of the reconstruction, the governing elite struck many deals among themselves concerning how to divide the spoils of state resources. The late prime minister Rafic Hariri played a major role in securing enough funds to keep both his allies and rivals content. Since his assassination, the amount of money brought into the country has dwindled, leaving a smaller amount of resources for the elite to fight over. When this could not be solved internally among themselves—in a sense luckily for us as citizens—it was brought to the public sphere, with leaders hoping to call each other’s bluff. The call by the speaker of the parliament for a national dialogue session is little more than an attempt to put the house back in order, reinforce collusion among the political elite, and collectively address street action which has noticeably caught the attention of political leaders from across the spectrum. Recent events have laid bare the reality that when the political elite disagree, the system is paralyzed, and when they agree it leads to collusion. In both cases, this comes at the expense of citizens: either we are denied services or have to pay a high price for it. It is against the backdrop of this system that people are collectively demanding accountability. Hence, the garbage crisis is a culmination of two major conflicts: one between citizens and the political elite and the other among the elite themselves. 

Even though the roots of the garbage crisis go back to the mid-1990s, the ways successive governments have dealt with Lebanese citizens shows how indifferent they have consistently been to people’s concerns and welfare. For one, the government knew that a crisis was around the corner if no solution was found to address the already over-extended capacity of the Naameh landfill. Then, the government suddenly acted as though it was doing something about the waste management crisis by calling for bids whose criteria remain unclear, and due in no small part to a lack of transparency in the bidding process, the results left Lebanese more perplexed as some companies won bids in some regions but lost in others, and the cost of services offered by the new firms appears to be even higher than Sukleen, which was already high compared to international standards. Then, the committee administering the process declared the tenders successful late Monday only to cancel the bid results the next morning. If that was not enough, the government announced that it had decided to dump the garbage in Akkar in return for one hundred million dollars in development after years if not decades of neglect in Lebanon’s northernmost region. 

Not only has the government mismanaged the process, it has demonstrated its complete disregard for initiatives by municipalities and CSOs that have attempted to pick up the pieces, and solve the garbage crisis over the last few weeks. Instead of opening up the decision-making process, and inviting civil society to be part of the solution that could save the treasury a considerable amount of money, it did what it does best: monopolize the process, ignore the voices of society, and attempt to split the pie among the political elite themselves.   

Furthermore, political parties had the arrogance to exploit the situation on the ground, and even are attempting to leverage it to their own advantage against political rivals. For instance, one party openly supported the protesters by sending their minister to a demonstration. He was swiftly asked to leave. Another MP from the same party tried another gimmick, suspending his membership in the parliament. However, he lacked the resolve to actually resign from a parliament that illegitimately extended its own mandate. Another political leader who contributed to the origins of the crisis not only applauded the protesters, but even asked them to stay in downtown hoping to either deflect blame for his role in creating the crisis or tarnish the credibility of the movement by supporting it, or both.  

Another minister who did not have the stomach to feign interest in alleviating people’s frustration condescendingly questioned who the protesters “really are,” and who they represent. This was the peak of arrogance from a public official. In fact, it is precisely this type of attitude which is fundamentally wrong with our system, where the political elite show complete disdain for people’s welfare. They are only ready to address some of the people’s demands as long as they are politically loyal to them. Putting it differently, our political system recognizes people as clients and not as citizens. So people who demand services as rights or demand accountability from government and ministers who are failing to deliver are to be ignored, excluded, or denied any recognition. It is within this context that the aforementioned minister’s statement must be understood. 

In fact, the real question is: who do the political elite represent in the first place in a country where elections are an opportunity for the political elite to select their constituency rather than citizens to elect their representatives? After all, political parties have consistently engineered their path to power through a customized electoral law that ensures they receive votes through gerrymandering and vote counting, vote buying during the election season, and the use of sectarian discourse to strike fear among their constituencies so they are mobilized to head to the voting booths. Their electoral strategies have effectively silenced the majority of the electorate from expressing its true preferences. In fact, most surveys consistently show that the number of Lebanese citizens’ who trust both the government and parliament does not exceed ten percent.

Failing to outmaneuver the protesters thus far, the government has shamefully used violence to silence the people. They beat up citizens, accused detainees of being drug addicts, and forced them to take urine test to prove their innocence. The behavior of the security agencies shows that they are at best inept in protecting freedom of expression and human rights, all while protecting the governing elite. This poses serious questions about all the investments made by international donors on the security sector reform and how reform was to be “people centered.” Accountability would entail information about what happened to all that money, how was it spent, and how it had an impact on the performance of security agencies in dealing with this crisis.

Once the forceful methods of ending protests failed, the minister of interior went further by dismissing protesters, labeling them foreigners—an irony of sorts, given that the current and past governments in Lebanon have been formed in part based on foreign intervention—in an effort to discredit them while hinting that they are funded by a small Arab country. What the minister of interior and the government in general is not aware of is that the protesters are homegrown groups frustrated with the corrupt system of governance. Political leaders’ statements show again how they are disconnected from society and remain adamant in their interpretation of the movement from a narrow prism of sectarian politics and foreign conspiracies—when convenient—to justify their relevance in this bankrupt system. In fact, the protesters express the anger and frustration of the silent majority who are simply fed up with the current state of affairs.

[This article was originally published on LCPS' website.]

The Property Regime: Mecca and the Politics of Redevelopment in Saudi Arabia

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The 1990 Gulf War was a watershed in the history of the modern Middle East, one that altered the political economies of the region as well as state-society relations therein. In Saudi Arabia, the anti-regime popular mobilizations that had emerged during the war, coupled with the post-war global economic recession, shaped the ways in which the ruling Al Saud monarchy managed its monopoly on power and economic resources. On the one hand, the rulers adopted multi-pronged strategies of coercion and cooptation to pacify oppositional movements. On the other hand, they relied on land speculation, and the development of real estate schemes in particular, as new modes of political legitimation and capital generation, given the narrowing of global investment opportunities. Specifically, the post-war property regime targeted Mecca and Riyadh as objects of urban redevelopment through which new visions of the Saudi modern manifested and circulated, thereby assuming a central role in both economic and political life.  

Late twentieth-century centralized city planning, however, took on different forms in the country’s religious and political capitals, respectively. In Mecca, site of the yearly Muslim pilgrimage, urban redevelopment plans centered on the complete overhaul of the city’s physical, cultural, social, and economic landscape. The attendant multi-billion dollar mega projects have been replacing historical sites, cultural landmarks, and private properties in the neighborhoods circling Mecca’s Grand Mosque [al-masjid al-haram]. Petro-resources, circulated through Saudi Arabian banks in the form of loans to contractors and Mecca’s real estate market, will turn Central Mecca into a constellation of mixed-use developments comprising upscale international hotels and short-term and permanent residences, as well as state-of-the-art commercial facilities and markets. The future of this area will thereby be completely severed from its intellectually, socially, and economically rich past.

The Saudi regime has marketed the remaking of Mecca as necessary to enhance the infrastructure of the pilgrimage in order to accommodate a ballooning Muslim population in a now easily accessible city that has more to offer than its historical and religious material heritage. Accordingly, the aim of the construction (and destruction) is to bring the religious capital into the twenty-first century and to turn it into a model global city for development and modernization. In the words of Mecca’s governor Khalid ibn Faisal Al Saud, modernization is meant to transform Mecca into the most beautiful “First World” city. The lucrative construction projects have in reality also changed the religious experience of the modern pilgrimage, along with other Islamic rituals. They have, for one, increased class inequalities and created “gated communities” where rich worshippers can separate themselves from the crowds. Effectively, people who can afford the four-to-five million-dollar apartments or pay upward of three thousand dollars per night for a hotel room do not have to hear, smell, touch, or be near other pilgrims. They can pray in group [jama‘a] from the luxury of their homes or hotel rooms, a practice sanctioned by former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz in 1998. This separation defeats the purpose of the pilgrimage and the sense of spiritual communion it is meant to generate as well as the erosion, if only temporarily, of boundaries (national and class) that it customarily enforces, represented in the humble, white robe that pilgrims wear. In addition to creating class inequities and distinctions among pilgrims, these mega projects have thus far forced a hundred thousand residents of Central Mecca from different socioeconomic classes out of their homes. The former residents have received meager compensation in return and are without legal recourse. Some have ended up in slums less than a mile away from the Grand Mosque, hidden from visitors’ eyes by the Abraj al-Bayt Towers and other large-scale developments.

While the first wave of destruction at such a massive scale in Central Mecca began in the late-1990s, it was only in the last few years, mostly since 2011, that the mass media paid these phenomena any attention. In the near absence of scholarly works that account for, or theorize, Mecca’s urban transformations, the media reasoned that Wahhabi iconoclasm, rooted in literal interpretations of the Quran and the prophetic traditions, was behind the state’s drive for urban destruction. While practices of memorialization counter official Wahhabi beliefs, seeing them as a mediated form of worship and an association with God and equating all such actions with polytheism, the Saudi regime has, since 1928, managed the iconoclastic desires of religious zealots, using these for political purposes when necessary. The Shi‘i shrines of Najaf and Karbala’ as well as Sufi houses of worship in the Hijaz, for instance, constituted prime idolatrous targets, which the Wahhabis attacked beginning in the eighteenth century. Historically, however, such acts of destruction were equally motivated by economic and territorial conquest. Accordingly, the religious establishment took up places of religious importance as sites of material and discursive contestation against those they considered non-Orthodox Sunni Muslims—a flexible term that was used for those who opposed Al Saud’s political project.

Blaming religious zeal for such mundane global urban phenomena that are part and parcel of capitalist development and the reorganization of modern power misses the forest for the trees. Such facile explanations that can only see the Middle East through the lens of religion reproduce images of Saudi Arabia as retrograde and frozen in a bygone time instead of revealing the political and economic reasoning behind Mecca’s redevelopment projects. Indeed, to create new opportunities for capital reproduction and accumulation amid the globally driven post-Gulf War economic crisis, the regime transformed the Saudi landscape into a rent-generating asset through developing the real estate and tourism sectors of the economy. Local property speculation, generally insulated from the declining global real estate market, thus became part and parcel of petro-capitalism, a “spatial fix” (David Harvey, 2001) for a petro-regime dealing with its worst crisis of legitimation amid fluctuating oil revenue streams and constricting investment opportunities. While development projects in Mecca turned the regime’s enormous amounts of surplus petro-capital into a regular source of rent and bolstered the importance of real estate development to economic life, they also tied the economic elites to the regime’s political and economic longevity, consolidating the power of the ruling family and its economic allies. The lucrative construction projects therefore further entrenched the economic elites and capitalist classes within the fledgling property regime’s fold, bolstering its longevity in the face of increasing popular dissent.

The destruction of one form of historical memory in Mecca, which Wahhabi iconoclasm nonetheless supports, has been critical for the consolidation of Saudi political authority. It has also been complemented by the creation and memorialization of an official, secular history in Riyadh based on Al Saud’s past, a process that has received scant attention in both journalistic and scholarly analyses. The property regime’s multibillion-dollar reinvigoration of the capital’s urban and cultural plans, the remaking of historic Riyadh, and the creation of a heritage industry therein, was driven by the rulers’ concern with how the built environment had changed social relations and engendered a loss of what they understood to be traditional Saudi identity and culture. They attributed such a perceived loss of identity to have caused popular dissent during the Gulf War. As such, multiple large scale projects, such as the Dir‘iyya Redevelopment Program, the King Abdulaziz Historical Center, the redevelopment of historic Riyadh, the multiple architectural monuments that have emerged in the city, and various archeological sites and cultural redevelopment plans, have aimed to solidify a sense of Saudi identity rooted in allegiance to Al Saud’s monarchy.

Ironically, the Wahhabi establishment has been a central partner in the move towards materializing and territorializing official Saudi history. In my broader work, I further explore this dissonance through a genealogical reading of the material and spatial politics that have been central to Saudi petro-modernity, social engineering, and economic diversification. I show how Mecca and Riyadh constitute sites where multiple, simultaneous projects are taking place. They present a point of intersection of manifold forces of economy, society, culture and ideology. The two cities are sites where different social orders, time, and densities exist in the same social space and for different ideological goals. The redevelopment of both cities, and the contradictions therein, are central to practices of statecraft and techniques of governance. The erasure of alternative accounts of state formation through commemoration in Riyadh and destruction in Mecca is, at heart, a continuation of Al Saud’s imperial project and the deep-seated violence to the everyday, the spiritual, and the temporal.

 

[This article was first published in print in the Cairo Observer in April 2015.]


We Are, You Are

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Graphic 1

City-centers are named as such because they gather people. They should not belong, be managed, or be controlled by a few. They should not be accessible only to a few. They are where all inhabitants walk, meet, stroll, buy, stop, and rejoin. City-centers are also where we protest. They are where we contest and subvert. They will always be as such.

We are not the margins, but the centers. They have placed security officers, concrete blocks, and check points. They are the ones that have controlled and perverted our sidewalks, gardens, and public squares. They have built walls against us and around the spaces where we gather and unite.

If in May 1968 the French youth dreamt of sand under the cobblestones of Paris, we in August 2015 reclaim the existing land of Beirut that has been expropriated from under our feet by the privatization of our common space in downtown Beirut. These are the sentiments  I have tried to express by the slogan “Under Solidere's pavement, our land.”

Graphic 2

Through many of the numerous conversations with my students at the [private] American University of Beirut (AUB), I have come to realize that I am speaking with a young audience largely unaware of the incongruity of living in a city whose center is privately owned. Inspired by these discussions, I have stated facts and described a situation: “This is not Beirut, this is the logo of a private company that owns the downtown of Beirut.” Here, the logo used is the one designed and appropriated by Solidere, the company I mention.

These issues are not marginal to the protests, they are central to them. The privatization of public property is at the core of corruption issues that have scarred the last ten years of our lives and reinforced our apathy and powerlessness. Adjacent to private beach resorts are the shores of public beaches polluted by the trash of private beaches. On the margins of polished downtown Beirut are the poor dirty neighborhoods of Beirut, tainted by the waste of polished downtown. Under bridges that connect business districts of the city and its surroundings are their piles of junk where we wait for our privately-run buses, vans, taxis—all of them polluting  the air we breathe.

Graphic 3

“Remove the trash from our streets. They are the trash, we are the streets.” This is the feeling we share under that cheap metaphor of a country we are living in, buried under its own dirty corrupt governance.

Graphic 4

We are the generation that witnessed their money laundering and denounced it with little to no reaction or result, until it literally stunk to unbearable levels. “Your money laundering pollutes our environment.”

Graphic 5

Finally your face was revealed, your smell came up, #YouStink.

Those who do not go down the streets to denounce, shout, and fight are all accomplices. I, we, those who do, are: “Citizens, and not accomplices.”

سَلَميّة، أمُّ القاهرة

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بين انقضاء أجل ربيع وبدء فصلٍ حائرٍ من الغبار، بين انتصارات أحلام اليقظة وفوحانات الهزائم الدهرية القِدم، بين أنهارٍ ممددّةٍ على خرائط دروس الجغرافية وعطشٍ طفوليِّ الشغف، بين قصائد وأغانٍ تمشّط شعر الريح الضجرة وحناجر تصرخ بجمرٍ مطفأ .. بين هذا الركام الآدمي المدثّر بسماءٍ مشققة ذات عيون من طين وآذانٍ لم تند منذ عصورٍ لفحيح الابتهالات .. وسط هذا العبث، تجثمُ سلمية على سفرها المكتوب بمناديل التلويح التي ربما كانت ذات وجدٍ مضى أو ذات وجدٍ آتٍ زرقاء ..

هنا الأخضر دقّ أوتاد خيامه، هنا كانت قنوات الكسل تجري وتجري لا تلوي على غياب، هنا كتب العصاة أسفارهم، هنا شغفُ المتنبي .. وهنا سكب بعضهم ماء وجدهم الإلهي حتى اخضرت كفّا الله .. وهنا الأخوة أراقوا دم الذئب على قميص أخيهم الذي كانت تحمله قافلة مصر غرباً و غرباً حتّى سواحل الأطلسي ..
وهنا كم ملأ ديك الجن أكؤسه على ندمه الوردي اللون … هنا حفرنا قبور الأجداد لنزرعها بالقطن .. وهنا انقطع آخر خيطٍ بيننا وبين الإله ….
هكذا يدلل السلميون على خيباتهم، وهكذا يحتفون بالهزيمة حينما الجميع يهللون لأمجادٍ كاذبة .. هكذا يحتفون بانقضاء أجلِ ربيعٍ لم يأتِ أصلاً، ويحتفون بحمّى عطشهم الباسق كمآذن الريبة، يكتبون ضحكهم على أفول الأعمار، لهم جنة من يباسٍ عرضها جسد الريح، ناياتهم وحدها تعرف كيف ترتب فوضى غضب الطبيعة، حيث الكلام له صدر أعمارهم، يتحلّقون حوله باسطين خطاياهم بين يديه، ونساؤهم مشغولات بإعداد مؤونة أولادهنَّ الراحلين إلى جهاتٍ ليست صالحة للأحلام .

سلالات :
" العمر شاقٌّ لولا الشعر " هكذا يقول السّلمي، ولربما قالها عجوز قبل مائة عام، حيث الليل أطول من انتظاره، وحيث كان الشتاء يومها أمّاً، والريح تحرث لهاث الكروم في طمأنينة وادعة، " لو لم يكن في الدنيا عتابا - " يا الله كم أنت شفوق بعبادك ..
هنا ندمٌ كالحٌ اسمه الشعر، حين تتساقط قصاصات الحب من جيوب التلاميذ على دروب المدارس، ولربما يحشى ما تبقى في شقوق الجدران خشية مباغتة الأستاذ لتفتيش الصفحات الأخيرة من دفاتر الحساب .
كلُّ شيء هنا مرهون لهذا الفتى المدلل الذي اسمه الشعر، الحبيبات والأمهات والفصول والأعمار، فدى عينيه، قداسة العصيان تسكب قدّام قدميه، لا شيء هنا له المطلقُ إلاه، ولا شئ له إغراؤه، حقائب السفر نحو مقاعد درس المدن فارغة إلاّ منه، حيث تُترك الكتب السرية محفوظة لدى أمّهاتٍ لا يقرأنها مخبوءة في عنابر القمح وفي طيّات وسائد الحبيبات .
سلالات من الأسماء تترنح على خارطة الشعر العربي ضمتها دفتي سفر هذه المدينة العجيبة، أغمض التاريخ عينيه عن أسماء وأسماء حومن حولها ولربما كانت فيهم أو كانوا فيها .. امرؤ القيس يقطع براريها دون ذكرها في رحلة عذابه الثأرية، عمر بن كلثوم يتغنى بخمرها الذي دوّى صداه على ملء رمل الجزيرة "ولا تُبقي خمور الأندرينا " حين الأندرين هي امتداد لسهول سلمية صاحبة الشهرة العظيمة بأعنابها ومعاصر خمورها - بين المدينتين 40كم - .
أبو تمام يقف أمام باب ديك الجن منتظراً الإذن بالدخول بينما الأخير الذي غص مجلسه بالندماء والشعراء والمريدين يوزّع على ضيوفه الشعر والبشاشة والكؤوس التي لا تفرغ من الخمر أبداً ..
علامة سلمية الشعرية الفارقة كانت - أحمد بن الحسين - والذي لم يكن متنبئاً لولا ركونه الدائم للقرامطة - عصاة العصر- وجعله من سلمية ملاذه ومنجاه كلما ضاقت به السبل وفسحة الكلام وسماء السماوة .
يضعف القرامطة وتبهت ألوان مدينتهم - سلمية - ليقع المتنبي أسيراً بيد عامل الإخشديين على حمص ويعتقل في " كوكتين " - الآن كيتلون 5 كم شمال سلمية- والتي كانت مقر أمراء أعراب الشام المتعاطفين مع العصاة، ويساق موثقاً بقيدٍ من خشب الصفصاف إلى حمص ليذوق مرارة السجن وجزاء من يقول لا في عصر اتفق فيه الجميع على كلمة نعم، ويوثّق المتنبي قصة اعتقاله بقوله :
زعم المقيم بكوكتين بأنه من آل هاشم بن عبد مناف
فأجبتهُ مُذ صرتَ من أبنائهم صارت قيودهم من الصفصاف

يعود المتنبي إلى سلمية بعد سنوات مع سيف الدولة لتظهر المدينة في قصيدة يصف فيها معركة جرت في بواديها فيقول :
تثيرُ على سلمية مسبطرّاً\ تناكر تحته لولا الشّعارُ
لكن هذه العودة مختلفة فقد خلت المدينة من العصاة وغدت يباباً تتلاقفها أيدي دويلات الشام الواهنة، ينام الشعر طويلاً وينام حس العصيان لدى أبنائها ليصحو مع بداية بنائها الأخير عام 1848 حيث تتالى قوافل عائلات سكان جبال ساحل الشام وسهل عكار ويعود الشعر على أيدي أمراء العتابا علي زينو وبدر القطريب ثم يبدأ آل الجندي سلالة الشعر والتنوير على يد أحمد الجندي وأخوه أنور ومن ثم أبناء أخيهما، الأكبر الدكتور الطبيب سامي الجندي و السياسي والأديب والمترجم المشهور ووزير إعلام حكومة 1963وسفير الثقافة العربية في فرنسا لسنوات طويلة والذي نقل إلى العربية رائعة أراغون " مجنون إلسا " وأول من عرّف القارئ العربي على إيزابيل الليندي بنقله “بيت الأرواح” عن الفرنسية وصاحب “كسرة خبز” و”سليمان” كتابه الأخير الذي كان بمثابة سيرة ذاتية للمدينة ولجيل كامل هزَّ في يومٍ من الأيام جزع الحلم فلم يتساقط عليه سوى الخيبة .


الأخ الثاني لأسرة آل الجندي هو أبو لهب الشاعر علي والذي لم يتقن مهنة وعلى مدار سنوات حياته سوى الشعر، صاحب الصوت المتفرّد في المشهد الشعري العربي الحديث، والذي هو من أكثر الشعراء العرب المعاصرين إخلاصاً لحالة الشاعر، وكأني أراه الآن يحفظ طاولات مشارب البلدة عن ظهر قلب ولهاثه وضحكه واحمرار وجنتيه لمّا يزل مائلاً على غبش كاساتها. عاصم الجندي الصحفي والروائي والأديب وصديق كارلوس وحافظ أسراره وصاحب القلم النقدي اللاذع والذي توفي ودفن في لبنان منذ ثلاثة أعوام، إنعام القاص والروائي والناقد والمتنقل بين باريس ونيويورك كذلك خالد النقابي والمناضل البارز والذي تنقل وفصائل منظمة التحرير بين بيروت وتونس حتى استقر به مقام الموت في غزّة حيث دفن هناك.


الملفت في سلمية أنها أثرت المشهد الشعري العربي الحديث عموماً والسوري خصوصاً بأسماء لم تجتمع لمدينة من المدن، وقد قيل نقدياً عن ثالوث قصيدة النثر المتمثّل في (سليمان عوّاد، محمد الماغوط ، إسماعيل عامود ) وهم أبناء المدينة ومن جيل متقارب نسبيّاً حيث كتبوا وطبعوا في نهاية الأربعينيات وبداية الخمسينيات، ولعل الماغوط صاحب التجربة الأهم والذي شرب من راحتيه معظم من كتب قصيدة النثر من بعده،  وإذا ما سألته أن يزورها يقول " ... إلى أين أذهب، من أعرفهم ماتوا، والبلدة تغيرت، الناس والشوارع وحتّى الهواء لم يعد ذاك الذي أعرف، والمحبون كرماء لا تنقطع إمداداتهم من أخبار وعرق بلدي وفطائر السلق)، دونما سلمية ينفّذ محمد الماغوط شيخوخته وحيداً، ويقيناً يعرف أنها لم تزل كما قال عنها قبل ثلاثين عاماً أن " لسنابلها أطواقٌ من النمل / إلاّ أنها لا تعرف الجوع أبداً ... " فايز خضور يسترق أخبار البلدة وناسها من كل قادم، وحيداً هو كذلك في دمشق، دائماً له شروح على هوامش فلسفة النزق، أكثر شعراء سلمية تأثُراً بجفاف البلدة وصحرائها وريحها، يتظاهر أنه مرتاح من علاقاتها التافهة، ولا يعنيه أن يكون بعيداً عنها شيئاً، لكنه وكأني أراه موشوماً بفقدها، وربما تمنى أن تملأ أذنيه بالغبار من جديد، أو أن يعود إلى نفس الزاوية ويشرب من نفس كأس النبيذ على ذات الطاولة في خمارة أبو بسام سيفو.


سلالات شعرية مرخية في فضاء المشهد الشعري السوري كجدائل امرأة افريقية أفرزتها البلدة خلال عقودها الستة الأخيرة، الأسماء كثيرة وكثيرة جدّاً،/ أكرم قطريب، علي سفر، خضر الآغا، مخلص ونوس / مولعة بانكسارات المعلمين السابقين للمهنة، لكن على ما يبدو هم أكثر رقّة وأكثر إخلاصاً للبلدة من سالفيهم.
علائق الغرابة التي تربط هذا الوسط مع مفردات خاصة بإرادة الحياة / الخمر، العصيان، الشّعر، و الأهم الجنون /، علي الجندي على ما يُروى يسرّ لصديقه ممدوح عدوان حين رأى سيّدة صغيرة وجميلة مع طفلها في أحد شوارع دمشق أنه يحمد الله أن أمهاتنا لم تكن كذلك !؟، صديقي الشاعر أكرم قطريب يتصل أسبوعياً بي من أمريكا ليقول لي بأن " ضع سماعة الهاتف باتجاه الشارع أريد أن أسمع صوت الطراطير "، والطرطورة شاحنة بدائية محلية الصنع ذات صوت مزعج جدّاً وتعمل بمحرك دراجة نارية. المرحوم أحمد الجندي يقرأ في الصحيفة قصيدة لأحد الشعراء وهو من أبناء البلد يقول في نهايتها " ويبصق في وجهي القدر " يتصل الجندي بمقهى الهافانا ويطلب الشاعر صاحب القصيدة وكان يعرف أنه يتواجد هناك ليسأله بتهذيب : هل أنت الأستاذ فلان فيجيب الشاعر بنعم فيبصق أبو حيان مباشرة عبر السماعة، فيغضب الأخير ويصيح من المتكلم فيقول له الجندي أنا القدر ؟!


جانب مهم آخر لصعاليك سلمية هو هذا الإصرار الدائم على تركها والاغتراب عنها، وكل منهم هو عاصمة ثقافية مستقلة وعلى طريقته أينما حل، تجوال وحقيبة صغيرة وجسد يحمل عينين خاويتين وروحاً نهمة وبضعة أصابع تتلمس العالم المفتوح على العراء، أهل البلدة عموماً منتشرون في أصقاع العالم، تشعر أن الغربة لديهم لا لغاية السفر ولا لجمع المال وتحسين الأحوال .

مشاهد 

تجثم سلمية على مساحة ممتدة من الغبار والعطش والحصار، وتبدو للقادم إليها كوشم في يد الصحراء المعروقة، تدخل شوارعها لترى كيف تتداخل روائح غناء البدو بخمارات بائسة يعرف أهل البلدة أمكنتهم فيها جيداً بالسيارات العتيقة الصفراء المكدسة في ساحة البلدة كالسلاحف الإستوائية، بمساجد أنيقة وجميلة بدون مآذن "لهم فلسفة طريفة مفادها أنك تستطيع الوصول إلى الله دون أن تصعد سلّماً". الحمام الأثري في وسط البلدة معلم أثري جميل وهو صغير نسبياً ولكنه أنيق، وقد أغلق منذ أن جفت مياهها الجارية وقنواتها في بداية الخمسينيات .
الفندق القديم الفرنسي الطراز والذي تقاسمته فيما بعد وزارة الثقافة ولاعبو النرد والمقامرون وأخيراً السكارى .
بقايا سور البلدة الأثري القديم والذي هدّم لتشيد مكانه دارٌ للحكومة " فقد ملّت الأخيرة أن تكون بدون دار و تضطر للمبيت في الشارع " وها جلست الحكومة في دارها الجديدة بعد أن أخرجت التاريخ وتركته وحيداً يتجوّل في أزقة البلدة .
قلعة شماميس الجاثمة إلى الشمال الغربي من المدينة، تتويج لصمت التاريخ وغموضه، سرّها في هذه الرهبة العارمة التي تنتاب الزائر لها، من أغرب قلاع الشام بناءً و أكثرها منعة، لكي تصلها يجب أن تصعد تلاً شديد الانحدار ثم خندقاً عظيماً يلفها بشكل دائري ربما كان يملأ بالمياه فيما مضى، وبين أبراجها بئر عظيمة الفوهة شديدة العمق تحتار في سر حفرها وجدواه في هذا المكان العالي والضيق، وثمة عدّة آبار تخزينية أخرى ... المهم في الموضوع أن ثمة طراز بنائي كان سائداً في العصور السحيقة لم ينتبه له المهتمون، قوامه العبث .
في وسط البلدة مسجد ومدفن أثري مبني من البازلت يسمّى مسجد الإمام إسماعيل صاحب المقام هو رضي الدين عبدالله، ولا أدري لم يسميه أهل البلدة بالإمام إسماعيل، وعلى عادة مساجد الشام ترى وبشكل واضح في جدران وتضاعيف المسجد الرموز والمنحوتات الوثنية اليونانية ثم المسيحية بعهودها المختلفة وأخيرا الإسلامية، وقد كان قبل سنوات داثراً وخرباً بعد أن احترق التابوت الذي يضم الإمام المذكور وليكتشف بمحض الصدفة أن داخل الجدث هناك أكوام من المخطوطات النادرة المكتوبة في الفترة السرية من الدعوة الإسماعيلية ومعظمها في الفلسفة والعقيدة والتأويل، وقد ذهب هذا الكنز رماداً تذروه رياح الإهمال، تم ترميم المسجد في فترة قصيرة على يد سلطان البهرة (شق من الإسماعيلية) وأتى يوم افتتاحه أناس من الهند وباكستان وأوربة الغربية وكندا، وحيث غصت البلدة بالالآف من غريبي الوجه واليد واللسان، وأتموا طقوسهم ثم غادروا كما حضروا دون أن يدري بهم أحد.

تراث البلدة وفولكلورها وخاصة الغنائي منه

فولكلور جميل ومميز وغريب، خلطة عجيبة من بدو الصحراء وعتابا الجبل وكربلائية مجلوبة من تحت سرير الفرات، يقصد أهالي المناطق المجاورة والبعيدة مغنياً وشاعراً شعبياً هو صادق حديد والآن ولده محمد لكي يحتكموا لديه في تفسير بيت من العتابا أو يسمعوا قليلاً من شدو ربابته البدوية .
تتمشى في متاهات البلدة التي ربّما زوراً تسمّى شوارع، يلفت النظر هذا الكم الغريب من المجانين العقلاء، " أبو حجر، جندل، ألوز يشتم الناس على جميع أوزان الشعر ويحصل على كفاف يومه من شتائمه المقفاة .... "
يتكلّم الناس بأسى عن أشخاص انضموا إلى هذه السلالة و بالأمس كانوا معلمين و أطباء وربما مناضلين سابقين ...".
الليل فسحة أهل البلد ومنجاهم من الاختناق، عند أوّل حلوله يعرف الناس أمكنتهم جيّداً في مشارب وخمارات البلدة البائسة / سقراط، الجندول، العرزال، القوس، سيسيليا، جيتان، أبو العبد وردة، أبو بسام سيفو .../ أسماء لأماكن ينحشر الناس فيها ليلاً كراكبي الحافلات، كل يرخي بهمومه على طاولةٍ مطوّبة على اسمه، وسط دخان السجائر والأضواء النائسة تشرئب أعناق الأحلام ويعلو الضحك المخنوق وتتعرى الهزيمة حتّى آخر الشهوة .
أشخاص مرّوا في سفر المدينة لم يُذكروا إلاّ لماماً‌، اختاروا الهامش حينما هامشهم أثمن وأقوى من متون صفحاتنا، أبو علي حسين الحلاق، تعرفه بيروت ولندن ونيقوسيا والقاهرة وأسمرة وبغداد، ولم يعرفه أبناء مسقط رأسه إلا حينما جاءها مسجّى، رجل الأحلام القومية وصديق عبد الناصر وخليل الوزير وصاحب دار الكلمة، دار نصف المعمورة ليعود من منفاه اللاطوعي لكي يوارى الثرى في أحضان البلد .
شخص آخر لا بد من الإشارة إليه هو أبو علي برهان النظامي الفنان والملوّن الجميل، وحيداً تراه في مرسمه وبين أكداس من اللوحات، يتعامل مع اللون بهوس غريب ويرسم طالما بين يديه عصارات الألوان، في بيته تساءلت عن سر وجود لوحة تجريدية على باب خم الدجاج، فخبرني ضاحكاً أنه أراد أن يرسم فلم يجد قماشاً ولم يكن يملك ثمنه فرسم على باب بيت الدجاجات، دائماً يتكلم بأسى ويقول إنه يرسم لسيارة القمامة، حيث ينظف مرسمه بين الحين والآخر ويضع اللوحات في أكياس لتأخذ مكانها بين أكداس الزبالة، أساه الأكبر في وحدته وفي فقد أصدقائه، وذروته أن صديق عمره سامي الجندي مات بين يديه .

أرقام وأسماء :
سلمية، مدينة قديمة مرّت عليها عهود العموريين، الآراميين، الآشوريين، الكلدان، اليونان، الرومان ...
سُميت بهذا الإسم تخليداً لذكرى معركة سلاميس البحرية 480 ق.م التي جرت بين اليونان والفرس وانتصر فيها اليونان بقيادة القائد " تيمو ستوكل ".
اشتهرت منذ القديم بالأقنية الآرامية الرومانية التي زاد عددها عن 300 قناة تروي بحدود مساحة 1000 كم مربع .
تقع في سهل أفيح مترامٍ ذي هواء نقي إلى الشرق من حماه بحدود 33 كم وشمال شرق حمص بحدود 45 كم بين نهر العاصي وجبال البلعاس والبادية الشامية .
خربها كسرى ابرويز عام 602 م وأعاد بناءها العباسيون عام 132 هجري، كما جرت فيها المعركة الفاصلة التي أعلنت سقوط الدولة الأموية وقيام الدولة العباسية في مرج الأخرم غرب سلمية على بعد 5 كم عنها .
أصبحت مع بداية القرن الثالث الهجري مركزاً لدعاة الدولة الفاطمية، ومنها خرج الإمام الإسماعيلي محمّد المهدي إلى شمال أفريقيا عام 289 هجرية، وبايعه العرب الأفارقة وقبائل البربر في مدينة سجلماسة كأوّل خليفة فاطمي عام 297 هجرية . ثم لتتوسع الدولة الفاطمية بعد فتح مصر وبناء مدينة القاهرة على يد المعز لدين الله الفاطمي وقائده جوهر الصقلي، واستحقت سلمية أن يسميها طه حسين بأم القاهرة .
خربها القرامطة بعد عملية نزاع داخل الدعوة عام 290 هجرية بعد أن قتلوا كل سكانها " خرجوا منها وما فيها عين تطرف " .
أعاد بناءها الأيوبيون مع بداية الحروب الصليبية وجعلوها مقراً خلفياً لقواتهم المحاربة لقربها من وادي الفرات ومناطق الإمداد في الشرق، ونظراً لأهميتها الجغرافية والحربية والاقتصادية وقع خلاف داخل الأسرة الأيوبية بين صاحب حماه وصاحب حمص على ملكيتها.
خرّبها تيمور لنك عام 803 هجرية، وظلت على خرابها حتّى عهد السلطان العثماني عبد المجيد حيث أمر بإعادة بنائها عام 1848 م مع تسهيلات لساكنيها من إعفاء من الجندية والضرائب وتمليكهم أراضٍ خصبة للزراعة، وتواترت أسر من جبال الإسماعيليين في الساحل السوري وسهل عكار وبعض المناطق الأخرى وتمتد المدينة وتتوسع ويعمر ريفها بالعديد من القرى والمزارع والضياع .
أصابها الجفاف عام 1950 م حيث جفت أقنيتها ولاحق الناس الماء في باطن الأرض وسط فترة ما يسمى بجنون القطن، ويبست كرومها وبساتينها وتركها قسم من سكانها وهم الآن موزعون في كل أنحاء العالم .
أشتهر أهلها بتنوّع مشاربهم الفكرية ونزوعهم القومي وحبّهم للثقافة والإطلاع ربّما أكثر من أي مدينة أخرى، وخرّجت العديد من الشعراء والمفكرين في كافة مناحي الثقافة والعلوم.

قمامة لبنان من الفساد إلى صفر- نفايات: مقابلة للوضع بين زياد أبي شاكر ورانية المصري

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في الحوار التالي يناقش المهندس والمنظّم زياد أبي شاكرسياسات الإدارة الفاسدة والفاشلة لنفايات لبنان الصلبة المسببة للتلوث، بالإضافة إلى الخيارات العقلانية لصفر نفايات.تتضمن المقابلة التالية أربعة أجزاء، بحيث يمكنكم أن تنقروا.عليهما بشكل منفصل. بوسعكم أن تقرأوا أيضاً النص العربي المدوّن المرافق.

زياد أبي شاكر مهندس متعدد الاختصاصات متخصص في بناء مصانع لتدوير النفايات البلدية على المناطق المختلفة ويعمل ضد اتجاه  مصنع إعادة تدوير مركزي ضخم. وحين كان يقوم بالأبحاث في جامعة روتجرز في نيو جيرسي، في الولايات المتحدة الأميركية طوّر فريقه تقنية حديثة لمعالجة و تدوير النفايات بعد فرزها، تقوم على مبدأ التخمير السريع الذي يحول النفايات العضوية الى سماد زراعي بواسطة مواد تسمى الأنزيمات. بعد عودته إلى لبنان في ١٩٩٦، أنشأ زياد شركة “سيدار إنفايرومنتال”، وهي منظمة هندسية بيئية وصناعية  تهدف إلى بناء مصانع تدوير لإنتاج أسمدة عضوية موثقة دون ترك مادة نفايات للتخلص منها، بل يعاد تدويرها إلى شكل جديد من المنتج كي تُستخدم مرة بعد أخرى.

وبما أن معظم البلديات في لبنان والشرق الأوسط غير قادرة على  شراء مصانع تدوير نفايات، قام زياد بإعداد عقد بثلاثة طرق تقوم بمقتضاه المصارف المحلية بمنح شركته قروضاً ميسرة لبناء مصانع إعادة التدوير وتدفع البلديات فقط لخدمة إعادة التدوير والتخمير في أقساط شهرية مريحة لا تتجاوز ٥ دولارات لكل منزل كل شهر.مؤخراً، طور زياد وفريقه الهندسي، بعد أربع سنوات من البحث، تكنولوجيا جديدة تحول الأكياس البلاستيكية إلى لوحات بلاستيكية صلبة، سميت ألواح ـ إيكو، تستخدم خارج المنزل كي تحل مكان الألواح الخشبية والفولاذية. فازوا بجائزة إنرجي غلوب الدولية لعام ٢٠١٣ بسبب هذه العملية الثورية. حالياً، يقومون بتحويل هذه التقنية من استخدام وقود الأحافير لتوليد الطاقة المطلوبة لتجميع كتلة حيوية من أجل مصدر للطاقة قابل للتجديد. 

حصل على جائزة الجمعية الأميركية للمهندسين الزراعيين  للتصميم في ١٩٩٣ من أجل تصميمه الذي يربط  إدارة النفايات البلدية بالزراعة. وفي ٢٠٠١، حصل على جائزة شركة فورد للسيارات للبيئة وحمايتها في الشرق الأسط. وفي ٢٠١٤ سُمّي  المبدع الاجتماعي للعالم العربي من قبل مؤسسة ساينرغوس في مدينة نيويورك. وفي شباط ٢٠١٤ حصل على جائزة مؤتمر المسؤولية الاجتماعية للشركات العالمي التي تدعى قيادة العالم الخضراء المستقبلية.

وفي نيسان ٢٠١٤ اختير في قائمة المائة مواطن العالمي الجيدين وصانعي التغيير المبدعين السنوية من قبل مجلة “غود”، وهي مجلة أميركية. 

في حزيران ٢٠٠٣، حصل على شهادة تقدير من قبل الحكومة السورية لخطته الكلية لجعل صناعة الغذاء السورية متماشية مع بروتوكولات الإنتاج النظيف . وسّع دراسته كي تُطبق في جميع أنحاء الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا وحصل على شهادة تقدير من الجامعة العربية في نيسان ٢٠٠٦. 

 

إن عمله في تطوير مجتمعات صفر نفايات كسب له موقعاً للتحدث في مؤتمر تيد أكس بيروت في أيلول ٢٠١١. ظهر عدة مرات على شاشة التلفزيون من أجل عمله الاجتماعي المبتكر الذي يعزز حماية البيئة وتوفير وظائف لتحسين العالم. يحمل شهادة اختراع في تقنية تحويل المواد العضوية دينامياً دون تلوث وكتب بشكل غزير حول السياسات والمسائل والاتجاهات المستقبلية البيئية، يعيش زياد ويعمل في بيروت. لبنان.

 

 

 

Ekumenopolis ve Otesi: Imre Azem ile bir STATUS/الوضع Soylesisi

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Ekümenopolis ve Ötesi: İmre Azem ile bir STATUS/الوضع Söyleşisi

Bu röportajda kent antropoloğu Duygu Parmaksızoğlu, Ekümenopolis filminin yönetmeni İmre Azem ile kentsel dönüşüm ve son filmi Yeniden İnşa Çağı konusunda söyleşiyor. Azem bu filminde küresel sermayenin kentleri nasıl şekillendirdiğini ele alıyor.

Aşağıdaki röportaj ayrı ayrı dinlenebilir dört parçadan oluşuyor. Ses kaydının dökümü ve İngilizce diline çevirisi aşağıdadır.

İmre Azem 1975 yılında İstanbul'da doğdu. 1998'de New Orleans'daki Tulane Üniversitesi'nin Siyaset Bilimi ve Fransız Edebiyatı bölümlerinden mezun oldu. Ayrıca Paris'teki Sorbonne Üniversitesi'nde Fransız Edebiyatı derecesini tamamlamak üzere çalışmalar yaptı. 1998 yılnda mezun olduktan sonra New York'a taşındı ve medya üzerine çalışmaya başladı. 2004'ten itibaren bağımsız projelerde fotoğraf yönetmeni ve editör olarak çalıştı. Aynı zamanda mobilya tasarımı ve yapımında çalıştı.

2007 yılında İstanbul'da neoliberal kentleşmeyi konu alan Ekümenopolis: Ucu Olmayan Şehir belgeselini yönetmek üzere İstanbul'a taşındı. 2011 yılında tamamlanan uzun metrajlı belgesel ödüle layık görüldü. İmre Azem aynı zamanda kent meselelerine dair raporlama ve eylem çalışmaları yapan gönüllü bir grup olan İstanbul Kent Hareketleri'nin bir üyesidir.

Son filmi Agorafobi Ekim 2013'te tamamlandı. İmre Azem halen mobilya yapmaya ve çoğu kentsel meselelere odaklanan aktivist filmler çekmeye devam ediyor. Azem, diken.com.tr için video haberciliği de yapıyor.

Please scroll down for English translation of transcript below.

You Have, We Have

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For the past several weeks I have sat alone in front of two screens: that of my television following the news, and that of my computer reacting to the news. I have written and drawn my anger, and shared it with friends—both on line and in person. I have gone down to the streets, with thousands of others. Now, at this historical moment of the country’s movements and struggle, I am now part of an “us.” We take back our streets, sea, and forests, and we leave them the walls, the parking meters, and the gates and their locks. They divide the profits of their bids and illegally extend their government power. We have legitimacy and people power.

These visuals, sentences, ideas, and causes, are the result of a collaborative effort. They are inspired by, conceived with, and executed through the help of friends. They are the sum of the victories this movement has won until this day, in only a few weeks. We have stopped their tenders. We tore down their walls, We have taken control of our public spaces, and now we demand legitimate representation in the state.

The Mayor of the One Percent

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Recently, Dr. Bilal Hamad, the head of the Municipality of Beirut, or mayor, made statements defending his record. His comments revealed a profound sense of frustration at the mayor’s subordinate position to that of the mohafez, or governor, who can veto and delay the municipality’s initiatives. 

Having heard this explanation for the deplorable performance of the city’s municipality for over a decade, and being involved in researching and teaching the institutional mechanisms that sustain public urban and regional planning, we wish to highlight the deeply problematic conception of the job of mayor implicit in Hamad’s statements.

As the mayor rightly complains, the mohafez indeed holds executive authority over the office of the mayor. Yet this statement omits the fact that the mayor is an elected authority, representing a constituency of hundreds of thousands of city dwellers. His job is to champion the inhabitants of Beirut and to use their voices, if needed, to expose and even shame public officials, including the mohafez, if they block initiatives that are in the interest of the ninety-nine percent. 

This requires the mayor to step outside private discussions behind closed doors to work within the public realm, rallying stakeholders to protect the future of the city from the private interests of the few. We do not mean that the mayor should organize a yearly community meeting with activists. We are advocating for institutional arrangements that turn urban dwellers into active participants in their city’s future, as has happened since the early 1990s in cities all around the world.

Would the mohafez consider, or even be able to block, a project for greening Beirut, if public opinion was invited to support this objective? Would he have delayed the opening of the city’s only park, Horch Beirut, had the mayor supported publicly the multiple organizations that have advocated for its opening for over a decade? Would the Council for Development and Reconstruction have considered razing neighborhoods in Ashrafiyyeh to make way for the Fouad Boutros highway, adopting the outdated planning approach of the 1960s, had the mayor stood with inhabitants and activists who have been actively mobilizing to stop the project?

Since the 1960s mayors around the world have resisted highway development in their jurisdictions, by supporting the efforts of resident protestors. Their roles are documented in case studies taught to urban planning students as models to follow. 

And how is it that, at a time when the paradigms of urban mobility have shifted globally to improving pedestrian walkways and shared transportation systems, the municipality of Beirut still invests in private car ownership, and strives to secure parking spaces for individual drivers?

Would parliament have continued to pass laws increasing land exploitation in prime sea-front areas had the municipality alerted city dwellers that Beirut would soon become a city without access to the sea? Would the municipality’s technical offices have considered providing permits to developers building in sea-front areas, decision entirely under the municipality’s jurisdiction, had the mayor signaled he would protect our beautiful corniche, and would not allow anyone to block our sea-view anymore?

Why does the mayor choose, instead, to endorse repeatedly the interests of private investors who continue to pour concrete along our coasts?  And why does the municipality find it a priority to place a security booth behind the fence closing off the Dalieh area, the largest natural open-access space in the city, hence protecting the interests of a handful of property owners over those of hundreds of thousands of Beirutis?

And is it true that the municipality is looking to purchase the Ramlet al-Baida public beach that was sold illegally to a private investor in the early 2000s with an enormous margin of profit for the investor? Why has the mayor not considered taking legal action to reverse this illegal land sale in the name of the common good of the city with which he is entrusted? And why has the mayor never contested, as several municipalities have done over recent weeks, the decision of the central government to hijack his authority to manage Beirut’s waste by delegating it to a private company at exorbitant rates?

These are only some of the questions that need to be asked. 

No one denies the subordinate position of municipalities in Lebanon nor the reluctance of the central government to devolve power to them. Yet, within these parameters, Jezzine has protected and expanded its public spaces, Baakline and Saida their waste management, Sour its public beaches, Zahleh its electricity, and Ghobeiri its cultural amenities, to name but a few. However, Beirut, with much greater financial means and political access, still lags behind.

Looking at the enormous number of civic organizations that have sought to improve the livability of Beirut over the past decades, frustration at the poor performance of the municipality only grows. During his tenure, Hamad has had more opportunity than any other mayor to work with civil groups and use their knowhow, but also their political bargaining power, to improve the livability of our city. His office has at its disposal the goodwill and heroic efforts of many creative groups advocating for environmentally sound and socially responsible futures.

However, the mayor has done little to marshal this for the benefit of Beirut’s inhabitants. Many of these groups have recently taken to the streets, frustrated with the absence of a public representative who can champion their claims and channel their energies to improve the livability of their city. In this, Hamad has failed to serve his constituency, opting instead to remain in favor with the one percent of the elite. 

Let us ask bluntly, who is the mayor’s constituency? To whom does he feel accountable? To whom does he want to show his achievements when June 2016 comes and his term ends? While the mohafez may have blocked some of his technically sound proposals to improve Beirut, where Hamad has failed is in being a loud voice for the people of our city in the face of the private interests that seek to plunder it.

As we approach the next municipal elections, the call is for Beirut’s inhabitants to step away form confessional elite politics and elect a true champion of their city and its livability. Recent protests usher hopes in this direction.

[This piece was first published in The Daily Star. It was published earlier in Arabic in an-Nahar, and Mayor Hamad's response is available here.] 

مدينة الرقة السورية: من المدنية إلى مستقبل مجهول

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منازل الدنيا أربعة (دمشق والرقّة والري وسمرقند)، هذا ما قاله الخليفة العباسي هارون الرشيد، أما الرقّة فهي محافظة في شمال شرق سورية تقع على ضفاف نهر الفرات، وفيها يلتقي رافده نهر البليخ، وفي اللغة العربية يعني اسمها الأرض الملساء التي يغمرها الماء ثم ينحسر عنها. أصبحت الرقة محافظة مستقلة عن دير الزور في ستينيات القرن الماضي، وحظيت باهتمام الحكومة السورية في السبعينيات بإقامة مشروعات حيوية مثل سدي الفرات والبعث إلا أنها تحولت خلال العقود القليلة الماضية إلى إحدى المدن المنسية، وسقطت من خطط الحكومة التنموية باستثناء محاولات متواضعة لتغيير واقعها في نهاية العقد الأول من الألفية الثالثة ولم يُكتب لها الاستمرار. 

الواقع الحالي

خرجت محافظة الرقة عن سيطرة الدولة السورية في بداية شهر آذار عام 2013، منذ ذلك الوقت والمدينة تصارع من أجل البقاء، آلاف المسلحين اقتحموا المدينة من جهاتها الأربع، يقول المواطن محمد الصالح: «يُقدر عدد الكتائب المسلحة التي دخلت مدينة الرشيد بأكثر من مئة كتيبة، ذات انتماءات مختلفة، منها مُبايع لتنظيم «القاعدة» مثل «جبهة النصرة»، ومنها يتبع لما يُسمى بـ«الجيش الحر»، وأخرى لا تتبع لأي جهة وهي عبارة عن مجموعة مارقين من أرباب السوابق، وسجناء بجنايات وجرائم مختلفة أطلق سراحهم من السجن المركزي إبان سقوط الرقة».

تحولت المدينة الأكثر هدوءاً في سورية منذ عقود إلى ساحة معركة مفتوحة بين تلك الكتائب، خلافات أحدثها تقاسم الغنائم والمسروقات، واختلاف الرؤى والمنهج الذي تتبعه كل واحدة، إلى أن أعُلن عن تشكيل تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» في المدينة من قبل بعض المنشقين عن «جبهة النصرة» بعد شهر من سقوط المدينة، وبعد تسعة أشهر من الصراع بدأت الكتائب بتصفية بعضها، وانتصر تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية «داعش» على جميع الكتائب ليُعلن رسمياً نشوء «ولاية الرقة» أولى ولاياته في الشام، ويتخذها عاصمة للتنظيم.

يوثق أحد الصحفيين ما جرى هناك، ورغم اعتزاله الصحافة خشية الموت إلا أنه يراقب ما يجري بصمت ويدونه في يوميات المدينة التي يكتبها، فيقول: «ما زال الناس في مدينة الرقة يحاولون إيجاد سبل للبقاء على قيد الحياة، وأنت تسير في شوارع المدينة تسمع لغات مختلفة، أصبح أهالي المدينة حتى الأميين منهم يميزون اللغات العالمية، الفرنسية هي الأكثر انتشاراً فعدد العائلات الفرنسية كبير».

تحولت ساحات المدينة العامة إلى منصات لتنفيذ أحكام الإعدام، والتمثيل بالجثث وتقطيع الرؤوس والأيدي والأرجل، يطغى على المدينة جو من الخوف والحذر، إلا أن سكانها اعتادوا مع مرور الوقت رؤية جثة معلقة على أحد أسوار الحدائق، أو رمي شخص من بناء شاهق، أو رجم امرأة بالحجارة حتى الموت، ويُعتبر جلد شخص وسط السوق مشهداً مألوفاً في مدينة يحكمها تنظيم الدولة.

يعيش عناصر تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» مع أسرهم وأطفالهم في بيوت من هاجروا من أهالي الرقة، ومن صودرت أملاكهم بتهمة تأييدهم للنظام «النصيري الكافر»، مقاتلون من جنسيات مختلفة تتجاوز سبعين جنسية بما فيها العربية يعيشون مع عائلاتهم في الرقة، لهم فيها الحكم المطلق، وأصدرت «الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام» قراراً فرضت بموجبه الحجاب والعباءة على الفتيات من عمر 11 سنة فما فوق، ومنعت لبس البنطلون للفتيات والتبرج والعطر الصارخ، كما مُنع سماع الأغاني، وإقامة حفلات الزفاف، ومُنع الشبان من ارتداء القلائد، وأُعلن أن عقوبة كل من يشرب الخمر أو لا يصوم شهر رمضان الجلد. وسبق أن أصدرت «الدولة الإسلامية» قراراً منعت بموجبه «الأراكيل» في المقاهي. بعد ساعة من صدور القرار اختفت «الأراكيل» من المدينة. ومنعت النساء من السفر خارج حدود «الولاية» إلا في حالات المرض المثبتة بتقرير طبي ممهور بخاتم أمير الطبية في «الولاية».

«ليست غاية تنظيم الدولة الذي تنتشر دورياته في أحياء المدينة وأسواقها، فرض العقوبات على مواطنيها، بل نشر تعاليم الدين الإسلامي كما جاء في فكر التنظيم، ونبذ البدع والعادات التي انتشرت بين الناس نتيجة جهلهم بالتعاليم الحقيقية للدين»، حسب ما يقوله أبو دجانة، أحد عناصر التنظيم.

تدين المدينة اليوم بالدين الإسلامي، ويدفع مسيحيوها جزية سنوية فُرضت عليهم لـ«بيت مال المسلمين» التابع للتنظيم، ولا يُجبرون على اعتناق الإسلام لكنهم يخضعون لتعاليم الدين الإسلامي شأنهم شأن المسلمين.

تُغلق المحال التجارية أبوابها قبيل كل صلاة، وتخلو المدينة من جميع سكانها، يُعتقل كل من يتأخر عن أداء فريضة الصلاة، يخضع لمحاضرة دينية في مقر «الحسبة» التابع للتنظيم من قبل شيوخ دين غير سوريين.

يدفع أهالي الرقة من أصحاب المنشآت والمحال التجارية زكاة أموالهم حسب ما يقدرها مكتب الزكاة بعد زيارة ميدانية لتلك المنشآت، كما أنهم يشرفون بشكل مباشر على عميات حصاد القمح وجني المحاصيل الزراعية ويأخذون نسبة منها كزكاة تُدفع لـ«بيت مال المسلمين».

تتميز فترة حكم تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» التي بدأت قبل عام ونصف بالأمان الذي فرضته بحد السيف، وهذا ما لم يجده المواطنون خلال فترة حكم كتائب «الجيش الحر»، وهذا يجعلهم يشعرون بالرضى إلى حد ما رغم السخط على بعض القوانين التي لم يألفوها بعد. 

الرقة جغرافياً

تمتد الرقة بين خطـي عرض (35.15 - 36.45 ْ م) وبين خطي طول (38.00 - 39.35 ْم) وتبلغ مساحتها 19622كم،2 حيث تشكل 10.6% من مساحة سورية. تشكل الرقة نقطة وصل بين المحافظات الشرقية ومحافظات القطر الشمالية والوسطى، يحدها من الشمال تركيا وتبلغ الحدود المشتركة معها نحو (78,5)كم، ومن الجنوب محافظتي حمص وحماة، ومن الغرب محافظة حلب، ومن الشرق محافظتي الحسكة ودير الزور، وتبعد مدينة الرقة عن مدينة حلب (200)كم، وعن مدينة دير الزور نحو (135)كم، وعن مدينة حماة (260)كم، وعن حمص نحو (265)كم، وعن الحسكة نحو (230)كم.

تمتاز محافظة الرقة بتنوعها المناخي، ومقوماتها الطبيعية والسياحية، إضافة لتوفر المواقع الأثرية الموغلة في القدم كسور الرافقة الأثري، وباب بغداد والجامع العتيق (جامع المنصور)، وقلعة جعبر، ومدينة الرصافة، وسورا، وهرقلة، وزالبا، وحصن مسلمة، وتل الخويرة، وعشرات من التلال الأثرية المتوضعة على ضفاف نهري الفرات والبليخ، ومن أهمها تل المريبط المغمور تحت مياه بحيرة الأسد، والذي شهد أول استيطان بشري في العالم، ويعود إلى الألف التاسع قبل الميلاد، وتل أبو هريرة، وعناب السفينة والشيخ حسن وغيرها.

كما كانت تشكل مقامات الصحابة عمار بن ياسر، ووابصة بن معبد الأسدي، وأبي بن قيس النخعي، والتابعي أويس القرني الموجودة في مدينة الرقة أحد أهم المواقع التي تنضوي تحت لواء السياحة الدينية إضافة إلى مقام النبي إبراهيم الخليل في منطقة عين العروس. إلا أن المواقع الدينية آنفة الذكر، تم تدميرها بشكل كامل من قبل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، وتفجيرها بحيث لم يبقَ لها أي أثر.

يتجاوز عدد سكان المحافظة مليون نسمة، ويتوزع النشاط البشري فيها بين الزراعة وتربية الحيوانات، وعدد من الصناعات الخفيفية كصناعة السكر، وزيت الزيتون، والمجبول الزفتي، والمركبات العلفية، وحلج القطن، والأقنية البيتونية.

يتوفر في محافظة الرقة المخزون المائي الأوفر في القطر العربي السوري، إذ يجري نهر الفرات في أراضيها قاطعاً مسافة تتجاوز (180)كم، ويشكل سد الفرات بحيرة الأسد البالغة مساحتها (674)كم2 ومخزونها المائي (14)مليون متر مكعب، وبحيرة سد البعث بمساحة قدرها (27)كم2. إضافة إلى نهري البليخ والجلاب، وبحيرة العلي باجلية القريبة من مدينة تل أبيض، والدلحة شرق مدينة الرقة.

الرقة تاريخياً

يرقى تاريخ مدينة الرقة إلى الألف الرابع قبل الميلاد، وسميت في البداية كالينيكوس، نسبة إلى سلوقس الأول، مؤسس المدينة، الذي كان يعرف أيضاً بهذا الاسم (ويقول البعض أن الاسم يعود إلى الفيلسوف اليوناني كالينيكوس الذي يعتقد أنّه توفي في الرقة).

ولموقع الرقة أهمية كبيرة حيث كانت في العصر البيزنطي مركزاً اقتصادياً وعسكرياً، لوقوعها على ضفاف نهر الفرات ووجود السهول الزراعية الخصبة فيها. فقد كانت مركزاً لتجمع البشر منذ العصور الحجرية القديمة، وموطناً لتقدم الحضارة، ومركزاً لتبادل السلع وتجميع الحاصلات والمؤن وتصديرها إلى بلاد كثيرة عبر الطريق المائي (الفرات) والذي كان صالحاً للملاحة حيث استخدمه الحيثيون ونقلوا فيه سلعهم إلى بابل والخليج العربي وإلى الهند، واستخدمه من جاء بعدهم من الشعوب.

في العصر الآرامي كانت الرقة عبارة عن إمارة آرامية تدعى (بيت آدين) وكانت عاصمتها تل برسيب وذلك في القرن الحادي عشر والعاشر والتاسع قبل الميلاد.

أما في العهد الإغريقي فقد عُرفت الرقة باسم (نيكفوريوم) حيث بناها الاسكندر الكبير حين اجتاز الفرات قبل أربيل. وسُميت (قالينيقوس) باسم سلوقس الثاني قالينيقوس الذي أسس مدينة جديدة أو جدد المدينة القديمة في سنة 244-242 ق.م.

وفي العهد الروماني سميت الرقة (كالينيكيوم) نسبة إلى الإمبراطور غلينوس المتوفي سنة 266 بعد الميلاد. وتقع المدينة الرومانية شرقي باب بغداد القائم حالياً في الرقة، ولم يبق لها أثر.

خربتها هزة أرضية فجددها الإمبراطور ليون الثاني الذي حكم الشرق في سنة 474م وسماها باسمه (ليونتوبوليس).

في العهد الأموي، اهتم الأمويون بالرقة واتصل تاريخهم بها كل مدة عهدهم فقد كانت محطتهم الى أرمينية، وكانت محطتهم إلى غزو حدود الروم وتمون جيوش الأمويين الى أرمينية وحدود الروم، وكانت تشرف على القبائل العربية في الجزيرة الفراتية. اهتم الخليفة الأموي هشام بن عبد الملك بالرقة فوصلها بمجموعة من الحصون والقصور لتوطيد الأمن ولتكون محطة لراحته وراحة حاشيته بين الشام والجزيرة والحدود البيزنطية التي كان يغزوها بنفسه، وعني بزراعة الرقة وبري أراضيها، بما فجر من الترع من نهر الفرات لسقي الأراضي. ومن أشهر الآثار الأموية في الرقة رصافة هشام التي أضحت في عهد الأمويين منتجعاً صيفياً بعد أن أضاف إلى عمرانها وطورها هشام بن عبد الملك، وكان له الفضل في أن تكون جنة في وسط سورية في زمانها، أسهم في عمرانها وازدهارها بتشييد قصرين اكتُشف أحدهما في إثر التنقيب عن آثارها، فعُرفت آنذاك باسم: (رصافة هشام). بعد نهاية حكم الأمويين في سورية، تابعت (الرصافة) ازدهارها حتى بداية القرن العاشر الميلادي. واشتُهرت بتعايش المسيحيين والمسلمين بدليل اكتشاف وجود عدة كنائس فيها، ومسجد له محرابان باتجاه الجنوب وشارع مستطيل محاط بأعمدة رائعة، وقد هُدمت إبان غزوات التتار كلياً. 

حاضرة الخلافة

ازدهرت الرقة في عهد الخلافة العباسية على مختلف الصعد، وقد حظيت باهتمام كبير فأصبحت أهم المدن العباسية في بلاد الشام، ويذكرالمؤرخون أن المنصور هو الذي أمر ببناء الرقة العربية على طراز خطة بغداد، بعد أن ولي عليها لفترة حيث أعجبه موقعها وطيب هوائها وعذوبة مائها. وبعد استلامه الخلافة أرسل ابنه المهدي ولي عهده إلى الرقة سنة (155هـ/722م)، وأمره بأن يبني الرافقة على طراز بناء بغداد الى جانب الرقة البيزنطية كما أضاف الخليفة هارون الرشيد الذي سكن الرقة طويلاً، العديد من القصور والمواقع الهامة.

يقول الباحث التاريخي محمد العزو: «عندما هاجرت القبائل العربية (ربيعة، بكر، مضر) إلى الجزيرة الفراتية سكنت ربيعة بشكل رئيسي في منطقة الموصل الحالية، وبكر في آمد (ديار بكر، حالياً في الأراضي التركية)، واتخذت قبيلة مضر من الرقة عاصمة لها».

ويضيف الباحث: «كانت الرقة تحمل اسمين الأول نيكفوريوم نسبة إلى مؤسسها سلوقس الأول والثاني كالينيكوس. وتشير بعض المصادر إلى أن مدينتي كالينيكوس ونيكفوريوم متجاورتان، وقد أطلق العرب المهاجرون على كالينيكوس اسم الرقة البيضاء».

وحملتا معاً فيما بعد اسم “الرقتان”، وأغلب الظن أن لفظ الرقتين المتجاورتين في العصور الإسلامية يشير إلى الرَّقَّة البيضاء، والرَّقَّة السوداء، وقد تكون كالينيكوس أو كالينيكوم هي حي المشلب حالياً ونيقفوريوم هي الرقة السمرة حالياً».

قبيل فتح الرقة كان سكانها عرباً من مضر يعتنقون الديانة المسيحية، شأنهم في ذلك شان سكان مدن أخرى عامرة هي حران واديسا (الرها -أورفا).

ويذكر ياقوت الحموي في كتابه معجم البلدان، «إن الفتح الإسلامي للرقة تم صلحاً في سنة (17هـ/ 638م)، بقيادة عياض بن غنم وسهيل بن عدي وهما من قادة جيش أبي عبيدة بن عامر الجراح، واتخذ عياض من الرقة قاعدة لفتوحاته في الجزيرة الفراتية، حيث فتح سنة (19هـ) اديسا (الرها) وحران وسميساط ومن الرها الى منبج ورأس العين، وبعد أن سيطر على ذلك الجزء من المنطقة أخذ قرقيسيا الواقعة على الضفة اليسرى لنهر الفرات، وبذلك أمن الضفتين، ورجع إلى الرقة ومنها سار إلى حمص، والياً عليها وعلى الجزيرة(الرقة)، (التي غالباً ما كانت العرب في قرون الإسلام الأولى تعبر عن الرقة بهذا الإسم لأنها أقرب المواقع الهامة بالقياس إلى من يعبر الفرات)، وذلك بأمر من الخليفة عمر بن الخطاب، ومات فيها سنة (20هـ).

وفي نفس العام أي 20هـ/641 م قسم الخليفة عمر بن الخطاب البلاد إلى سبعة ولايات وهي : المدينة، البحرين، البصرة، الكوفة، الشام، الجزيرة ومصر.

بعد وفاة عياض بن غنم، تولى الرقة سعيد بن عامر بن خديم، فبنى في الرقة وحران جامعين، حيث بنى جامع الرقة من الآجر واستعمل في بنائه أنقاض الرخام من المدينة القديمة (البيضاء)، وهو أول جامع يُبنى في الرقة، ومن الجوامع الأولى في العالم الإسلامي، لكن للأسف اندثرت آثارجامع سعيد بن عامر، وأغلب الظن أنها تحت أبنية حي المشلب في موقع الجامع الأموي ( المنيطير) التي كانت مئذنته موجودة حتى بدايات القرن العشرين وبُنيت فوقه مدرسة زكي الأرسوزي الابتدائية.

يؤكد الباحث محمد العزو: «إن أهل الرقة استطاعوا خلال فترة الخلافة الراشدية المحافظة على معتقداتهم وكنائسهم القائمة. وبقيت الرقة تمارس حياتها الاعتيادية مستفيدة من خصوبة أرضها ووفرة مياهها وموقعها الجغرافي المميز بين الجزيرة والشام مما أعطاها أهميتها التجارية والعسكرية».

ويُضيف العزو: «بدأ الخليفة العباسي المنصور في عام (772)م، ببناء عاصمة صيفية للدولة العباسية بالقرب من الرقة، سميت الرافقة. بُنيت المدينة الجديدة بشكل حدوة فرس على الطراز المعماري لبغداد، وسرعان ما اندمجت مع الرقة. بين عامي (796 و808)م، استعمل الخليفة العباسي هارون الرشيد الرقة عاصمة له أيضاً، وأصبحت المدينة مركزاً علمياً وثقافياً هاماً».

وفي الرقة عاش وتعلم الفلكي العربي الشهير البتاني (858-929)م. في عام 1258 دمر المغول الرقة كما فعلوا ببغداد، ولم تعمر بعد حرقها إلا بمرور خمسة قرون.

إعادة الإعمار

زار أبو الفداء محافظة الرقة بعد زمن طويل من خرابها، وقد ذكرها في تقويمه حيث يقول: «الرقة في زماننا مدينة خراب ليس فيها أنيس»، وبعد أكثر من قرنين وربع من زيارة أبي الفداء لمدينة الرقة لم يُعرف عن أخبارها شيئاً يذكر، حتى جاء عام (1574)م حين زارها الطبيب الرحالة الهولندي (ليونهارت راوولف)، حيث يَذكرُ في تقرير له وصفاً لقصر في المدينة و(1200) جندي من جنود السلطان التركي، وكانت المباني والأسوار بحالة يرثى لها، يبدو أنَّه بعد التدمير الذي لحق بالمدينة إثر الغزو المغولي لها، قد بنيت بعض مبانيها، وأنه حدث استيطان جديد ربما وقع مع إنشاء المراكز التركية، وكنقطة ومحطة هامة لطرق الاتصال بين سورية والعراق ولم تكن حينها ذات أهمية تذكر، وحسب رأي الرحالة ليونهارت فإنَّ التجار فضلوا أنْ يستعملوا الطرق التجارية ذات المسار الشمالي، المارة بالبيرة (براجيك) حيث تجتاز الفرات وتتابع طريقها إلى أورفه (أديسا).

في(1650)م قام الرحالة التركي أولياء جلبي بزيارة إلى الرقة، وقد أكد في كتابه (سياحة ناما) أنَّ الرقة كان فيها سكان ثابتون، ويذكر أيضاً أنَّ التركمان قد دمروا المدينة وعلى أثرها أصبحت الرقة تابعة لأورفا (أديسا)، وحسب النظرية الشعاعية التي يقول بها علماء الآثار والتاريخ، فإنَّ الرقة كانت مكاناً للّقاء الشتوي للعرب والتركمان، بينما هي في شهر تموز خالية على الإطلاق من السكان، وكانت في تلك الفترة وحتى في الفترات اللاحقة، مكاناً قصياً لذلك نجد أنَّ الرحالة الأوربيين المتأخرين، الذين كانوا يأتون عبر براجيك وأورفه والمنطقة، لم يذكروا الرقة رغم وجودها، ومن جهة أخرى نجد أنَّ بعض الرحالة الذين زاروا المنطقة في القرنين الثامن والتاسع عشر الميلاديين، قد رسموا الرقة على خرائطهم، مثل الرحالة ريتشارد بوكوك وج.م كيناير، وهذا يعني أنَّ المدينة لازالت حية رغم خلوها من السكان. إنَّ الانقلاب الجديد في حياة مدينة الرقة قد حدث في بداية القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي، حيث بدأ الاستيطان الجديد لمجمل وادي الفرات والجزيرة السورية، إذ كانت البداية متواضعة ومع مرور الزمن تكونت مجموعة من المدن من بينها الرقة.

زار الرقة الرحالة الشهير زاخاو عام (1879)م، حيث أشار في كتابه (رحلة إلى سورية وبلاد الرافدين) أنه كان هناك مجموعة من السكان يقطنون في دور سكنية في مختلف مناطق المدينة القديمة، وأن عددهم يقارب مئة شخص ويقول: «أعتقد أنَّ التجار هاجروا إليها من مدينة حلب»، أماَّ الرحالة الليدي آن بلينت التي مرت في الرقة عام (1878) م أكدت أنها، «لم ترَ سكاناً داخل أسوار المدينة القديمة»، وهي محقة لأنها مرت في المدينة أثناء فترة الصيف، والسكان في هذه الفترة هم خارج المدينة، فبعضٌ منهم يمارس زراعة الخضار على ضفاف النهر (القبيات) ويسكنون في بيوت مشيدة من مادة القصب والسوس (سيباط)، والبعض الأخر من السكان يكونون قد رحلوا مع قطعان ماشيتهم إلى منطقة الشمال، وراء مساقط الغيث ومواضع العشب والكلأ، وفي نهاية فصل الصيف يعودون أدراجهم إلى المدينة، أما انطباع عالم الآثار أرنست هرتسفلد الذي زار الرقة في عام (1907)م فقد أكد، «إنها مدينة حديثة جداً، وأنها كانت تضم مركز بريد وبرق، وأن سكان المدينة كانوا يعيشون من التجارة مع العرب المحيطين بالمدينة من صناعة قصب السكر ومن حفريات اللقى الأثرية».

بعد خمس سنوات من زيارة هرتسفيلد للرقة، وتحديداً في شهر أيار من عام (1912)م قدم إلى الرقة الرحالة التشيكي لويس موزيل، وقد أكد أنه، «وجد فيها سكاناً عددهم (300)عائلة»، ولكن هذا الرقم قد يكون نتيجة لتقديرات غير مؤكدة والسبب في ذلك عدم وجود استقرار سكاني في المدينة في تلك الفترة الزمنية ليشكل مساحة أفقية واسعة، أما الاستيطان المبكر في محيط المدينة القديمة، فقد حدث أن عشائر (الأبي شعبان) استوطنت منطقة الرقة منذ عام (1650)م، وكانت منازلهم على شواطئ الفرات امتداداً من الحدود الإدارية لمحافظة الرقة، مع دير الزور شرقاً، إلى منطقة شمس الدين غرباً، ويشكل هذا الاستيطان الهجرة الأولى لمنطقة الرقة بعد تدميرها من قبل الغزو المغولي في عام (1259)م. 

الرقة اقتصادياً

تعتبر محافظة الرقة زراعية بامتياز، وشهد قطاع الزراعة تطوراً كبيراً بعد إنشاء سد الفرات الذي نظم مجرى النهر، وساهم في استصلاح مساحات واسعة من الأراضي، وتبلغ مساحة الأراضي الزراعية المروية نحو (220) ألف هكتار، منها نحو (110) آلاف هكتار مستصلحة وهي مشاريع ري حكومية، والبقية ضفاف بحيرة الأسد، وسقي نهري الفرات والبليخ، والأراضي التي ترويها الآبار الارتوازية، وتبلغ مساحة الأراضي المروية بعلاً نحو (450) ألف هكتار تزرع بعضها بالقمح في منطقة الاستقرار الثانية، إضافة للكمون، وبالشعير في المناطق الأخرى.

وحسب إحصائيات وزارة الزراعة في سورية، تحتل الرقة المرتبة الثانية في إنتاج القمح بعد محافظة الحسكة، وبلغت المساحة المزروعة بالقمح في موسم عام (2011) نحو (136) ألف هكتار، وبلغ إنتاجها نحو (550) ألف طن، فيما بلغت المساحة المزروعة في موسم عام (2012) نحو (142) ألف هكتار، وبلغ إنتاجها نحو (518) ألف طن، علماً أنه تم زيادة المساحة المقرر زراعتها بالقمح بناء على توجيهات الحكومة السورية وتوصيات اللجنة الزراعية العليا لزيادة الإنتاج، وتأمين الاكتفاء الذاتي وصولاً لتحقيق الأمن الغذائي.

كما تحتل الرقة المرتبة الثانية في إنتاج القطن بعد الحسكة، وبلغت المساحة المزروعة بالقطن في موسم عام (2011) نحو (46) ألف هكتار، وبلغ الإنتاج المسوق نحو (167) ألف طن، فيما تم زراعة نحو (46650) هكتار في موسم عام (2012)، والإنتاج (165) ألف طن.

أما بالنسبة لمحصول الذرة الصفراء فتحتل الرقة المرتبة الأولى على مستوى القطر في إنتاج الذرة الصفراء، منذ عام (1988) حتى عام (2012)، وتنتج نحو 60% من إنتاج القطر في السنوات السابقة، ففي موسم عام (2011) تم زراعة نحو (22) ألف هكتار بمحصول الذرة الصفراء، وبلغت الكميات المسوقة نحو (145) ألف طن، فيما بلغت المساحة المزروعة لموسم عام (2012) نحو (26) ألف هكتار، والإنتاج نحو (128) ألف طن.

وتعتبر محافظة الرقة من المحافظات الأولى في زراعة الشوندر، حيث بلغت المساحة المزروعة بهذا المحصول لموسم عام (2011) نحو (5500) هكتار، والإنتاج المسوق (330) ألف طن وهي من السنوات المتميزة بكمية الإنتاج، فيما بلغت المساحة المزروعة في موسم عام (2012) نحو (4077) هكتار، والإنتاج نحو (190) ألف طن.

ويبلغ عدد أشجار الزيتون في محافظة الرقة أكثر من خمسة ملايين شجرة، معظمها مزروع على ضفاف بحيرة الأسد، والمثمر منها أكثر من 60% من العدد الكلي للأشجار، فيما تقدر كميات الإنتاج بنحو (50) ألف طن من الزيتون الحب، وفي الرقة أربع معاصر خاصة لإنتاج زيت الزيتون، ووسطي إنتاج الزيت يقدر بنحو 20كغ للمئة كيلو من الزيتون الحب.

أما الثروة الحيوانية المسجلة في الرقة فتبلغ نحو (2.2888) مليون رأس من الأغنام والماعز و(2656) رأساً من الأبقار، و(6521) رأساً من الإبل و(159) رأساً من الجاموس و(359) رأساً من الخيول. 

آفاق المستقبل

تغير نفوس الناس في محافظة الرقة يتناسب طرداً مع تغير الظروف، فقد خلفت الحرب ما خلفته من انقسام في الرؤى والآراء، تفرق الأخ عن أخيه والابن عن أبيه، هاجر العديد من أهالي المحافظة إلى مدن أخرى أكثر هدوءاً كحماة واللاذقية وطرطوس ودمشق.

هجر معظم الفلاحين أراضيهم، وغادر الأبناء إلى لبنان وتركيا والعراق مؤخراً (بعد سيطرة التنظيم على مناطق واسعة منه)، بحثاً عن فرص عمل تساعدهم على شقاء الحياة بعد أن شحت الموارد وارتفعت الأسعار، أما من بقي في المدينة فيسعى جاهداً لتأمين مصدر رزق ثابت يعينه مع أفراد أسرته، بعد أن خرجت مساحات واسعة من الأراضي الزراعية عن الخدمة بسبب توقف مياه الري الحكومية بعد سرقة معدات المضخات من قبل مسلحي «الجيش الحر»، إبان سيطرتهم عل الرقة.

تُعد تجارة السيارات هي الرائجة بعد تجارة النفط، وقد انتشرت مكاتب بيعها في معظم أرجاء المدينة. وتُباع سيارات بلا ضريبة للرفاهية كانت تأخذها الحكومة سابقاً عن السيارات السياحية، وفيما عادت المدينة الصناعية إلى العمل ونشطت فيها الحركة على نحو ملحوظ بسبب ازدياد عدد السيارات، يستورد التجار بضائعهم من تركيا، إلا أن الأسعار مرتفعة جداً.

أما الفقراء، فقد اختاروا سبلاً للحياة مستقاة من بساطتهم، فاشترى بعضهم صنارة صيد أو شباكاً، حسب قدرته المادية، وقصد نهر الفرات وامتهن صيد الأسماك. وتحول سوق الهواتف الخلوية في شارع الوادي وسط المدينة إلى سوق للأوراق المالية وتصريف العملات، وخصوصا أن انقطاع شبكة الاتصالات عن المدينة قد يستمر أسابيع في بعض الأحيان. واستورد بعضهم أجهزة للاتصال الفضائي لضمان تواصل المغتربين من أبناء الرقة مع أهاليهم بأسعار مرتفعة للدقيقة الواحدة.

 ويبقى مستقبل الرقة مجهولاً في ظل تمسك التنظيم بها ودفاعه المستميت عنها باعتبارها عاصمته في بلاد الشام، أما سكانها فلا حول لهم ولا قوة هم فقط يحاولون العيش بسلام يدركون أنه مؤقت في ظل الحرب الدولية التي تشهدها المنطقة.


Table Ronde: Observer la ville dans le Monde Arabe (Vidéo)

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Le 5 juin 2015, une table ronde intitulée Observer la ville dans le Monde Arabe s'est tenue dans le cadre des "Rendez-vous de l’histoire du monde arabe" de l'Institut du Monde Arabe de Paris. Organisée et animée par Vincent Lemire, historien spécialiste de Jérusalem, elle rassemblait Mercedes Volait, historienne de l’architecture, fondatrice de l’Observatoire urbain du Caire contemporain en 1985 au sein du CEDEJ, Eric Denis, géographe, qui en fut l’animateur entre 1993 et 2002, Eric Verdeil, géographe, animateur de l’Observatoire urbain de Beyrouth de l’IFPO, et Julien Loiseau, historien, spécialiste du Caire médiéval et aujourd’hui directeur du Centre français de recherche de Jérusalem. Jean-François Pérouse, animateur de l’observatoire d’Istanbul, devait être présent mais s’est finalement excusé. La table ronde était consacrée à un bilan des apports scientifiques et des modalités de fonctionnement de ces programmes permanents de recherche, aujourd’hui remis en cause et menacés par la réduction des moyens scientifiques consacrés aux centres français de recherche en sciences sociales du pourtour méditerranéen.

La table-ronde a mis en avant le rôle des différentes disciplines, de l’histoire urbaine à la géographie, en passant par la sociologie et l’anthropologie, et les outils construits dans la durée au service de cette ambition: bibliothèques, cartothèques spécialisées, index, chronologie et revues de presse, bases de données cartographiques et démographiques. Les résultats des actions scientifiques menées ont débouché sur de nombreuses publications, aujourd’hui accessibles en ligne, via les Presses de l’IFPO, les publications du CEDEJ ou de l’Institut français d’études anatoliennes. Au début des années 2000, des programmes transversaux ont également vu le jour, comme CITÉ: Le Caire, Istanbul, Téhéran ou Les cultures professionnelles des urbanistes en Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient.

Loin d’être pensés dans une logique uniquement et étroitement académique, ces programmes de recherche ont travaillé en lien étroit avec différentes institutions locales et françaises en charge des questions d’urbanisme, de développement ou, au Liban, de reconstruction. Des collaborations étroites ont existé en Egypte avec le CAPMAS, chargé des recensements de la population, au Liban avec la direction générale de l’urbanisme. Les observatoires de Caire et de Beyrouth ont régulièrement coopéré avec l’Institut d’aménagement et d’urbanisme de la région Ile de France. Des liens se sont également construits dans la durée avec les universités et centres de recherche locaux. C’est le cas à Beyrouth avec le Centre de télédétection du CNRS, ou l’Université américaine de Beyrouth par exemple dans le cadre des City Debates. La vidéo est visible ici.

Pour une présentation plus détaillée de l’Observatoire urbain de Beyrouth, voir ce billet d’Eric Verdeil.

 

 

The Arab Center for Architecture (ACA): Interview with George Arbid

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The Arab Center for Architecture (ACA) was established in 2008 to raise awareness about contemporary architecture and urbanism within civil society. In an interview I held on 25 June 2015 at the offices of the ACA in Beirut, George Arbid, the co-founder and current director of the ACA, discussed the work of the ACA and modern architecture in the region. Arbid explained the activities and aims of the ACA, including the establishment of an archive, a library, educational programs and the formation of the DoCoMoMo Lebanon chapter. He outlined the important contributions of Arab architects to modernist architecture and the complexities of talking about “Arab architecture,” or an “Arab modern movement.” He also discussed the exhibition Fundamentalists and Other Arab Modernisms,and its accompanying publication Architecture from the Arab world (1914-2014) a Selection, which formed the Kingdom of Bahrain’s pavilion at the Fourteenth International Architecture Exhibition La Biennale de Venezia, in 2014.       

Deen Sharp (DS): Before we discuss the work and activities of the Arab Center for Architecture (ACA), could you provide us with a broad introduction to the idea of modernist architectural heritage and its importance?

George Arbid (GA): Architecture in general terms is a cultural product, and is in constant motion. When [the public] speak of local architecture, they often mean traditional architecture. For instance, if you ask people what Lebanese architecture is about, they would talk about the nineteenth century or early twentieth century tripled arched houses with red tiled roofs, stones and central layout. However, Lebanese architecture or, I prefer to say architecture produced in Lebanon, has gone through [several] transformations. I could claim that an architecture produced nowadays can also reflect local identity, and can be coined as Lebanese. The determining factors of that identity are climate, geography, topography, economy, need, building techniques, personal and societal beliefs, cultural aspirations, local ethos, and so on.

At ACA, we are interested in promoting the idea of architecture as culture, and therefore modern architecture of the twentieth century as part of [our] heritage. Like any architecture produced in the twentieth century, it was subjected to faster influences than in the earlier periods but anyone who knows the history of architecture well, knows that in earlier times architecture was something that was also contaminated. And, I would argue [contaminated] often positively by travels, wars, cultural influences and so on. Therefore, the identity of architecture has always been subjected to various influences. It is our task to try to define the specificities of architecture in the Arab world in the twentieth century, and promote the idea that it is a cultural product.

DS: Picking up on that thread, the history of modern architecture usually focuses on western architects and their products, such as Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, Frank Lloyd Wright, as well as one of the most significant modernist architects outside of the Western canon, Oscar Niemeyer. But obviously not many Arab architects pop up in this central canon of what we understand as the modern movement. Could you identity some particular Arab architects that could be inserted into this canon, and identify their specific contributions?  

GA: Certainly, the first name that comes to mind for me, is Sayed Karim, an Egyptian architect (also known as Sayed Korayem). [Karim] is not well known because the world was more interested in the work and writings of Hassan Fathy. [Fathy] is certainly a major architect of the twentieth century who represents a change, an idiosyncratic change, in the production of architecture in Egypt. His is a polemical work that some [have] criticized for not being realistic. Of course, when we speak of Fathy we think of building in clay, people building for themselves, the houses [for] the poor, and so on. But, more or less at the same time (1940s-1970s), there was another production in Egypt by architects such as Sayed Karim, who also published the magazine called al-Imara. [Karim] promoted a totally different [kind of] architecture: which was more progressive in a certain way, and more experimental in another, and certainly more adapted to rapid urbanization. [Karim] deserves serious research, and indeed Mohamed el-Shahed has recently completed a doctoral thesis that partly analyzes how Karim negotiated architectural modernism in the context of Egypt.

I could also name other Arab architects. In Lebanon, pioneers like Farid Trad, the engineer-architect Antoine Tabet, and Said Hejal who designed many of the Maqassed schools. Some of [these schools] are testimonies to very rational uses of space in an urban context. You have Joseph Philippe Karam with his daring projects, like the famous City Centre (also known as the Egg) in Beirut. [For an overview of Lebanese modern architects see here] In Sudan, you have Abdel Moneim Mustafa who, in the 1970s and 1980s, produced an architecture that would nowadays certainly win an award in sustainable design. The reason it could win an award is simply that they had little means, and little means in architecture usually leads to resourcefulness. These architects working along such lines in Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and other countries in the Arab world, were producing an architecture that was climate responsive, economic, and belonged to the local ways of doing things. And yet, they were progressive, and forward-looking. This is the most interesting aspect of this type of architecture. It is not an architecture that dwells on identity for the sake of the looks of it, but rather for the lessons learnt from previous traditions and ways of doing things.

DS: Taking together the various individuals that you have mentioned, would you argue that they produced a distinctive regional modern movement in architecture? Is there really something that we can call the Arab modern movement?

GA: Perhaps speaking of a movement would require more setups and tools, like for example magazines. In the case of Sayed Karim, we could say so as there was some sort of promotion of modernism as a movement around him. In many other cases, it was individual undertakings, although most of those architects were part of a larger mode of thinking, connected to artists, for example in Beirut or Baghdad. Baghdad would be the best example. People like Rifat Chadirji, Jawad Salim, Qahtan Awni, and Qahtan Madfai were part of some sort of renaissance of architecture in Baghdad and in Iraq. Perhaps they did not create a movement per se, that was recognizable and announced, like the Bauhaus Movement or other more organized groups. Yet, we could say that there is a modern Iraqi architect or modern Iraqi architecture, as there is a version of modernism in other countries.

Perhaps, [however,] we should refuse the appellation of modern Arab architecture. It does not make much sense to me. [This is because] the climate is very different from Baghdad to Beirut to North Africa. The cultural traditions are similar in ways, of course influenced by religious and societal beliefs, and praxis. At the same time, those variations are enormous. In the Lebanese case, the architecture of the mountain is significantly different from the architecture of the coast. Even the materials used are not the same. You would use sandstone in the city, and plaster it because it is porous, and you cannot keep it un-plastered. Sandstone is found on the coast from Batroun to Jbeil [Byblos], Tripoli, Saida and Beirut whereas the houses of the mountain, which are a variation of that model, are built with limestone. The detailing, the structural capacities of the wall and the construction are all different. Therefore, it does not make sense for me to say Lebanese architecture per se, or Arab architecture per se. One has to be more specific. Yes, we could speak then of regional, when we refer to locality in a narrower sense, rather than [referring to] the global region as the Middle East or the Arab world. It is like when people say “Islamic architecture:” Islamic when, where?  

DS: In establishing the Arab Center for Architecture, which you co-founded in 2008, how have you dealt with this definitional tension, and how are you framing your approach to the Arab Center for Architecture?

The appellation certainly explains that we are interested in the broader region, [beyond] Lebanon where we are located. It is called the Arab Center for Architecture; it could also be called the Center for Architecture in the Arab World, but certainly not the Center for Arab Architecture. And, that explains more or less how we place ourselves. It is a center that is located in the Arab world, it is interested in researching, disseminating, documenting, archiving, and debating architecture in the Arab world. Not only the architecture of the twentieth century, because we aim to be a platform for debating the current city and its developments. We are not particularly interested in researching more ancient architecture— earlier than the eighteenth, or even mid-nineteenth century. There are other venues, people and academicians interested in that aspect. We are interested in regionalism per se. We would like to tackle something that falls more or less in the gap between academia on the one hand, and professional bodies and orders on the other: dealing with civil society, disseminating architecture as culture to a larger number of people, and trying to make a difference on the terms, for example, of advocacy for preservation. [We do not mean] preservation of a particular period, but the principle of preserving what deserves to be preserved—[an] architecture understood as text on the evolution of the city. 

We are aware of the difficulties of convincing authorities and individuals who deal with the issue that a building made of glass, steel, aluminum, and concrete is heritage. You can hardly convince people that a building of the nineteenth century is worth being preserved. So when you come and say, you should preserve a building built for example in the 1950s, such as the Hotel Carlton [in Raouche, Beirut] that was demolished a few years ago, you usually have a hard time convincing people. We tend to consider buildings as economic artifacts and products—which they certainly are in a certain way. But, they are also cultural products. [Therefore, it is important to involve] the public in decision making over what should be kept, and this is a battle we are in the midst of.

DS: You have given us a sense of the type of people you are trying to engage in the work of the ACA. Could you give us a sense in more concrete, if you could excuse the pun, examples of the sort of activities that the center has been engaged with over the past seven years that it has been active?

The first activity is the physical collection of archives that is open to the public. We have a room at the Center dedicated to collecting physical archives. This archive contains the drawings of architects, either technical or perspective drawings, photographs of buildings or documents related to the architects. In some cases we have correspondence between architects and clients. We even have bills from the construction that speak of the materials of the time and the source of material. As our staff is limited for the time being and we are a growing institution, access is given by appointment.

The second activity is our library. It is still embryonic, but, this year, we aim to develop this collection. The collection is open to the public, and we do have students and post-docs, architects, and even just interested people, coming and reading here, though they cannot borrow books. We have a very small collection, specialized in nineteenth and twentieth century architecture in Lebanon and the Arab world, in addition to books on the history and theory of architecture.



["Revealing Architecture" Leaflet, p.2: One of ACA's Dissemination Projects. Photo ACA]



[Exhibition at ACA. Photo ACA]



We also have a program of dissemination of architecture with the broader public, which we call “Revealing Architecture” (or
Kashf al-Imara in Arabic), and it has four components, financed by the European Union. One component is organizing six lectures annually where we invite Lebanese architects who practiced in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to come and present their work, in conversation with an architect (usually under the age of fifty) who looks at the work, and reacts to it from today’s perspective. We have had three of those lectures, and we still have three more running for the year. We have an audience of sixty to seventy people who come, and engage in very interesting debates. We film these talks, and they will be posted on our website. We also have a very active Facebook page and a website. Another component of the project is organizing twelve visits to either iconic buildings, or important neighborhoods in Lebanon, explaining the history of the development of the neighborhood. We have had already six of those, and we have six more to go, and the audience is varied. For example, we invite tourist guides to come, and get acquainted with how you can speak about the modern city. Of course, they are trained to speak about important archeological sites, traditional places, villages, and the city center for its economic growth and interest. But, they are not usually equipped to speak about neighborhoods, or for that matter, modern iconic buildings. There is architectural tourism happening here. So we want to be part of that by distributing scientific knowledge to people who can in turn disseminate it.

The third component which I think is very important, and part of a long-term agenda, is to work with school children. We have prepared a tool kit that we will [launch] in October 2015 [for] kids aged around thirteen. We are doing this with the Lebanese Ministry of Education. The tool kit will present architecture, the city, and public space to school kids. It is of course made in a playful way, and it is very interactive. We expect this to be disseminated in public schools in Lebanon, and hopefully in other countries [in the Arab region].  

The fourth component is an architectural map of Beirut with the important neighborhoods and landmarks. It is a sort of promenade in the city with some information about the importance of each building, its historical context and the architect. This is the plan for the current year.




[Workshop at ACA with Ashkal Alwan students, with George Arbid. Photo by ACA]


DS: You have also founded DoCoMoMo Lebanon. For people who are unfamiliar with DoCoMoMo, could you introduce the broad outlines of the organization? Also, what does it mean for you to have founded a chapter here in Lebanon, and how does the ACA seek to pursue that path as well?

GA:DoCoMoMo is particularly important in my point of view because it is a world institution. It has around forty-five to fifty chapters around the world. DoCoMoMo is the acronym for the International Committee for Documentation and Conservation of Building, Sites and Neighborhoods of the Modern Movement. The people who are behind this are academicians and professionals. It started in Holland, and has spread all over the world. The interesting side of this institution is that it is composed of professionals, practicing architects who deal with, among other things, renovation, conservation, and preservation of modern buildings, but we also have academicians, such as historians and sociologists, who are interested in their history. And they organize international and regional conferences. We are planning a conference in Beirut next year that will deal with the preservation of buildings, and the adaptive reuse of buildings. Each panel will have a speaker from Lebanon, a speaker from the region and an international one. Today, we cannot only speak of sustainability [in relation to] high-tech facades. Preserving buildings is also sustainable, as it has to do with recycling the building stock we have. I am particularly interested in this from the design side. For example, I teach at the American University of Beirut (AUB), and I often give studios there to students on the adaptive reuse of buildings or neighborhoods. The work that has been done in these studios provides a lesson on how to try to save certain buildings, not by necessarily countering the current building code or ignoring it, but by using the opportunities it can offer. We therefore try to strike a balance at the neighborhood scale, beyond the concern for the building as a unit. This is different from either the tabula rasa [approach], or absolute preservation. Because we are interested in reality as a starting point for operative change, we keep, at the core of the studio, the understanding of the regulatory setups, procedures, mechanisms at play in the production of buildings and cities, and we engage in the intellectual and formal exercise through a project.

DS: One of the ACA’s most prominent and significant projects thus far, I think it is fair to say, has been the participation in the Venice Biennale as part of the Kingdom of Bahrain’s pavilion. Fundamentalists and Other Arab Modernisms was an exhibition that you co-produced with the Lebanese architect Bernard Khoury. Before talking about the important publication Architecture from the Arab world (1914-2014), a Selection that formed the centerpiece for the pavilion, can you tell us first about how two Lebanese architects happened to produce Bahrain’s pavilion?

GA: It is true that it is a major achievement. Bernard Khoury, who is part of our board, proposed the project to us. He was contacted by Noura al-Sayeh who is an architect counselor for the Ministry of Culture in Bahrain. [Khoury] was called in to design the pavilion, and he proposed ACA, and me in particular, as a co-curator. The theme set by Rem Koolhaas, the director of the 2014 Venice Biennale, was one hundred years of architecture. Koolhaas had proposed to look back at the century, and to try to understand the changes in the world that produced the cities and the architecture in which we live. Given my expertise on the topic, the fact that we had already gathered some archives, and our connections, Khoury thought we would be good interlocutors. I was very happy to actually co-curate the pavilion with him, because we quickly convinced Bahrain that we should be doing a pavilion on architecture in the Arab world rather than just in Bahrain. The visionary Bahraini Minister of Culture, Sheikha Mai, quickly agreed on the idea. So, the pavilion is actually a gift in some way from Bahrain to the Arab world to exhibit one hundred years of architecture.




[The Bahrain Pavilion at the 2015 Venice Architecture Biennale, co-curated by George Arbid and Bernard Khoury. A rotunda of book shelves displaying the book produced for the occasion. In the middle:  a table offeris a timeline and map of the Arab world with one-hundred poles representing the buildings showcased in the book. Above: a circular ceiling with simultaneous projections of a man reciting the twenty-two national anthems of Arab countries. Photo by Delfino Sisto Legnani]


Khoury brilliantly designed the pavilion, in conversation with al-Sayeh and me. We decided that we would not exhibit actual photographs of buildings, or models of buildings. [Instead,] we would speak about the current situation of the Arab world, its geography, and the unfortunate political dislocation. Architecture would be displayed in a physical book that people could take with them. We wanted to step away from the common digital projections and atmosphere [that this format creates]. So, the pavilion is a space that you enter, it is a very clear space, it is like a wall of books, a rotunda of books. We distributed forty thousand copies for free. It is a lavish book, which won two awards, the Most Beautiful Swiss Book 2014, and the Best Book Design from all over the World 2015 at the Leipzig fair. People could not believe they could simply take copies. Students took two, three copies for their friends. That was the best thing we had done because it got disseminated physically. Of course, it is very easy nowadays to disseminate images: you go on the internet and [easily obtain them]. But, [it is much more difficult to] go find a drawing in Mauritania, or in Egypt, or in the archives of an architect who stopped his work thirty or forty years ago. It was a huge undertaking, and we were very happy with the result.

The book is 180-pages, and it presents a hundred buildings with in photographs and drawings. [For a building to be included in the book, the stipulation] was for it to have a good drawing that represented the architectural idea, and the agency behind it, testifying for the visionary side of architecture. By giving priority to drawings, we wanted to disseminate the importance of architecture archives. [Each] building included also had to have a public concern. We did not put individual houses, as we considered that, in such a venue, we should be speaking about the “publicness” of architecture. We also have essays [in the book]. I invited colleagues and researchers to write essays about the Arab world. I wrote about Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan (the Levant). The pavilion itself was very well received. It has a map of the Arab world with a timeline; it was a beautiful idea put into form and space.   

DS: The book had a wonderful description that I want to highlight. It said it was a “subjective, non-exhaustive and sometime fictional reading of the architectural legacy of the last hundred years across the Arab world.” I also want to setout the thesis that the pavilion sketched out for you to elaborate on. It stated that the pavilion outlines that “transition from the 1980s in which it is noted that the seeds of the modernist project were aborted, and a colonial map was replaced with the real estate developer’s model and neoliberal economics.”

GA: Yes, that is absolutely true. The map in the space of the pavilion itself had a timeline where you can see the architecture we mostly witness now in the news, and how it has shifted to Dubai, Qatar and other places in the same area. The type of firms behind architecture is not the same anymore, and this has a huge impact on the architecture produced. It has an impact on public space, and what public space means, why it is there, and for whom. It also has to do with the image-making of architecture: what is a landmark? There was a time when landmarks were buildings that [were related to] administration, with a collective, though not always progressive, agenda of independent nation-building, and well-being for all. Whereas in this neoliberal time, interest and agency behind projects and reasons behind their implementation has shifted, and so has the role of the architect. The expectations and aspirations have shifted. This is legible in the book, and also around us in our cities. Obviously a Center like ours cannot claim it can counter anything of the sort, yet what it can do is make alternatives visible, make things that were accomplished visible. Even stylistically, I would say, which is the most uninteresting part of architecture, but even at that level, one could argue that a comparison is useful to start thinking about change. The operations, the setups, the professional bodies and the stylistic and formal manifestations, are all things we like to look at, debate, and hope to trigger an influence on.   

DS: Maybe one aspect that I see missing from the Center’s work, and missing from the regional landscape is a direct engagement with architectural criticism. None of the major newspapers in Arabic, English or even French, and correct me if I am wrong, have an architectural critic of any sort. There is some architectural criticism that is going on in the form of blogs, and Facebook groups among architects or academics, but do you think the ACA can play a part in encouraging more public forms of architectural criticism?

GA: I absolutely agree with you, and your critique. Yes, criticism is absolutely necessary. It requires objectivity that comes from a certain distance and, of course, from knowledge. We certainly would support architectural criticism, and we want to do that. We have in mind an architectural magazine that would also be online, where these questions would be asked, and also where maybe answers can be sketched, which is also related to criticism. We would also like to implement an architectural award that would not necessarily be given to students or to people at the end of their careers—which the Order of Engineers and Architects in Lebanon does for instance. This would be an architectural award for practicing architects, [who are] at mid-career, that would pinpoint critically, and positively the work that we think should be highlighted, and be part of what is considered good architecture. When it comes to writing a critique, yes, it should definitely happen, and it should also happen in the Arabic language. We did not speak about the Arabic language in this interview, but I think it is crucial that things are disseminated in Arabic as well. We would like to also be involved in translations from English to Arabic, French to Arabic, or Arabic to other languages. The writings of Rifat Chadirji, for example, should be translated because he wrote often in English, but also in Arabic. His major book Al-Ukhaidir and The Crystal Palace do not have an English translation, which is a shame, as this is a very good testimony of the arts and architecture of Iraq from the 1930s to the 1970s, and 1980s. Translating major books from English, French and other languages to Arabic would certainly have an impact, and we hope that we, and others, can do this. Of course, this would require more funding, and a set up involving translators, and professional people, because translating technical books and architectural theory is not an easy task, especially given concepts that are new for the Arabic language.

But to go back to criticism, certainly criticism is important. We have to make it more acceptable to colleagues. It is a tradition, and a mindset that has to filter through everyone, so that any critique is not taken personally, as there is perhaps this wrong concept that you cannot criticize your colleagues’ work. When the whole enterprise is one that is distant from the object itself, and the author is speaking of better architecture, criticism is very important and should happen.

DS: And, of course, in documenting and arguing for the protection of certain elements of the built environment over others, the ACA is always engaged in an act of criticism. Moreover, in creating a center around Arab modern architecture, an important critical intervention has been launched in attempting to expand public concern over the preservation of the built environment to include twentieth and twenty-first century architecture and architects. Spaces such as the ACA are a crucial and all too rare meeting point for practicing architects, academics, urban planners, developers and the broader public to engage with each other over the meaning of quality architecture, and urban space. Indeed, the ACA has already been the site of some crucial debates over Beirut’s urban form, such as the construction of the Fouad Boutros Highway in Achrafieh. Architects and their architecture are important to how a city is formed and a better understanding of what quality architecture is, and how it is achieved can result in an improved quality of (urban) life.


[George Arbid is an architect and Associate Professor of Architecture at the American University of Beirut (AUB). His doctoral dissertation at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design is entitled Practicing Modernism in Beirut: Architecture in Lebanon, 1946-1970 (2002). Among his writings is “Beirut: the Phoenix and the Reconstruction Predicament,” an essay that he wrote for Urbanization and the Changing Character of the Arab City published by ESCWA in 2005. He is the editor of Architecture from the Arab world (1914-2014) a Selection,and the author of the forthcoming book Karol Schayer Architect: A Pole in Beirut. He also runs an architecture practice that, among other projects, designed the Shabb and Salem residences, the latter of which was nominated for the Aga Khan Award in 1998.]

 

 

What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Political Economy?

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Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki, editors, Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-Development and Beyond. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Anyone who visited Ramallah in 2013 would have heard a lot of talk about seatbelts. Everyone there—everyone—was talking about them, and how consistent and prevalent they had become after just a little bit of police enforcement. In 2010 it was the multi-space parking meters the Ramallah municipality had recently installed. Both events and practices were commonly described as the neoliberalization of Palestine, dark indicators of what was to come. Before that it was coffee shops. Next year it will be something else.

Since 2008or so, Palestinians and scholars working there have been talking a lot about neoliberalism specifically, and about political economy more generally. It is as widespread as it has ever been, probably since the erosion of third wordlist anti-imperialist or Marxist-Leninist factions in the national movement, and certainly more than in the last few decades. Just in the last year or so there have been high profile talks on the subject; a large research project on the Political Economy of the Middle East based out of the Arab Studies Institute formed; books on the history of Palestinian capitalists, on Marxist thought in the Levant, on the history of money in Palestine, and on the phenomenon of neoliberalism in Palestine are all in the pipeline. Both the Palestinian Authority and the Center for Development Studies at Birzeit are funding research on economic resistance, and it has purchase in places like the Palestinian Policy Network Al-Shabaka, and the Palestinian Center for the Study of Democracy, Muwatin. Yet there is an ambient shapelessness about it, and shared definitions are rare.

In 2010, Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki organized a conference on “De-development under Prolonged Occupation: The Millennium Development Goals and the Palestinian People,” and have published many of those papers as Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond, a new contribution to this growing field.

Sara Roy’s concept of de-development guides this volume. Roy defines the term as part of occupation, a process that limits economic growth and development for Palestinians. Critically, the de-development process occurs “when normal economic relations are impaired or abandoned, preventing any logical or rational arrangement of the economy or its constituent parts, diminishing productive capacity and precluding sustainable growth.” It is an economic condition where self-correction is prevented or impossible, and it is explicitly political: “Over time, de-development represents nothing less than the denial of economy potential.”  

Turner and Shweiki begin by writing specifically against a seemingly objective form of academic political economy and its assumptions. According to them, the discipline implies and exacerbates the fragmentation of Palestinian geography and body politic and the “invisible colonial grammar that takes these divisions for granted and reifies them.” The result is to render divisions, it seems, merely as an academic problem, “a narrative that needs to be unpacked and critiqued.” They propose we take the text as a set of interventions against that dominant mode in the discipline. They seek to “decolonize” the discourse by explicitly politicizing analysis, and by “analyzing the shared experience of dispossession and marginalization together in one volume [in order to] contribute to clarifying the wider picture of the political economy of the Palestinian people.”

That wider picture is one of

A people experiencing a colonial matrix of dispossession, disenfranchisement, and destruction in a world-historical period regarded to be post-colonial. This experience and process has been variously labeled as constituting “spatiocide” (Hanafi), “politicide” (Kimmerling), and/or “sociocide” (Abdel Jawad). This book, however, takes as its starting point the concept of “de-development” in order to focus more specifically on the political economy dimension.

Taken together, the chapters suggest to Turner and Shweiki that there is a way forward in “adopting Foucault’s assertion that ‘where there is power, there is resistance.’”

Through a powerful collection of authors working mostly in political science, international relations, and as practitioners in NGOs and IOs, the volume successfully politicizes ideas about the economy in Palestine. It shows how economics are tied to occupation, are political, and are one of the mechanisms for the continued dispossession of Palestinians. The book catalogs, in great detail, numerous ways that the occupation seeps into everyday life and economic practice, and is an excellent resource for people new to the conflict. Although the contributions are all brief, the level of the detail is intense. The occupation is everywhere you look, simply everywhere. And by placing all of these pieces side-by-side, the editors have done important work towards bringing down the analytical geographical separation that inflects both scholarship and practice.

In the foreword, Sara Roy lays out how in the mid-1980s, she came to the idea of de-development, and how de-development has been imposed in Gaza and has “delimited people’s lives.” Roy criticizes current international and Palestinian plans for state building, arguing they are not viable and will not correct the de-development process or lead to liberation. In the first two sections “De-development Explored” and “De-development Applied,” we see how the occupation stifles Palestinians in terms of planning, social and biological reproductive capacity, aid, water and ideological practices around water, whether they are refugees, Jerusalemites, or citizens of Israel. That is why a book like this is crucial for practitioners, aid workers, and people new to the conflict—it actively and correctly disables countless liberal assumptions, practices, and forms of development and political work in Palestine today.

In “De-development Explored,” Sahar Taghdisi-Rad argues against the neoliberal policy frameworks that restrict and prevent economic development in Palestine and coopt political elites. She argues for a radical break in PA policy. Mandy Turner continues this theme and shows how Western aid has transformed the PA and strengthened the geographic fragmentation in the Oslo framework “through the ‘partners for peace’ discursive framework which has been used to manipulate Palestinian elites.” Clemens Messerschmid shows how the water issue is not simply a natural issue, but a political one. Finally, Nadera Shalhoub-Kerkovian and Rachel Busbridge demonstrate some of the micro-dimensions of power, social, and colonial violence through a small-scale ethnographic study of how women in Jerusalem have been impacted by these phenomena.

The next part, “De-development Applied,” contains case studies of de-development: economic segregation and difficulties faced by Palestinians inside Israel by Raja Khalidi and Mtanes Shehadeh, Ismael Abu-Saad on the systematic dispossession of Palestinian Beduoins, and Ingrid Jaradat Gassner on the ways that Palestinian refugees have been ignored and disempowered. It ends with Nasrallah’s description of how Israel is master planning Jerusalem against Palestinians.

The third section on “De-development Resisted” is the most far-reaching in the book, and in addition to analyzing some of the current conditions and the histories that led up to this juncture, it points to some potential ways to work towards economic justice for Palestinians. Omar Shweiki describes the histories of revolutionary “social work” in Palestine and conceptions of development tied explicitly to the national struggle. He suggests that a recent movement to reinvigorate a representative PLO is a cause for hope, and that ideas of economic welfare and self-sufficiency should reenter debate. Nicholas Pelham’s piece on the tunnel economy is a meticulous and fascinating description of the scale of this economy, and how illegal and legal come together in part through government regulations of grey trade. Sobhi Samour and Raja Khalidi’s piece on the state building project is perhaps the most explicitly radical in the volume—and, for what it’s worth, the only one to favorably mention Marx or reference the Marxist tradition of political economy. The book concludes with Mushtaq Khan’s ideas for moving forward in the current environment. He suggests that “peacemaking and state-building discourses initiated by Oslo have failed to achieve Palestinian national goals,” making an important intervention to practitioners, and advocates a rights-based approach to solving the problems of the present.

The editors have put together a sturdy account of the continuous nature and overlapping forms of Palestinian disenfranchisement and fragmentation. But is it enough to say that the fact of shared experience of occupation constitutes political economy? There is a certain looseness in the category of political economy that these pieces demonstrate when they are placed side-by-side, and this framework implies that political economy overlaps a great deal with arguments for economic development. Clearly politics and economics are inseparable, in Palestine as elsewhere. But I somewhat disagree with the way the editors attach political economy to the various -cides here, and suggest that those –cides are not simply labels for the same experience; they are analytical tools to describe and understand the situation.

If, as the editors suggest, they are different labels for the same phenomena, what does it mean that we are telling ourselves the same story, repeatedly, but in different ways? And what does this mean for the category of political economy? Perhaps rather than defining political economy against the way it is practiced, a positive definition of political economy as the study of capitalism and its social, political, economic, and other forms, could be a qualitatively different, robust, and unifying framework. It goes beyond description. It allows us to ask: If the occupation is killing Palestinian space, politics, and society, how is it doing so? What are the logics and histories? What does it mean to kill a space if it is socially produced? Do politics and society stop existing? And what does it imply if these –cides the same as de-development? A Marxist economist complained to me about “the proliferation of –cides,” and asked, “Is it because they don’t want to speak of genocide?” I don’t have the answer to that question, but I agree with the implication that there may be bigger structures and logics that we can attempt to understand, of which the forms and contours of dispossession are effects or epiphenomena.

Moreover, I wonder if the concept of de-development implies a kind of normative developmental progression, and whether a view from a different scale might help to clarify the picture or raise questions about ideal types of development. Taghdisi-Rad is correct in her analysis, but where do the policies she describes come from? Who do they represent? Shalhoub-Kerkovian and Busbridge’s ethnography of women in Jerusalem exposes terrible truths about gendered violence and the ways that women are disproportionately de-developed through the occupation. But what are the differences and similarities between how women are disproportionately subject in patriarchal capitalist society everywhere, and what might be unique, different, or exacerbated under occupation? Turner is convincing in her analysis of how aid dependence is shaping the broader political economy, but I wonder about the ways that a global discourse can be imposed on Palestinians embedded within it; there are Palestinians who benefit from these forms of development, privatization, and state building, and who have class interests and alternate conceptions of national politics.

As a group, these articles demonstrate the utter pervasiveness of the de-development process on Palestine and Palestinians. In nearly every way, they demonstrate how the political economic rationales of occupation have disempowered or excluded various subsets of Palestinians. Abu-Saad and Nasrallah show how many Israeli policies towards Palestinians are top-down, purposeful, and designed to de-develop them and their future capacities for economic, educational, geographic, and other kinds of growth. Gassner seems to speak for many in the section when she “approaches development as a human right and as a process of social, political, and economic transformation that can empower the excluded and exploited.” It is a right that Israelis have taken from Palestinians. This is undeniably the case. However, there is an open question: the assumption is that Palestinians as a racialized minority, nation, and as populations, are the objects of economic policy. While that is true, how do different peoples and populations fit into a wider system that has both political and economic imperatives? How do those groups get defined in the first place? Khalidi and Shehadeh allude to it as they describe the position that the indigenous Palestinians within Israel have with respect to the Israeli economy, and how various factions and territories are balanced in order maintain the status quo of Israeli settler colonization.

The last two pieces demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses in the volume. Khalidi and Samour are critical of the economic interests and practices they believe are damaging Palestine, and how general class stratification and elite economic interests are increasingly diverging from national and nationalist political interests that are based in shared Palestinian experiences of dispossession and occupation. On the other hand, Khan seems to emphasize coping under the present conditions. His critique of Oslo is devastating. He writes “the freedom to live in dignity is probably the most important freedom for a population under occupation, as well as for Palestinian refugees since the failure to recognize their right of return results in gradually delegitimizing all other initiatives over time.” Yet the narrow focus on combining political and economic analysis in support of rights and dignity makes it difficult to see structural issues; I would suggest that the structure of colonialism itself denies the possibility of dignity, and of politics. The most important freedom for Palestinians is the freedom from colonial occupation, without which dignity as Palestinians will be impossible.

Politics and economies are linked and inseparable, and it is difficult to identify phenomena like state building or development as either one or the other. The editors correctly describe the situation as bleak and their intervention as a radical one. But when they say their intervention is limited to the discipline, they limit its reach. An argument at a different scale, and with a more cumulative understanding of history, might include discussion of capital, practice, and ideology in a way that would not see capitalism as a new imposition—as though Palestine had been at some stage insulated from capitalism. We would instead see Palestine as a place and society that has long been dispossessed by and through settler colonial phenomena that are at once racist, geographic, economic, regional, and global—where the mechanisms for control are as much about labor within Israel, or development aid that allows the occupation to be outsourced to Palestinian elites, or actual class aspiration among Palestinians, or the problems that Palestinian and Israeli capitalists have in extracting ground rent in an unstable political situation. Even prior to colonization, Palestine is a place that has long been an unequal, unevenly developed part of the capitalist global political economy

Ultimately, Turner and Shweiki have made important contributions to the debate, and have done a great deal to demonstrate the ways that economics are punitive and how economic development is being denied to many Palestinians under occupation. Their volume can successfully work toward its goal of decolonizing many of the liberal, colonial assumptions that inflect development and political practice in Palestine. They have done a great deal to dismantle the implicit colonial notions that have segregated not only the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, the 1948 territories, and the diaspora, but the academic work on Palestine. Their book is an important node in ongoing debates that travel between the scales of affects of political economy and the structural questions of capitalism, capitalist society, modes of production, and geographies of capital. Together, these approaches will help to illuminate why the occupation looks like it does, and help us work towards ways out of this bleak situation.

New Texts Out Now: ABE Journal: Architecture Beyond Europe

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Jadaliyya (J): What made you start the journalArchitecture Beyond Europe, and who are the scholars involved in its editorial work?

Mercedes Volait (MV): Several related concerns prompted the launch of the journal in 2012. One is that modern architecture outside the West features poorly in the literature devoted to architectural history, and when it does surface, it is principally for the conspicuous global starchitecture of the last decades or for colonial icons, as if nothing else worth study had been built worldwide during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Another problem is the national or civilizational frames commonly used to analyze modernity. It is assumed that modernity is intrinsically Western, and reached non-Western settings through imperialism.

One lesson I gained from studying the rise of the architectural profession in modern Egypt for my PhD (1993) is that other factors, such as autochthonous aspirations to change and innovation, also paved the way to new architecture. It is time to reverse the lens and focus on the local production of modernity, rather than on its diffusion from the West. That is not to say that “indigenous modernities” grew in isolation: many Egyptian architects were educated in Europe, the US, or the Soviet Union and kept links with their places of training. They joined regional or international professional networks, were exposed to Turkish or Brazilian modernism, and eventually worked out of Egypt or in partnership with non-Egyptian associates. The challenge is to apprehend the diverse, multi-directional, transnational dynamics and conditions that made architecture modern anywhere, and the variety of connections.

One way to achieve this is to provide a specialized forum promoting scholarly exchange and collaborative research. The architectural historians (all based in Europe) involved in the editorial and advisory boards of the journal are all engaged in transnational studies, whether their interest lies in the exile, travel, and migration of architects, the internationalization of building culture, the imperial expansion, postcolonial nation-building processes, the role of international organizations, the architecture of diplomacy, or the intercontinental flux of ideas and concepts. There is still much to excavate on such topics.

J: What particular topics, issues, and areas does the journal address?

MV: Content-wise, the primary interest of the journal is to encourage a historical approach to the interconnected nature of architectural production and practice, broadly understood, through the study of phenomena and situations that cut across national or cultural lines. The core of the journal is a guest-edited section including three to five articles on a given topic, but ABE also welcomes stand-alone articles. Topics addressed so far range from the exportation of Scottish cast iron to Argentina in the nineteenth century to an Indian journal advocating Western modernism on the eve of independence, or the convoluted routes of a hotel design from Montenegro to Iraq during the Cold War.

The emphasis on history explains why the journal has a permanent rubric, entitled “Documents/Sources,” which is specifically devoted to presenting primary material relevant to the journal’s fields of interest, in an effort to point out unknown sources or ways of reading them. Other regular rubrics are “Dissertation Abstracts” and “Book Reviews,” in order to keep pace with new research and increase the circulation of knowledge among the scholarly community concerned.

An important goal of the journal is to complexify our understanding of the forces (including power) that shape architecture and to foment debate among a plurality of academic perspectives. Hence the Debate section, currently guest-edited by Mark Crinson of the University of Manchester, but also the multilingual policy defended by the journal, in order to offer visibility to European research and in return to expose it to other scholarly traditions. Languages of publication are currently English, French, or Italian, but we do hope to be able to include others in the future, for example Spanish or German. In any case, abstracts and keywords are all made available in five languages (French, English, German, Italian, and Spanish).

The concern for outreach led us to publish the journal, with immediate full-text access to its content, on Revues.org, the journals’ platform of OpenEdition (a comprehensive digital publishing infrastructure whose objective is to promote research in the humanities and social sciences) that receives an average of 2.8 million visits per month. Revues.org is supported by prestigious French research organizations and has a critical mass ensuring long-term sustainability. The journal was accepted by Revues.org after an international peer-review process.

J: How does ABE Journal connect to and/or depart from other journals in architecture and urban studies?

MV: ABE Journal connects to other journals of architecture by its historical approach to the making of the built environment, but departs, institutionally speaking, from most of them because it does not emanate from a learned society (like Architectural histories, JSAH, or Histoire urbaine,among others), nor is it linked to heritage-making (for example, the journal InSitu), but originates from scientific research. This allows the journal to work without charging an Article Processing Charge (APC) to authors, or subscriptions to libraries.

Its specific focus on architecture outside the West considered in a transnational perspective also makes the journal unique. There are other journals interested in non-Western architecture, such as the International Journal of Islamic Architecture, but none interested in connecting a variety of world regions.

J: How does ABE Journal, as a non-area studies journal, contribute to renewing architecture and urban studies in the Middle East?

MV: The transnational perspective of the journal allows highlighting, or delving into, aspects of Middle Eastern architecture that would be hardly perceptible or attainable to the area specialist. The making of the Babylon Hotel in Baghdad (1969-82, Edvard Ravnikar, Majda Kregar, Edo Ravnikar Jr., and Miha Kerin, architects), already mentioned above, is a good example of the measure of transnational knowledge (and plurilingual skills) required to properly uncover its full story, from a resort in Eastern Europe to a major site of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this case, a good number of the sources documenting the building lie not in Iraq, but in Ljubljana and Belgrade, among other places. It reveals the crucial involvement of socialist networks in the making of the modern Middle East.

Even during the colonial era, the range of actors involved in the production of architecture was larger than commonly imagined. This is suggested, for instance, by the building activity of an association created in 1886 to assist Italian missions abroad that became a major builder in Egypt and North Africa during the interwar years, promoting a type of “Mediterranean” architecture that distinguished itself from the official architecture produced by British or French colonial powers.

Finally, much insight can be gained by discussing Middle Eastern projects in relation to similar constructions elsewhere, as in the case of the tourism development projects designed for Egypt from the 1960s to the 1980s by architect Hassan Fathy after surveying resort architecture in Tunisia or France—a little-known aspect of the work of the famous advocate of modern vernacular.

Interested readers can consult the geographical index to have an overview of all North Africa and Middle East-related materials published in the journal.

J: Who do you hope will follow the journal, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MV: I would like the journal to encourage young researchers to embark on the serious study of architecture beyond Europe, and confirmed ones to devote more attention to other geographies than the established ones (that is, the Atlantic world). There is so much to discover out there! I assume indeed that ABE’s readership can extend beyond those with an interest in architecture, as the issues tackled through architecture have a larger relevance, particularly in the interconnected and allegedly global world of today. Gaining background and perspective on global integration through the material culture of architecture can be thought-provoking and instructive.

Excerpt fromABE Journal: Architecture Beyond Europe

From Łukasz Stanek, “Socialist Networks and the Internationalization of Building Culture after 1945,” published in ABE Journal,Issue 6 (2014)

In 1968 the Parisian journal Opus International published on its cover an image of two mirrored supermen, differing only by the acronyms on their chest: that of the United States and that of the Soviet Union (fig. 1). Designed by the Polish artist Roman Cieślewicz, this poster, it has been noted, made the two powers appear as twins, accused them of exercising a destructive influence on the rest of the world, and suggested the impossibility, or futility, of choosing between them.[1]


[Figure 1: Supermen, poster by Roman Cieslewicz, Paris, 1968.]

However, in another way, the use of an essentially American icon suggested a fundamental asymmetry, as if the only visual language in which the conflict could be expressed was provided by just one of its sides. As is well known, the claim about the symmetry between the US and the Soviet Union was part of the Cold War discourse,[2] and it helped the “superpowers” to discipline their populations and their allies, with, for example, the CIA’s Handbook of Economic Statistics consistently overestimating the size of the Soviet economy. Yet it was precisely the economy where the American preponderance was most evident. As economic historians have shown, Cold War rivalries were articulated within a global system of financial and commercial exchange by and large defined by the United States and the former colonial powers in Western Europe, to which the Soviet Union and its allies could hardly present a viable alternative.[3]

It is this entanglement of politics and economy that conditioned the work of architects, planners, and engineers from socialist countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—the topic of three papers in this issue of ABE. Rather than discussing singular events that seemingly confirmed the symmetrical images of the “Global Cold War,”[4] the three authors look at longer engagements of architects and planners in what was at that time called the “Third World.” Christina Schwenkel studies the transformation of the city of Vinh in central Vietnam, to which architects from socialist countries contributed in two phases, during the wars of independence against France and the United States. Vladimir Kulić shows how a blueprint of a hotel, originally designed in the early 1970s for the Adriatic coast of socialist Yugoslavia, was built in Baghdad a decade later, to be operated by the Indian luxury chain Oberoi. Alicja Gzowska discusses the reconstruction, restoration, and conservation of buildings in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia by the Polish State Workshops for Conservation of Cultural Heritage (PKZ) from the 1960s until the end of the Cold War.

Together with a small, but growing, body of literature on the work of architects from socialist countries abroad,[5] this issue contributes to the larger debate on the mobility of models, people, images, affects, and norms in twentieth-century architecture, which the recent issues of ABE significantly advanced. The focus on socialist countries extends the discussion about the networks that facilitated the acceleration of this mobility after World War II, including colonial institutions and their postcolonial mutations; economic globalization; international organizations such as the UN, UNESCO, and the institutions of the emerging EU; professional organizations such as the UIA, as well as technical assistance programs of Israel and Scandinavian countries.[6]

NOTES

[1] David Crowley, Posters of the Cold War, London: V&A, 2008, p. 50.

[2] Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.

[3] Oscar Sanchez Sibony, “Capitalism’s Fellow Traveler: The Soviet Union, Bretton Woods, and the Cold War,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 56, no. 2, 2014, p. 290–319.

[4] Westad, Global Cold War, op. cit. (note 2).

[5] See the papers in Łukasz Stanek and Tom Avermaete (eds.), “Cold War Transfer: Architecture and Planning from Socialist Countries in the 'Third World',” theme issue of The Journal of Architecture vol. 17, no. 3, June 2012. For bibliography, see Stephen Ward, “Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World,” inPatsey Healey and Robert Upton (eds.), Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices, London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2010 (RTPI Library series, 19), p. 47–72; and Łukasz Stanek, “Second World’s Architecture and Planning in the Third World,” The Journal of Architecture, vol. 17, no. 3, June 2012, p. 299–307. See also Taoufik Souami and Eric Verdeil (eds.), Concevoir et gérer les villes: milieux d’urbanistes du sud de la Méditerranée, Paris: Economica; Anthropos, 2006 (Villes); Péter Borbás, “A vidék építésze. Értekezés a vidéki építészetről Reischl Gábor munkái kapcsán,” PhD dissertation, Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design, Budapest, 2014; Jennifer Czysz, “Urban Design as a Tool for Re-imaging a Capital City: Planning Conakry, Guinea after Independence,” MA dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2001; Yasser Elsheshtawy, “City interrupted: modernity and architecture in Nasser’s post-1952 Cairo,” Planning Perspectives, vol. 28, no. 3, 2012, p. 1–25; Ákos Moravánszky, “Charles Polónyi and the Art of Sailing with the Wind,” inŁukasz Stanek (ed.), Team 10 East. Revisionist Architecture in Real Existing Modernism, Warsaw: Museum of Modern Art, 2014, p. 34–63; Christina Schwenkel, “Traveling architecture: East German urban designs abroad,” International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity vol. 2, no. 2, 2014, p. 155–74. Accessed 20 January 2015; Łukasz Stanek, Postmodernism is almost all right. Polish architecture after socialist globalization, Warsaw: Fundacja Bęc-Zmiana, 2012; Łukasz Stanek, “Accra, Warsaw, and socialist globalization,” in Benno Albrecht (ed.), Africa. Big change, big chance, Exhibition Catalogue (Milan, Triennale di Milano, 15 october–28 december 2014), Bologna: Editrice Compositori, 2014, p. 162–4; Łukasz Stanek, “Architects from socialist countries in Ghana (1957–1967): Architecture and mondialization,” forthcoming in December 2015 in The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians; Łukasz Stanek, “Architectural globalization in the late Cold War: Techno-cultural transfers between socialist Poland and Kuwait,” forthcoming in 2015 in the International Journal of Islamic Architecture. See also the forthcoming publications by Andreas Butter (presentation with Christoph Bernhardt, “Networking across the iron curtain, competing for the Global South: The International Union of Architects (UIA) and the export of East-German socialist architecture to the Global South (1949–1989)” at the conference “Alternative Encounters: The ‘Second World’ and the ‘Global South’, 1945–1991,” Jena, 3–4 November 2014 ) and Nikolai Brandes (presentation “Concrete utopia. Mozambican housing schemes between cooperative colonialism and afro-socialism,” at the 5th European Conference on African Studies, Lisbon, 27–29 June 2013).

[6] For an updated overview and bibliography, see Johan Lagae and Kim De Raedt, “Editorial,” ABE Journal, no. 4, 2014, theme issue Global Experts “Off Radar.” Accessed 03 June 2015; recent contributions to this debate include Benno Albrecht (ed.), Africa. Big change, big chance, op. cit. (note 5); Luce Beeckmans, “The adventures of the French architect Michel Ecochard in postindependence Dakar: A transnational development expert drifting between commitment and expediency,” The Journal of Architecture, vol. 19, no. 6, 2014, p. 849–71; Kim De Raedt, “Between ‘true believers’ and operational experts: UNESCO architects and school building in post-colonial Africa,” The Journal of Architecture, vol. 19, no. 1, 2014, p. 19–42; Neta Feniger and Rachel Kallus, “Building a ‘new Middle East’: Israeli architects in Iran in the 1970s,” The Journal of Architecture, vol. 18, no. 3, 2013, p. 381–401; Regina Göckede, “Spätkoloniale Moderne – Vergleichende Studien zur Globalisierung der Architekturmoderne,” ongoing habilitation project at the Technische Universität Cottbus; Rachel Lee, “An architectural link between Masala Dosas and war. The unlikely potentials of Otto Koenigsberger’s shrinking heritage,” ABE Journal, no. 3, 2013, theme issue Colonial Today. Accessed 03 June 2015; Rachel Lee, “Negotiating modernities: Otto Koenigsberger’s works and network in exile (1933–1951),” ABE Journal, no. 5, 2014. Accessed 03 June 2015; Tim Livsey, “‘Suitable lodgings for students’: Modern space, colonial development and decolonization in Nigeria,” Urban History, vol. 41, no. 4, November 2014, p. 664–85; Itohan Osayimwese and David Rifkind (eds.), “Building modern Africa,” theme issue of The Journal of Architectural Education, vol. 68, no. 2, October 2014; Peter Scriver and Amit Srivastava, “Building a new university in Cold War Australia: The Colombo Plan and architecture at UNSW in the 1950s and 60s,” in Antony Moulis and Deborah van der Plaat (eds.), Audience: 28th Annual conference of the Society of Architectural Historians, Australia and New Zealand, Brisbane: SAHANZ, 2011. Recent exhibitions include: “Forms of freedom. African independence and Nordic models,” The Nordic Pavilion, Venice, 7 June–23 November 2014; “Africa. Big change, big chance,” Triennale di Milano, 15 October–28 December 2014, Milan, Italy; “Architecture of independence: African modernism,” Vitra Design Museum, Weil am Rhein, Germany, 20 February–31 May 2015.

[Excerpted from ABE Journal,Issue 6 (2014), by permission of the editors. For more information on the journal, or to access an archive of issues, click here.]

Cities Media Roundup (September 2015)

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[This is a monthly roundup of news articles, and other materials related to urban issues in the region, and beyond. It does not reflect the views of the Cities Page Editors or of Jadaliyya. You may send recommendations for inclusion in the Cities Media Roundup to cities@jadaliyya.com, mentioning "Roundup" in the subject line. We also welcome your submissions to the Cities Page: please check details on cities.jadaliyya.com]
 

Urban and Real Estate Development

The Construction of Mecca and Its Effects [in French]
Slimane Zeghidour writes in Orient XXI about the changes and developments which have disfigured Mecca over the years, as well as plans for the future.

Changing Meanings of Pilgrimage to Mecca
In Books and Ideas, Sylvia Chiffoleau compares contemporary pilgrimage to Mecca to its past form, and how it has been transformed through real-estate development to legitimize the power of the Saudi rulers.

The Geopolitics of the Salman Canal [in Arabic]
An-Nahar reports that Saudi Arabia is planning to construct a channel between the Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, and considers the potential implications on the war in Yemen.

Property Regulations in Post-Revolutionary Alexandria
Matthew Priest, writing in Esquire Middle East, raises the alarm about the increasing rate of demolitions taking place in Alexandria in the wake of the reduction in building regulations following the Mubarak regime’s collapse.


Local and Regional Policies  

A Spatial Analysis of Access to Public Schools in Greater Cairo
A study in Tadamun reports on the severe shortage of accessible public education for those in informal settlements, questioning the achievements of the Egyptian government’s so-called “education decade” (1990-2005). 

The Egyptian Census and Informal Settlements [in Arabic]
Sarah Sabry argues in al-Shorouk that the upcoming Egyptian national census of 2016 could be an opportunity to revise and expand our understanding of informal settlements.

Women-Only Taxis in Cairo
Al-Ahram reports on a new fleet of pink taxis reserved for women, considering their likely impact on public safety and women’s employment.

Environmental Conservation in Lebanon
Middle East Eye covers the Lebanese Water Festival, a sports event taking place in the Palm Island natural reserve off the coast of Tripoli, whose organizers hope it may lead to increased environmental and conservation awareness. 

Closure of Water Plants in Lebanon [in French]
LOrient Le Jour reports about the imminent closure of six hundred facilities supplying fresh water to Lebanon.
 

War and Cities

Forthcoming Israeli Demolitions in Palestine
The Guardian discusses a recent UN report on Israeli demolitions of Palestinian properties in the occupied West Bank as a way of taking control of Arab lands. 

Informal Syrian Refugee Settlements in the Lebanese Chouf
Richard Hall’s article in Global Post profiles the experiences of Ketermaya, a village in the Chouf Mountains which has taken in more Syrian refugees than the United States, describing the infrastructural challenges surrounding the crisis.

Diminishing Expectations in the Zaatari Refugee Camp
Writing for the New York Times, Jodi Rudoren puts the influx of refugees to Europe and West into perspective, reporting that the inhabitants of the Zaatari camp in Jordan are now beginning to consider that they will be there permanently.

An Interview with a Syrian Truck Driver
Mehmet Akif Ersoy, writing in Al Monitor, discusses the experiences of truck drivers who bring goods across the Syrian frontlines, and interviews one of them.

Questioning the Depoliticization of Refugee Camps
Alex Mahoudeau reflects for Les carnets de lIFPO on the so-called depoliticization of NGO’s practices in the context of Palestinian refugee camps of Beirut, and how they are challenging traditional partisan structures.

Why is Russia in Latakia
Fabrice Balanche discusses in this policy brief for The Washington Institute why Latakia is Syria’s Achille’s heel combining a spatial and political analysis, illustrated by maps.
 

Urban Heritage, Past and Present

The Crisis of Algiers’ Old City
Mélanie Matarese writes for Middle East Eye about the coming collapse of the Algiers casbah, and how its remaining residents are coping.

The History of the Egyptian Museum’s Collection [in Arabic]
Al-Shorouk covers the history of the Egyptian Museum and the artefacts it displays, with a particular focus on the institutions which housed the pieces before the Museum’s inauguration in 1902. 

Excavations in Sidon Continue to Yield Treasures [in French]
May Makarem’s article in LOrient Le Jour discusses the British Museum’s ongoing archeological discoveries in Sidon, which have revealed artefacts from a number of ages and civilizations.

Iconic Egyptian Revolution Graffiti Wall Demolished
Ahram Online reports on the destruction of the graffiti wall along Mohamed Mahmoud Street in Cairo as a result of an American University of Cairo (AUC) renovation plan.


Local Resistance and Urban Protest: Lebanon’s #YouStink 

The “#YouStink” Protests in Context [in Arabic]
Al-Modon talks to the activist Paul Achkar about the protests in Lebanon, discussing the regional and social groups of which it is composed, and relating the movement to similar phenomena in Spain, Portugal, and elsewhere.

#YouStink Protest Claims back Beirut’s Coast
This article in Beirut Report covers public attempts to reclaim the seafront from unlawful construction projects, illustrating this with a number of photographs and videos taken from the recent #YoutStink action 

What Next For Lebanon?
Chatham House features this short article by Nadim Shehadi, which explores the possible futures of the #YouStink movement and the difficulty it will face in remaining non-sectarian.

The Aims of Protest in Lebanon [in French]
IFPO researcher Nicolas Dot-Pouillard writes about #YouStink for Orient XXI and asks whether such a heterogeneous protest movement will be able to keep its aims in sight. 

Possible Drifts of Beirut’s Protests [in French]
Karim Emile Bitar, political analyst at IRIS in Paris, discusses the popular revolt in Beirut, its good side and what he sees as possible drifts.
 

Featured Resources

Book Review: Istanbul 2023[in French]
Fabien Jeannier reviews Yoann Morvan’s book Istanbul 2023, which was previously reviewed on Jadaliyya.

Conference: Focus On Tangiers: Where African and Europe Meet [in French]
Hosted by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, this conference takes place from the 2-3 October 2015 in Tangiers.

CFP: Urban Challenges at Territorial Borders
A call for papers for a panel entitled “Cities at Maritime Straits in the Middle East and the Mediterranean: Urban Challenges at Territorial Borders” at the 15th Border Regions in Transition Conference, which takes place in Hamburg and Sønderborg between 17 and 20 May 2016. Deadline: 1 November 2015. 

Video: The Re-Opening of Horsh Beirut [in Arabic]
This video, posted by Legal Agenda, covers the re-opening of one of Beirut’s largest green public spaces and explains its historic and social importance to the city. 

Paper: Mapping Lebanese Political Control over the Banking Sector
This seminar paper by Jad Chaaban provides an overview of an ongoing study which aims to reveal the connections between the Lebanese banking sector, and the ruling classes. 

Project: A New River for Beirut
Rayan Majed writes for Now Media about the possibility of transforming Beirut’s river, both to provide green spaces in the city, and to improve water distribution and sustainability.


Recently on Jadaliyya Cities
 

What Do we Talk About When We Talk about Political Economy?
Kareem Rabie reviews Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki’s edited volume Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-Development and Beyond (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 

The Arab Center for Architecture (ACA): An Interview with George Arbid
Deen Sharp interviews George Arbid, one of the co-founder of the Arab Center for Architecture, based in Beirut, discussing ACA’s mission, objectives, ongoing initiatives and futures projects. 

Table Ronde: Observer la ville du Monde Arabe
This report features the video of the roundtable held at the Institut du Monde Arabe (Paris) in June 2015, during which several urban geographers including Jadaliyya Cities co-editor Eric Verdeil discussed the important roles played by transnational French urban research centers.

The Mayor of the One Percent
Mona Fawaz and Mona Harb write on the limited conception of the role of the mayor by Beirut’s mayor Dr. Bilal Hamad, arguing for a more pro-active role of the municipality in the public affairs of the city, away from the private interests of the few.

You Have, We Have
Jana Traboulsi illustrates the numerous claims made by Lebanese protestors in this series of posters, demanding rights to the city’s public spaces and to reliable urban services.

سَلَميّة، أمُّ القاهرة 
Abdallah Wannous writes about Salamiyya (Syria), recounting its past rich cultural legacies, and its current dismay, in the light of war and people's displacement.

قمامة لبنان من الفساد إلى صفر- نفايات: مقابلة للوضع بين زياد أبي شاكر ورانية المصري 
Rania Masri interviews Ziad AbiChaker for Status. AbiChaker is an environmental engineer who has elaborated several policies for solving the garbage crisis in Lebanon and reaching zero waste, by relying on decentralizing waste management to municipalities and equipping them with the proper resources to facilitate recycling and reducing waste.

We Are, You are
Jana Traboulsi illustrates the slogans utilized by Lebanese protestors in this series of posters reflecting on the city and its commons.

The Property Regime: Mecca and the Politics of Redevelopment in Saudi Arabia
Rosie Bsheer analyzes how Al Saud monarchy managed its monopoly on power and economic resources, using land speculation and the development of real estate schemes in Mecca and Riyadh.

Garbage Crisis Exposes Arrogance and Conflict Among the Political Elite of Lebanon
Sami Atallah examines the garbage crisis in Lebanon in relation to the internal conflict among the political elites of Lebanon.

Place as Provisional: Site-Specific Art Commissions in Sharjah
Caitlin Woolsey examines the site-specific art commissioned by the Sharjah Art Foundation, reflecting on the meanings and politics of place, authenticity, and specificity. 

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